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INTRODUCTION
Since the Enlightenment, religious epistemology has been the focus
of much debate among the theologians and philosophers. Through most
of church history. Scripture and dogma had been looked upon as the
final sources of truth and revelation. With modern philosophy gradually
establishing itself as autonomous from such authorities, it raised key
questions concerning the traditional idea of revelation. To be sure,
these questions have been raised throughout church history. Yet it has
been in the past three centuries under the impact of modern thought that
such an acute emphasis has been placed upon religious epistemology.
With the eccelesiastical authority of the Church called into question and
the supernatural inspiration of Scripture largely rejected, the traditional
idea of revelation seemed to be precluded. How then could God be known?
Could reason be trusted? Could one rely upon personal experience or
ethics as a means of knowing God? These questions confronted the
"enlightened person".
These critical concerns of enlightened thought brought about a
reformation of religious epistemology. Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard
were pivotal in the recasting of traditional thought. Their analyses
of the issues and synthetic works are significant sources for contem
porary thinking in religious epistemology.
Kant inaugurated a heightened espistemological consciousness in
philosophical theology. He divorced religious belief from pure reason,
i.e., consciousness of morality and ethics, which are mere inferences
Carl E. Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, New Directions in
Theology Today, Vol. II (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), p. 12.
1
2growing out of the practical use of pure reason. This effectively
places theology beyond the reach of pure knowledge and roots it in
the faculty of moral intiution. This is not to say that one cannot
think about theology but that religious belief is rooted in one's moral
awareness which is a given. Kant reasons that this a priori moral
awareness exists within every person.
Separating knowledge from religious belief precludes the possibility
of history serving as a means of revelation since history is deistically
enclosed within the realm of the finite and excludes the realm of the
infinite. Historical revelation necessitates a unity between knowledge
and belief. Therefore Kantian epistemology creates a problem for
philosophers and theologians who wish to set forth history as the
arena of divine revelation.
Hegel reacted against Kant's separation of knowledge and faith.
He asserts that all aspects of reality are open to rational inquiry
including metaphysics. Consequently, Hegel brings faith into close
association with knowledge. Based upon this unity of faith and knowl
edge he posits that God has revealed himself in history. If one is to
have knowledge of God, then one must critically examine history. For
Hegel, reason serves as the means of perceiving divine revelation.
Knowledge is the road from the finite to the infinite.
Kierkegaard's epistemological stand is in some ways akin to Kantian
thought in that both men assert that one cannot "leap outside the
confines" of one's finite existence. Kierkegaard declares, "I am only a
poor existing human being, not competent to contemplate the eternal
Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1980), p. 27-
3either eternally or theocentrically, but compelled to content myself with
existing." Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard does not rely upon a universal a
priori moral consciousness. He views humanity as having little aware
ness of God unless God initiates revelation to an individual on a personal
level .
Kierkegaard viewed Hegel's attempt to transcend the finite as a
total failure. Admittedly, much of Kierkegaard's assault upon Hegel
was based upon a caricature of Hegel. Yet Hegel did, from a logical
point of view, fail to come to full appreciation of the difference between
essence and existence.^ Hegel's union of the finite with the infinite
occurs only essentially but not existentially .
Kierkegaard greatly influences twentieth century religious episte
mology especially through the writing of Martin Heidegger. The effect
of his existentialist epistemology cripples the faculty of reason to appre
hend revelation from the standpoint of critical history. In light of
existentialist thought, historical events are, by definition, nonexistent.
Existence is present, "the now". Thus, to speak in terms of past or
future events is to speak of things beyond existence. To be sure,
past events can affect the present. Past events can and should be
studied. However, past events can never serve as the focus of reve
lation. For God to reveal himself in existence is to reveal himself
Sfziren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans.
David F- Swenson and Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University,
1941), p. 190.
"^Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason, (New
York: Schribner's Sons, 1957), p. 134.
4in the present. Belief in God emerges only from the existential moment
of the divine encounter. Historical knowledge is altogether irrelevant
for Kierkegaard.
Instead of past events being identified with revelation, revelation
becomes the source of interpreting Biblical events. This effectively
divides history and faith. Every Biblical event, then, is split between
the historical facts and its spiritual significance. The factual aspect of
history does not exist, yet the spiritual aspect does because it contains
truths which are significant for the present. Nevertheless, the spirit
ual side of history is always interpreted through the present religious
experience based upon an existentialist idea of revelation.
Pannenberg addresses twentieth century existentialist epistemology.
His approach to religious knowledge is similar to Hegel's approach in
that he does not allow for an absolute separation of knowledge and faith
as did Kant and Kierkegaard. Pannenberg stands in contrast to Hegel
by maintaining that the absolute unity of knowledge and faith comes at
the end of history. Hegel maintains that total unity of the two can be
a present reality.
In contrast to modern existentialism as well as to Kant and Kierke
gaard, Pannenberg proposes that the focus of divine revelation is
history. He presupposes the idea of truth as a unity of event and
significance. Therefore, Pannenberg does not permit any compartment
alizing of truth, e.g., religious truth as opposed to historical truth.
This thesis will review the basic epistemologies of Kant, Hegel,
and Kierkegaard as they relate to the problem of revelation and history,
noting particularly how they influenced each other. Then, the recent
response to the problem of religious epistemology as it has been developed
5in the synthetic worl< of Pannenberg will be examined. Particular
attention will be given to analyzing the influence which Kant, Hegel,
and Kierkegaard have had upon Pannenberg's theological development.
PART ONE
THREE PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEM OF REVELATION AND KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER ONE
KANT
Kant and Hume
In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant attempts to establish the
validity of knowledge and the impossibility of traditional metaphysics.
It will be seen that his epistemology of the phenomenal casts a pro
nounced shadow over metaphysics.
Kant's agenda for addressing the issue of epistemology was
influenced by David Hume's empiricism. He writes: "I freely confess
that it was the thought of David Hume which many years ago first
interrupted my dogmatic slumbers and gave an entirely new direction
1
to my inquiries in the field of speculative philosophy." Hume's type
of empiricism logically led him to skepticism.
Both Kant and Hume contend that the bases for observation is
through our five senses. One is acted upon by external stimuli.
Hume, however, maintains not only that sense stimuli are the source
of all knowledge, but that all knowledge is reduced to sense impres
sions and nothing more. This idea has interesting consequences.
Take Hume's classic example of billiard balls. One can observe
a billiard ball striking another billiard ball. Consequently the second
Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,
trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961),
p. 44.
7
8ball moves. The only valid observation one can make is one ball struck
the second ball and the second ball moved. Did the first ball cause the
second ball to move? This, according to Hume, one could not know as
a matter of fact but only as a mere inference. At best one can say one
billiard ball seems to have an effect on the second ball. There is no
discernable power which produces effect. All one observes in the
billiard balls moving are temporal sequences. Because of Hume's postu
late that all knowledge must come via sense impressions, the law of
cause and effect cannot be known as objective reality but only inferred,
based upon the observation of temporal succession. The concept of
cause and effect is therefore defined by means of the concept of temp-
2
oral succession. The implications of this view of reality on the sciences
are enormous.
A second outgrowth of Humean empiricism is a skepticism of any
thing which is beyond sensory impressions. An object is the sum of its
physical properties. But this in itself is problematic. Can one use the
category of "property" in Humean empiricism? Logically no, because to
speak of "property" is to speak of a "thing" which possesses the pro
perty. It is the existence of this "thing" which Hume doubts because
all there is to reality so far as one can know is a series of impressions.
The end result of Hume's epistemology is a denial of knowledge
and the collapse of those concepts one traditionally employs in order to
3
speak about and to understand reality. Oddly enough, if Humean
Justus Hartnack, Kant's Theory of Knowledge, trans. M.
Homes Hartshorne (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1967),
p. 8.
^Ibid., p. 10
9empiricism is true, then there is no knowledge and if there is no knowl
edge wherein lies the validity of Hume's epistemology? "If there is
knowledge, then Humean empiricism is false. ""^
Kant found himself with the task of answering Hume. In some
measure the integrity of the sciences was at stake. Kant deals with
the matter in his first critique. The key question is: "What and how
5much can understanding and reason know apart from all experience?"
The answer to this question lies in Kant's three types of judgment,
analytic - a priori, synthetic - a posteriori, and synthetic - a priori .
Kant and Hume agreed on the validity of the first two types of judg
ment. They also agreed that analytical judgment gave no knowledge
of reality. They are only expressions for an analysis of the concept
g
of subject. Synthetic judgment deals with sense data. The category
of synthetic - a priori judgment serves in Kantian thought as the
hinge pin of his epistemology and this is the point at which Hume and
Kant part ways.
Kant's a priori
Kant rejects the notion that all our concepts are derived from exper
ience as Locke's theory holds. Nor does Kant maintain the notion of innate
ideas. He believes there to be concepts and principles which the reason
derives from within itself on the occasion of experience.'' Thus, a child is
not born with a sense of causality. But on the occasion of experience, its
^Ibid.
^Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VI,
Wolf to Kant (Westminster: Newman Press, 1964), p. 213.
^Hartnack, p. 12. '^Copleston, p. 212.
10
reason derives tine concept from within itself. Its a priori-ness grows
out of the fact that the concept is not derived from experience but is
applied to and, in a sense, governs experience. Therefore, a priori
o
concepts are grounded in the mind's own structure. This concept or
type of judgment is empty of all empirical content or material. There
exists knowledge which does not arise out of experience but yet is
synthetic. Kant writes: "That all our knowledge begins with experience
there can be no doubt . . . but though all knowledge begins with ex-
q
periences, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience."
Before understanding the nature of synthetic a priori judgments,
one must first understand what Kant means by analytical a priori and
synthetical a posteriori judgments. Analytic judgments are those in
which the predicate is contained, at least implicitly, in the concept of
10the subject. They are said to be "explicative judgments" because
the predicate does not add to the concept of the subject anything which
is not already contained in it explicitly or implicitly. The veracity of
11
analytical judgments depends upon the law of noncontradition.
Synthetic judgments affirm or deny of a subject, a predicate which is
not contained in the concept of the subject. Kant calls them "ampliative"
12
or "augmentative judgments" because they add something to the con-
13
cept of the subject.
Kant describes two types of synthetical judgment as earlier noted,
synthetic a posteriori and synthetic a priori. In all synthetic judgments
Ibid, p. 213. ^Kant, p. 41. "'Ibid., p. 48.
^Copleston, p. 219. ^^Kant, p. 48
^Copleston, p. 219.
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a connection exists between the subject and predicate. With synthetic
a posteriori judgments the predicate cannot be analytically deduced from
the subject. Take the proposition, "All seminary students are tall."
This is synthetic in that the predicate "tall" adds a quality to the
subject "seminary students." It is a posteriori because only after one
examines empirically all seminary students can one posit the stated
proposition .
In defining a synthetic a priori, Kant considers this proposition.
14
"Everything which happens has a cause." For Kant the relation
ship of the predicate "having a cause" is not an explicative judgment;
but at the same time it is a priori . It is characterized by necessity
and strict universality which is a mark of a priori judgments. This
proposition is not saying "cause and effect" is deduced empirically
as if there were only a high probability of events having causes based
upon experimentation. In Kant's mind the proposition is absolute. One
15
knows in advance, a priori, that everything must have a cause.
An important note is that in Kantian thought there can be no
absolute certainty that effect "b" is a result of cause "a." The
measure of certainty that "a" caused "b" must be determined empirically.
But the idea that there exists a particular cause for "b" is absolute.
At this point Kant epistemologically lays a firm foundation for the
validity of the sciences. If Kant's hypothesis can be accepted, the
problem of relating empirical elements and rational elements in knowledge
will be solved. All knowledge beings with experience but does not
Kant, p. 50. Copleston, p. 222.
12
1 fi
arise out of experience. If Kant is correct, then all knowledge
contains elements that are not drawn from experience but supplied by
17
the mind itself. This is crucial to the Kantian system.
The main objective of Critique of Pure Reason is to prove the
validity of synthetic a priori judgments. The volume is subdivided into
three sections, the "Transcendental Aesthetic," where Kant addresses
synthetic judgments in mathematics, the "Transcendental Analytic," where
synthetic a priori judgments are examined in physics and the "Trans
cendental Dialectic," where he deals with synthetic a priori judgments
in metaphysics.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to critique Kant's proof for
synthetic a prior* judgments in a detailed and systematic fashion. But
a brief overview of -the various synthetic a priori categories existing
within the mind is essential to this study.
Transcendental Aesthetic
In the "Transcendental Aesthetic," Kant explains how synthetic a
priori judgments are made. The key to Kant's argumentation is his con
cept of space and time. In defining space Kant sets forth four points
of analysis.
First, "Space is not an empirical caoncept derived from external
experience. "^^ In fact, space is a presupposition for being able to
''^Kant, p. 41.
^'^W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 2nd rev. ed.
Vol. VI, Kant and the Nineteenth Century, (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1975), p. 26.
^^Hartnack, p. 18.
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observe at all. Space cannot be the object of observation, but rather
it is a necessary condition for the universally valid and necessary truth
that things must be found in space.
Second, "Space is a necessary, a priori representation that under-
19lies all outer intuitions." One cannot imagine that there is no space.
Kant is not talking about a psychological deficiency as though if one
were another type of being one could imagine the absence of space.
The problem is a logical one. The thought of spacelessness is logically
absurd.
Third, "Space is not a discursive concept, but a pure (i.e., a
20priori) intuition." In other words, space is not something one thinks
quantitatively. One cannot think of two spaces side by side but,
instead, one space split into fractions. Space is not constituted by
portions of space. Space simply is space.
21
Fourth, "Space is not a concept but an a priori intuition." A
concept can have many instances. There are many instances of books
but only one concept of book. In other words, a concept can be demon
strated by separate instances of that concept. Such is not the case
with space. One cannot speak in terms of a particular instance of
space. Space is not a concept but an intuition. Thus, in order to do
geometry one must possess the intuition of space and, according to
Kant, everyone has that intuition.
Kant sets forth four points of analysis concerning time. 1) Time
is not an empirical concept. 2) Time is a necessary idea. 3) Time
19'^Ibid. Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 25.
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is not a discursive concept but an a priori intuition. 4) Time is not
formed by the additions of units of time, i.e., it is not a concept but
parallel to Kant's treatment of space; therefore, this writer shall not
expound upon it.
Kant's section, "Transcendental Analytic," is long and extremely
complex, but an overview is needed. This writer shall briefly point out
key concepts and categories expounded upon in his critique.
For Kant human knowledge arises out of two sources in the mind.
The first is the faculty of receiving impressions. One's sense intuition
provides one with data. Second, thinking is a source of knowledge,
that is to say, one must understand cognitively that which one receives
23
through senses. Both are needed to have real knowledge. Kant
writes:
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and with
out the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts
without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are
blind .... These two powers or faculties cannot exchange
their functions. The understanding is incapable of intuiting,
and the senses are incapable of thinking. It is only fronruthe
united co-operation of the two that knowledge can arise."
Kant was the first philosopher to formulate unambiguously the
interaction of sense data and an a priori structural or relational faculty.'
This distinction strikes a compromise between the empiricist and the
rationalist. Knowledge, in Kant's thinking, is not an either/or
intuition . 22 The argumentation of these four points of analysis runs
Transcendental Analytic
22
Ibid., p. 25ff.
23
Copleston, p. 247.
24
Kant, p. 92.
25
Jones, p. 34.
15
proposition concerning subject and object. Instead, one has real
interaction between subject (which supplies the concepts) and object
(which is the source of sense data) resulting in knowledge.
An important faculty in Kant's thought is that of judgment. He
writes:
We can reduce all operations of the understanding to judg
ments, so that the understanding can be represented as the
power of judging. For it is^gccording to what has been said
above, a power of thinking.
For Kant the power of thought and judging are the same. In
judging, one unifies different representations to form one cognition by
27
means of concept. This is to say, concepts are the synthesizing
elements in knowledge. Therefore, to judge is to synthesize, and the
way one synthesizes can be categorized in one of twelve categories.
Kant draws heavily from Aristotelian logic in enumerating types of
po
judgment. The following is a list of judgments and categories.
"Judgments" have to do with understanding and "Categories" have to
do with sensibility.
Judgments Categories
I. Quantity I. Quantity
(i) Universal (i) Unity
(ii) Particular (ii) Plurality
(iii) Singular (iii) Totality
II. Quality II. Quality
(iv) Affirmative (iv) Reality
(v) Negative (v) Negation
(vi) Infinite (vi) Limitation
III. Relation Ml- Relation
(vii) Categorical (vii) Inherence and
subsistence
(substance and
accident
oc. 77 28
"^"^Kant, p. 106. ^'Copleston, p. 249. Jones, p
16
(continued)
(viii) Hypothetical (viii) Casusality and
dependence
(cause and effect)
Community
(reciptrocity
between agent
and patient)
(ix) Disjunctive (ix)
IV. Modality
(x) Problematic
IV. Modality
(x) Possibility-
impossibility
(xi) Existence-
non-existence
(xii) Necessity- ^
contingency
(xi) Assertoric
(xii) Apodictic 29
For Kant, the twelve types of judgment (understanding)
correspond to the twelve types of categories (sensibility). A brief
explanation of misjudgments is in order.
The first type of judgment is "quantity". By necessity all
judgments have quality. If, for example, the judgment is about
aardvarks, the judgment will either be about all aardvarks, some
aardvarks, or a particular aardvark. Thus, judgments of quantity
30
are either universal, particular, or singular.
All judgments must also have "quality". One can say this animal
is an aardvark, which is an affirmative judgment, or one can say,
this is not an aardvark, which is a negative judgment. According to
Kant, one also can say this is a non-aardvark. He calls this an
infinite judgment. Kant's reason for using of the term is this: In
making the judgment that the animal in question is a non-aardvark, one
has therewith placed that creature in the infinite domain or unlimited
class of that which is not included under the concept "aardvark." This
31
type of judgment is affirmative judgment, "This is an aardvark."
29
Kant, p. 107.
30
Ibid., p. 113.
31
Hartnack, p. 34.
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A judgment must have a relation. Kant posits three types of
relations: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. Categorical
judgment is a subject-predicate relation. "The sky is blue" is a categor
ical judgment. The predicate blue is a quality about the subject sky.
In hypothetical judgments there is a relation between ground and conse-
32
quence. "If I do not study, I will fail my courses." Not studying
will be the reason for failing the courses which is a consequence.
Finally, a disjunctive judgment states that two or more judgments exclude
each other and that all the judgments that comprise the disjunction
exhaust all possibilities. If one says "she is a teacher or a ditch
digger or a zoo keeper," the relation according to Kant's use of dis
junction is such that she can be only one of the three possibilities. If
one knows she is neither a teacher or ditch digger, then she is neces
sarily a zoo keeper.
Kant's fourth and final judgment is modality. Either a statement is
possibly true, or it is true as a matter of fact, or it is necessarily
true. The statement "I shall live beyond the age of 30," is a problematic
judgment. The fact that Kant lived between the years 1724 and 1894 is
a matter of fact or "assertoric". If one knew all of the factors in his
birth on the twenty-second of April and knew for certain of his death
on the twelfth of February then one could make, according to Kant, a
necessary judgment, a judgment necessarily true. He calls this "apodictic."
Much more could be said about Kant's "Transcendental Analytic."
It is a long and detailed treatment of phenomenalogical epistemology.
32|bid.
18
It is sufficient to say, however, that in positing his synthetic a priori
categories and intuition, Kant feels that he has given science a firm
epistemological foundation and adequate protection against Humean
skepticism. As was mentioned earlier, Kant's attitude toward reason
being applied to metaphysics is a natural and logical outgrowth of his
arguments in "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Analytic." In these two
sections Kant meticulously delineates an epistemological scheme for the
phenomenal level of reality. By their own design the Aethetic and
Analytic cannot be applied to metaphysics. The reason for this is seen
in Kant's attitude that his own epistemology is definitive. If Kantian
epistemology is the absolute definitive word on knowledge, then reason
33
can have nothing to say about metaphysics.
Transcendental Dialectic
A key to understanding Kant's "Transcendental Dialectic" is his
bifurcation of phenomenon and noumenon. In The Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the categories are only ap
plicable to that which exists in time and space. One may apply the
categories empirically, but they have no transcendent applicability. In
essence reality can be "known" only as far as one can come into first
hand intuitive contact with it and rationally apprehend and interpret
what such intuitions yield.
The phenomenal world is a world of structured laws which can
Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,
trans. Theodore M. Green and Hoyt Hudson, (London: Open Court
Pub., 1934), p. xxxviii.
19
be apprehended by rationality. But Kant with this scheme limits
phenomenon to science. Morality and religion do not fall within the
bounds of phenomenon. Morality and religion are, in Kant's scheme,
noumenal realities. In developing his idea of phenomenal reality Kant
wishes to obviate Berkeleyan subjectivity; thus, he suggests the pos
sibility of an ultimate or noumenal reality. This reality cannot be
apprehended through sensuous intuition or grasped through reason.
'^^
Speculative reason can never afford one knowledge of the nature
of ultimate reality. In fact, not recognizing the limitations of reason
does great violence to religion and morality. Kant states:
When empiricism itself, as frequently happens, becomes dog
matic in its attitude towards ideas, and confidently denies
whatever lies beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, it
betrays the same lack of modesty; and this is all the more
reprehensible owing to the irreparable injiy^y which is thereby
caused to the practical interest of reason.
Exactly what is noumenon? Kant defines it both positively and
negatively.
If by noumenon we understand a thing in so far as it is not
the object of our sensuous intuition, thus abstracting from
our mode of intuitijw it, this is a noumenon in the negative
sense of the term.
The noumenon cannot be the object of sensuous intuition or any type of
intuition. Stated positively Kant maintains:
If we understand by it (the noumenon) an object of a non-
sensuous intuition, we then assume a particular kind of
intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not
ours and of which we cannot see even the possibility; and 07
this would be a noumenon in the positive sense of the term.
34
Ibid., p. XXXIX.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 427
^^Ibid., p. 267. ^'^Ibid.
20
Thus, the noumenon is a reality but one lacks the faculties to appre
hend it. Kant states: "What objects may be in themselves and apart
from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains completely unknown
38
to us." Thus he bifurcates reality into two levels, phenomenon and
noumenon .
To speak of religion in Kantian terms is to speak of morality. It
is meaningless to talk of morality without presupposing a freedom of the
will rooted in the noumenal realm. Yet, for Kant there is a type of
religious faith which can give the same degree of certainty as any
phenomenal knowledge. He expresses this in a published lecture given
at the University of Konigsberg.
Conviction is of two kinds, dogmatic and practical. The
former has to be sought in mere concepts a priori, and has to
be apodictic. But we have already seen that by the path of
mere speculation we cannot convince ourselves with certainty
of God's existence. At most the speculative interest of our
reason compels us to assume such a being as a subjectively
necessary hypothesis. But reason has no capacity sufficient
to demonstrate it. Our need makes us wish for such a demon
stration, but our reason cannot lay hold of it. It is true
that I can argue from the existence of the world and from its
accidental appearances to the existence of some supreme
original being. Yet there still remains to us another kind of
conviction, a practical one. It is a special field, which gives
us far more satisfying prospects than dry speculation can
ever yield. For if something presupposed on subjective
grounds is only a hypothesis, a presupposition on objective
grounds is a necessary postulate. These objective grounds
are either theoretical (as in mathematics) or practical (as in
morality). For moral imperatives, since they are grounded in
the nature of our being as free and rational creatures, have
as much evidence and certainty as mathematical propositions
originating in the nature of things ever could
have. Thus a necessary practical postulate is the same thing
in regard to our practic^g interest as an axiom is in regard to
our speculative interest.
�^�lbid., p. 87.
on
Immanuel Kant, Lectures On Philosophical Theology, trans.
Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark. (London: Cornell Univ. , 1978),
p. 122.
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Thus, Kant delineates knowledge (pure reason) and faith (practical
reason). He wishes to demonstrate that the method of phenomenal
knowledge is unsuitable to religious belief or faith. It is inferior to
religious faith. Kant continues in the same lecture cited above:
Such a moral theology not only provides us with a convincing
certainty of God's being, but it also has the great advantage
that it leads us to religion, since it joins the thought of God
firmly to ouk morality, and in this way it even makes better
men of us.
Kant precludes the possibility of stepping from phenomenal knowledge
into noumenal religious belief with his Absurdum Practicum. Absurdum
logicum is an absurdity in judgment. Absurdum Practicum occurs when
it is shown that anyone who denies this or that would have to be, in
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Kant's words, "a scoundrel." He lucidly states the error of making
scientific knowledge tantamount to religious knowledge or moral belief.
Our faith is not scientific knowledge, and thank heaven it is
not! For God's wisdom is apparent in the very fact that we
do not know that God exists, but should believe that God
exists. For suppose we could attain to scientific knowledge
of God's existence, through our experience or in some other
way (even if the possibility of this knowledge cannot imme
diately be thought). And suppose further that we could
really reach as much certainty through this knowledge as we
do in intuition. Then in this case, all our morality would
break down. In his every action, man would represent God
to himself as a rewarder or avenger. This image would force
itself involuntarily on his soul, and his hope for reward and
fear of punishment would take the place of moral ^i^otives.
Man would be virtuous out of sensuous impulses.
Kant by this statement asserts not only two types of thought but the
necessity of keeping the phenomenon and noumenon mutually exclusive,
thus, separating knowledge of the phenomenal world and practical thought
of religion and morality.
""ibid. Ibid., p. 123. "2 1 bid.
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A consequence of Kant's dichotomy between knowledge and faith is
a divided "self". There is the empirical self and the noumenal self.
The empirical self is subject to the determinative laws of the phenom
enon. The noumenal self is free to make moral choices. Kant writes:
The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to
the same notion as freedom, concerns only the existence of
things so far as it is determinable in time, and, consequently,
as phenomena, in opposition to their causality as things in
themselves.
Kant takes causality to be applicable only to the phenomenal world
of which a person as a physical being is a part. Yet, Kant contends
that a person is a moral creature thus necessitating freedom of will.
He views these two truths as irreconcilable. "It is impossible to reconcile
the necessity of causal relation with freedom: they are contradictory."^^
The resolution of this contradiction is to bifurcate religion and science,
as well as to split a person into an empirical and metaphysical self.
This bifurcation marks most of Kant's critique of rationalistic
metaphysics. He attempts to show the fallacy of applying phenomenal
categories to the noumenon in three basic areas of rationalistic specu
lation: self, being-in-general, and God.
With regard to self, as mentioned earlier, there exist two distinct
levels which are mutually exclusive. Kant writes in regard to rational
istic psychology that
since the proposition "I think" (taken problematically) contains
the form of each and every judgment of understanding and
accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that
the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employ
ment of the understanding. ... We therefore propose to
follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of
pure psychology ....
^�^Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. T. K. Abbott.
(Longmans Green, London, 1927), p. 188.
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(1) In all judgment I am the determining subject of that
relation which constitutes the judgment. That the "I", the
"I" that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, as some
thing which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate,
must be granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed identical
propisition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for
myself a self-subsistent being, or substance ....
(2) That the "I" of apperception, and therefore the "I"
in every act of thought, is one, and cannot be resolved into
a plurality of subjects, and consequently signifies a logically
simple subject, is something already contained in the very
concept of thought .... But this does not mean the
thinking "I" is a simple substance ....
The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in
thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the
knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of
thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical
determination of the object ....
The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined
by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the following syllogism:
That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does
not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.
A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be
thought otherwise than a subject. Therefore it exists also
only as subject, that is, as substance.
In the major premise we speak of a being that can be
thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it
may be given in intuition. But in the minor premise we
speak of it only in so far as it regards itself, as subject,
simply in relation to thought and the unity of consciousness,
and not as likewise in relation to the intuition through which
it is given as object to^^hought. Thus the conclusion is
arrived at fallaciously.
The fallacy to which Kant is calling attention is called "the fallacy
of four terms." A simple example of this is as follows:
major premise: All Greeks live in Kentucky.
minor premise: Kant is greek to me.
conclusion: Kant lives in Kentucky.
This syllogism contains not three but four terms: Greeks (persons),
Kentucky, Kant, and greek (adjective). The error of this is that
Greek is used in two different ways. So it is with Kant's example.
Ibid., pp. 370-1. Jones, p. 52.
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Self is used in two different ways, the self of the phenomenon and the
noumenal self. Kant writes further:
'Thought' is taken in . . . two . . . totally different senses:
in the major premise, as relating to an object as it may be
given in intuition; in the minor premise, only as it consists in
relation to self-consciousness. In this latter sense, no object
whatsoever is being thought; all that is being represented is
simply the relation to self as subject (as form of thought).
As will be pointed out later, Hegel seeks a unity between the
empirical and the transcendental realm. That is to say, when thought
and being are wedded together, there can be no essential distinction
between noumenon and the phenomenon.
A bifurcated self leads to the idea that the transcendental self
(noumenon) is a self which cannot be experienced, because all experi
ences must come via time, space, and the categories earlier outlined.
This has interesting consequences, as, for example, when this is
made to bear upon the possibility of God revealing himself through the
person of Jesus Christ. In fact, it effectively precludes that possibil
ity. As will be seen later, Kierkegaard's epistemology runs parallel
to Kant's, but at this point they are radically different.
One of the traditional topics of rationalistic metaphysics is knowing
being-in-general. Kant posits four theses of rationalistic metaphysics
and four antitheses and then shows that both the theses and anti
theses can be proved. He concludes from this that one cannot know
being-in-general. Following are the four theses and antitheses.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 52.
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Thesis
(1) The world has a beginning
in time, and is also limited
as regards space.
(2) Every composite substance
in the world is made up of
simple parts, and nothing
anywhere exists save the
simple or what is com
posed of the simple.
(3) Causality in accordance
with laws of nature is not
the only causality from
which the appearances of
the world can one and all
be derived. To explain these
appearances it is necessary to
assume that there is also an
other causality, that of freedom.
(4) There belongs to the
world, either as its part
or as its cause, a being
that is absolutely neces
sary .
Antithesis
(1) The world has no
beginning, and no
limits in space;
it is infinite as
regards both time
and space.
(2) No composite thing in
the world is made up
of simple parts, and
there nowhere exists
in the world any
thing simple.
(3) There is no freedom;
everything in the
world takes place
solely in accordance
with laws of nature.
(4) An absolutely necessary
being nowhere exists
in the world, nor
does it exist outsid^gthe
world as its cause.
The position of the antithesis reflects an empirical-scientific point
of view. In other words, it is restricted to only the "facts" as one
experiences them. But the thesis position represents a wholly different
aspect of reality. The cogency for the thesis position, Kant claims,
gains support from
a certain practical interest in which every right-thinking
man, if he has understanding of what truly concerns him
heartily shares. That the world has a beginning, that my
thinking self is of simple and therefore indestructible nature,
that it is free in its voluntary actions and raised above the
compulsion of nature, and finally that all order in the things
constituting the world is due to a primordial being, from
which everything derives its unity and purposive connection--
these are so many foundation stones of morals and religion.
The antithesis robs use of all these supports, or at least
appears to do so . . . .
Ibid., p. 397-421.
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If there is no primoridal being distinct from the world,
if the world is without beginning and therefore without an
Author, if our will is not free, and the soul is divisible and
perishable like matter, moral ideas and principles lose all
validity, and share in the fate of the trans^cendental ideas
which served as their theoretical support.
It must be emphasized that Kant firmly believes both thesis and
antithesis to be true in every sense. Combined, the thesis and anti
thesis represent the whole of reality. But the whole of reality cannot
be experienced, only the antithesis or the phenomenal realm. Thus,
Kant drives a firm wedge between the two parts of reality. This idea
is dominant in Kant's critique of the traditional proofs of God's exist
ence.
Proof of God's Existence
According to Kant, there are three major rationalistic proofs of
God's existence. These are the ontological , the cosmological and the
physico-theological proofs. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts
to demonstrate the invalidity of all three proofs. He starts with the
ontological proof.
The general form of the ontological proof may be stated as follows:
In the concept of a most perfect being existence is included.
For if it were not, the concept would not be the concept of a
most perfect being. Therefore, if such a being is possible,
it necessarily exists. For existence is included in the full
complement of its possibility. But the concept of a most
perfect being is the concept of ^.^possible being. Therefore,
such a being necessarily exists.
The idea of the Ens realissimum is the idea of an absolutely necessary
being. If this being is possible, it exists. The idea of a merely
"^^Ibid., pp. 424-25. ^^Jones, p. 55.
Copleston, p. 295.
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possible necessary being is contradictory. Kant contends that it is not
proper to talk about the idea of a merely possible "necessary being"
being a contradiction. One may think that God does not exist at all.
If this is the case, there is no contradiction since one has thought
away God's existence. Kant states: "If you think away its existence,
you think away the thing with all its predicates. How, then, can there
be room for any contradiction?"
Kant also contends that the argument from the idea of the Ens
realissimum to its existence is worthless. Essentially, it is a tautology.
If one introduces existence into the idea of being, then one can naturally
53conclude that it exists. Kant's argument against the ontological proof
is much more rigorous and detailed than this brief description. This is
the most important argument because of Kant's strategy to link the
other two arguments to the ontological proof making these dependent
upon the supposed validity of the ontological argument.
Kant's idea of the cosmological argument for God's existence is
based on Leibniz.
If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also
exist. Now, I at least exist. Therefore there also exists an
absolutely necessary being. The minor premise contains an
experience; the major premise reasons from an^^xperience in
general to the existence of a necessary being.
Obviously Kant's point of criticism is on the inappropriateness of
causality being applied to noumenal reality. One cannot use causality
to transcend the world of sense-experience. Another point of criticism
is that even if one could argue from causality one could say nothing
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 502-3.
Copleston, p. 296.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 508.
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more than there was a first cause. Nothing can be said concerning the
attributes of the first cause.
The standard cosmological argument says more than that there is a
first cause. According to Kant, the statements about the attributes of
the first cause are based on the concept of Ens realissimum. "The
necessary being is the Ens realissimum, the most real or perfect being, "^^
This, of course, makes the cosomological proof contingent upon the
ontological proof.
The third argument is called the physico-theological proof. The
essential elements of this proof runs as follows:
First, we observe in the world manifest signs of purposeful
arrangement; that is, of adaptation of means to ends. Secondly,
this adaptation of means to ends is contingent, in the sense
that it does not belong to the nature of things. Thirdly,
there must exist, therefore, at least one cause of this adapta
tion, and this cause or these causes must be intelligent and
free. Fourthly, the reciprocal relations existing between the
different parts of the world, relations which produce an
harmonious system analogous to a work of art, justify^gur
inferring that there is one, and only one such cause.
Kant's critique of the third proof is similar to the critique of the
second proof. He states: "All laws regarding the transition from
effects to causes . . . relate solely to possible experience ... to the
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object of the sensible world." This of course goes back to his separa
tion of phenomenon and noumenon. From the physico-theological argument
one could at best, according to Kant, argue for an "architect of the
CO
world" but not necessarily a creator of the world. Kant also argues
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that the physico-theological proof is dependent upon the cosmological
proof in that it must appeal to causation in some fashion. Thus, the
third proof is indirectly related to the first proof, the ontological
argument.
In dismantling all the rationalistic proofs of God's existence, and
silencing all metaphysic, Kant has cleared the way for his moral theol
ogy. A detailed treatment of Kant's moral theology is beyond the
scope of this paper; but, in a word, he places all demonstration of God's
existence upon human moral awareness which is rooted in the noumenal.
Thus, God has nothing to do with the phenomenon. This is indicative
of Kantian deism. This, in turn, bears greatly upon his idea of
history as it relates to God.
Kant and History
Kant's view of history grows out of his epistemological model.
Foundational to this view is his concept of time. Kant places the
entity of time in the phenomenal realm. He presupposes a fundamental
unity of the phenomenal. Thus, any event in this realm has an impact
upon all other events. In the Kantian system, time is connected to
substance. Without substance there would be no time. The only way
one can perceive time is by relating it to objects of the external world.
Temporal events are not cognizable without some type of permanent
material frame of reference, i.e., the sun or moon. The combination
of an objective existence of time and one's a priori concept of such a
thing allows one to recognize and measure time.
It follows from this unitary system of temporal relations that
everything which happens must happen in a single history, the history
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of eternal (phenomenal) substance. The unity Kant proposes to be
indicative of phenomenal reality precludes any activity of God in
that reality, i.e., historical divine revelation, because it is a closed
system.
A major axiom of historical knowledge is that every historical
event is situated somewhere in past time. This axiom cannot be
empirically discovered in the course of inquiry, but it is an a
60
priori condition of historical knowledge. Certainly, historical
knowledge is not purely a priori . One empirically observes temporal
events. Historical knowledge arises out of the union of the a
priori and experience. Out of this one sees Kant espousing a unity
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or correlation between temporal sequence and logical implication.
This is not original with Kant. Even Plato in the Timaeus maintains
that time is a moving image of eternity. This is followed by
most philosophers since that time in one form or another. To deny
this is to preclude the possibility of historical knowledge altogether.
"For it follows that we can never say about any event 'this must have
happened'; the past can never appear as the conclusion of a logical
inference. "^^ One could never argue back from the present to the
past. This ability to argue back from the present to the past is the
underlying idea of historical method.
Kant's main work on history is an essay entitled "An Idea for
a Universal History from the Cosmopolitan Point of View" published
^^Lewis White Beck, ed., Kant Studies Today (La Salle, III:
Open Court, 1968), p. 167.
^^R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford
Univ., 1956), p. 109.
^"^Ibid., p. 110. ^^Ibid.
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in 1784. Kant points out in his essay that although as noumena, human
acts are determined by moral laws; yet, as phenomena, from the point
of view of a spectator, they are determined according to natural laws as
as phenomenon. In studying history one is able to discover laws which
govern human action. Articulating these laws, is difficult, but Kant is
convinced that they are there. The unifying element in history, aside
from Kant's idea of time, is progress. Just as there is a plan in nature
evidenced in its harmony, there is a plan for humankind which is
detectable if one studies history carefully. This is not to be confused
with God having any control over history. This plan is executed by
humanity itself even though it is not aware of this.
To understand what Kant means by a plan, one has to look into
his Critique of Judgment in which the concept of teleology in nature is
expounded. The idea that nature has a plan is something which cannot
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be proven or disproven by scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, operating
with that presupposition gives understanding to the study of nature so
Kant contends. This plan is rooted in the noumenal but is manifested
in the phenomenal. Since one does not have access to the noumenal,
one can only deal with the phenomenal manifestation of this plan.
When studying history, a parallel can be drawn from studying
nature. Just as the scientist can talk of laws in nature, the historian
can talk about laws in history. These laws are not to be understood
as causal but rather descriptive. It is not that some mind is steering
history in a particular direction, but history does proceed as if this
the effects of causes.
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History is the narration of human action U/iew
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were the case.
What one receives from studying history is an understanding of
moral progress. This progress does not come about as a result of a
calculated effort by humanity. In fact, Kant contends just the oppo
site. It is through humanity's evil, irrational, ambitious greed that
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progress comes about. Because of these negative elements in hu
manity, peace is impossible. Yet humanity is continually overthrowing
the power in office which is inevitably nonpeaceful, in an attempt to
establish a peaceful society. Kant views humanity as being pulled in
two directions, good and evil, rational and irrational. The plan of
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history is to make humanity rational and moral. To be sure, Kant
views humanity's history as being far more evil than in his own day;
thus, real progress is being made.
In the actual study of history Kant presupposes that history can
be treated as any other object in the phenomenon. He does not allow
for the possibility of a subjective interpretation of historical facts.
Furthermore, he makes little attempt to understand the reason behind
the facts. He assumes history occured just as it is recorded. This
was an assumption on Kant's part for which he was severely criticized
by later philosophers.
Despite this shortcoming Kant makes marked contributions to a
philosophy of history. He urges a combining of historical scholarship
and philosophy. This amounts for Kant to integrating historal events
and ethics.
Placing historical events in the light of ethical theory represents
an enigmatic twist in Kant's epistemology. Historical facts, taken to be
66 1 . - 1Ibid . Ibid., p. 100. Ibid., p. 101.
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purely objective and phenomenal, are combined with and interpreted in
light of ethical theory which Kant bases in the noumenal realm. To be
sure, Kant would contend that though morality is based in the noumenal,
one can see the effect of morality in the phenomenal realm. In Kant's
view of history, particularly in light of a "plan" which history follows
(though not in any causal sense), one has interplay between the two
aspects of reality, phenomenal and noumenal. As seen earlier in this
paper, the splitting of the two is essential for his general espistemology
and for his refutation of the traditional proofs of God's existence.
Kant is determined to show that God in no way can be an object of the
69
senses. One can only be aware of the existence of such a being
based upon an awareness of ethics (noumenon). This bifurcation of
phenomenon and noumenon is essential, yet one sees the rigid para
meters so evident in his general epistemology becoming blurred in his
treatment of history in the light of ethical theory.
In the Kantian system history may inform one about morality or
ethics. History itself, however, carries no inherent effectual power to
alter the state of humanity. History is an object among other objects
to be studied and analyzed. History, in itself, has little to do with
God or morality. It is pure fact with no inherent value. This is the
distinction Kant ideally wants to make. In the actual working out of
the combination of history and morality, whether Kant successfully
maintains the distinction is, in this writer's mind, doubtful.
F. E. England, Kant's Conception of God (New York:
Humanities, 1968), p. 200.
^^Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957, pp. 75-76.
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Kant's two kinds of reality "model's" have far reaching implications
in the study of religious epistemology. Essentially, two kinds of reality
mean two sets of criteria of meaning and truth or even two types of
truth. There is truth about facts, i.e., phenomenon and truth
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about values, i.e., noumenon. Kant's construction of the phenom
enon precludes the possibility of value entering that realm of reality.
Values are firmly rooted in the noumenon. Fact cannot inform value
nor value fact. This division of fact and value has had a profound
effect upon religious epistemology which will be discussed later on in
this paper.
Jones, p. 89.
CHAPTER TWO
HEGEL
Hegel and Kant
G. W. F. Hegel, born in 1770 in Stuttgart and trained at the
University of Tubingen, was one of Germany's most prominant philoso
phers of his day. He still stands as an influential thinker. Hegel was
a key figure, standing between Kant and Kierkegaard both chronologi
cally and in terms of philosophical thoughts Hegel's epistemology is an
attempt to reinstate reason, which had been dethroned by Kant, to
its proper place. This writer shall give a brief description of Hegel's
criticism of Kant then deal with some other key contributions Hegel
made to philosophy and theology-
Hegel's most explicit and comprehensive criticism of Kant appears
in his rather long essay entitled Faith and Knowledge (1802-3). A
major difficulty in reading Hegel's critique of Kant arises from the
fact that Hegel uses terminology that is derived from Kant but uses
it in ways that contrast sharply with Kant's own interpretation and
usage.
^
Take, for example, the word "Idea". For Hegel, idea is a
F. W. F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. Walter Cerf and
H. S. Harris (Albany: State Univ. of New York, 1977), p. 17.
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concept that directly involves existence. But this violates Kant's own
definition of an "Idea of Reason". Kant writes in his first Critique:
I understand by Idea a necessary concept of reason to which
no congruent object can be given in sense-experience . . .
the pure concept of reason transcendental Ideas. They are
not arbitrarily invented: they are imposed by the very
nature of Reason itself, and therefore stand in necessary
relation to the whole employment of understanding. Finally,
they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all experi
ence; no object adequate to the transcendental Idea can
ever be found within experience.
Contrary to Kant's notion of reason being purely formal, Hegel weds
reason and empirical concepts together. He maintains that if "the Ideas
of Reason" are necessarily "objective (i.e., instantiated in experience)
then all empirically instantiated concepts have a good claim to be
regarded as ideas precisely because the synthesis of intuition and
3
concept IS a necessary condition of experience."
Hegel is extremely critical of Kant's notion that reason has no
actual content. Hegel writes:
When the Kantian philosophy happens upon Ideas in its
normal course, it deals with them as mere possibilities of
thought and as transcendent concepts lacking all re
ality . . . the Kantian philosophy remains entirely within
the antithesis. It makes the identity of the opposites into
the absolute terminus of philosophy, the pure boundary
which is nothing but the negation of philosophy."
Hegel's point is that, in contrast to Kantianism, the task of true
philosophy is to explore the infinite as well as the finite, God as well
as humanity, and the main tool with which one must work is reason.
Kant, according to Hegel, eviscerates philosophy by making metaphysics
2.Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith (New York: St. Martin's, 1961), p. 319.
^Hegel, pp. 17-18. ^Ibid., p. 67-
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beyond the reach of reason. For Hegel, reason must have ontological
significance because of his concept of God as being "reason" and yet
being subject as well. This will be discussed in greater detail later.
Hegel maintains that Kantian philosophy is idealism because for
Kant neither intuition nor concept has any actual content. He viewed
them both formally. Hegel writes: "Kantian philosophy has the merit
of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in
5
isolation nor intuition in isolation is anything at all." Of course Kant
is well aware of this as he states: "Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concept are blind." But, for Hegel, this
means that reason is empty and has no objective base. Thus reason
is grounded in the subjective and finite realm. He writes: "Kantian
Philosophy . . . turns just this empty concept into absolute reason,
both theoretical and practical. In so doing, it falls back into absolute
finitude and subjectivity, and the whole task and content of this
philosophy is not the cognition of the absolute, but the cognition of
this subjectivity."^ This is too limiting for Hegel. He sees Kant as
limiting philosophy by giving it far too little universality. Hegel
raises the question: on what grounds does Kant base any philosophy?
He cannot appeal to reason, because reason for Kant has no objec
tive independent existence. Hegel levels the same accusation at Kant
as Kant leveled at Hume. Hegel declares: "Kant reproaches Hume
for thinking of this task of philosophy with far too little definiteness
and universality. This is exactly what happened to Kant himself; and
like Hume he stopped at the subjective and external meaning of this
^Ibid., p. 68. ^Kant, p. 93. ^Hegel, p. 68.
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question and believed he had established that rational cognition is
impossible. "
Hegel also criticizes Kant's a priori categories. Hegel maintains
there is only one a priori and that is reason. The a priori categories
for Kant are nothing more than subjective divisions having no objective
basis whatsoever. Any attempt to partition various categories within the
subject is futile. Hegel contends that Kant has no basis to differentiate
between an a priori and pure sensation because both are equally grounded
in the subjective realm. Hegel interprets Kant as saying that the Ding an
Sich is the ultimate source of sensation via appearance. Jacobi notes
the same thing in his critique of Kant. He points out that without the
Ding an Sich one cannot get into The Critique of Pure Reason and with
9the Ding an Sich one cannot stay in it. His point is this; what is the
cause of sensation in a person? The cause cannot be found in the objects
of one's experience because according to Kant the possibility of knowledge
of any object is rooted in the forms of one's sensibility and the forms of
the intellect shape the sensuous material. Thus the Ding an Sich which
is hidden behind the veil of appearances causes the sensation. But in
making the Ding an Sich the cause of sensation Kant has contradicted
himself. In his Critique Kant does not allow the application of any
phenomenal categories to the noumenal, yet Kant, according to Jacobi
and Hegel, seems to have done exactly this by applying causality to the
Ding an Sich .
By bifurcating phenomenon and noumenon Hegel feels that Kant's
11
philosophy is nothing more than psychological idealism. In terms of
Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., p. xxvii. Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 75.
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epistemology, Kant has developed a philosophical system which is pure
subjectivism. To be sure, Kant believes the objective exists, but one
cannot know it by reason. Hegel goes to great lengths to develop a
system which would correct this supposed error. It will be pointed
out later that Kierkegaard's epistemology, which is a reaction to Hegel,
runs very close at points with Kant's epistemology.
The Hegelian Middle
Having delimited the possible fields of inquiry for philosophy,
Hegel in Phenomenology of the Spirit (Geistes) (1807) sets out to
explore various subjects such as nature, anthropology, history of phi
losophy, God and religion. The philosopher's task is to penetrate all
things, exploring inner realities. Hegel's goal in Phenomenology of
the Spirit is to set forth a scientific system delineating the develop
ment of the spirit as reflected in nature and humanity. It is meant
to be an epistemological ladder from sense-certainty to the philosophical
point of view of his system.
In the preface to this work Hegel begins by stating his notion of
a Systematic Science as the goal of all knowledge. Hegel seeks to lay
out a single, coherent, developing system, in which every term is a
notion divested of anything concrete or particular. He wants a system
which shows each term developing out of a preceding term in a neces-
12
sary fashion.
The goal of this system, for Hegel, is truth. He writes: "The
systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the shape
J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (New York: Oxford
Univ., 1958), p. 84.
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in which truth exists .... The inner necessity that knowledge should
be science lies in its very nature; and the adequate and sufficient explana
tion for this lies simply and solely in the systematic exposition of philosophy
itself. "''^
This system embraces all of history and nature. Hegel believed the
time was ripe for a system to be articulated. The system includes
individual experience, but it goes beyond it. Hegel wants to be completely
comprehensive in his system. This is not a flight away from matter and
particulars into a world of universals. Hegel is critical of any philosophy
wishing to take such a path. He wants to remain firmly rooted in this
world.
A word often employed by Hegel and critical to understand him is
Geist. Geist for Hegel is spirit not mind. Kaufmann points to three
reasons as to why this is so. First, in most contexts of Hegel's writings
mind for Geist makes no sense, only spirit does. "Even Baillie, though
he entitled his translation The Phenomenology of Mind, had to use
15
"spirit" again and again." The second reason could be an extension
of the first. Per heilige Geist is the Holy Spirit not the holy mind.
Spirit connotes many things that mind does not in a Biblical sense.
This is why Hegel claims that the concept of Geist was introduced
13
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16
by Christianity. The third reason Kaufmann gives by raising the
question: "Who has ever seen minds?" iVIany have claimed to have seen
spirits but not minds. Hegel, a great lover of the poet Schiller, employs
some of his poetry in his Phenomenology and uses Schiller's term Geist
17
which in the context of his poetry is clearly spirit.
What Hegel actually means by spirit is quite ambiguous. Fackenheim
gives some helpful ideas. He points out that the fundamental affirma-
1 8
tion in Hegel's thought is Reality is Spirit. For Hegel, spirit, though
opposed to matter, cannot be simply opposed to it. Spiritualism which
denies matter would be as one-sided as materialism which asserts the
opposite. The Hegelian spirit includes matter; spirit is free internal
self-development. Matter is not free externality, brute givenness and
19
chance. How can spirit include matter and yet be opposed to it?
This is indeed a difficult question and one which Hegel goes to great
length to explain.
Briefly, Hegel asserts that the spirit has the power of over
reaching. This spirit tolerates the other-than-spirit beside itself.
This is to say both spirit and that which is other than spirit exists.
Yet the spirit overcomes this side-by-sideness by absorbing the other-
than-spirit. This does not collapse into a form of monism, because in
the absorption it reconstitutes the other in its otherness even while
Of)
absorbing it. All of this seems quite contradictory or a mere semantics
game. Yet, Hegel is firmly convinced that such a system can be articu
lated. The question arises, how does he propose to work through such
an impressive agenda?
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Hegel is attempting to reconcile the universal and the particular,
the in-itself and for-itself, the objective and subjective. The truth lies
21
in the middle which is reason. Hegel states:
Its truth is what appears in the process of synthesis - where
the extremes were seen to be absolutely held apart - as the
middle term proclaiming to the unchangeable consciousness is
no longer for it an extreme, but is one with it and reconciled
to it. This mediating term is the unity directly aware of
both, and relating them to one another; and the consciousness
and thereby to itself, is the certainty and assurance of being
truth.
"^"^
The truth for Hegel is the middle. There can be no doubt that
this Hegelian middle is a place of great tension. This precarious middle
position has given rise to different schools of thought which are based
on Hegel's philosophy. Other philosophers who follow Hegel tended not
to stay in the middle but rather to move to one of the extremes.
Hegel, however, himself drives his stakes down in the absolute middle
of the extremes. Hegel has suffered great misunderstanding at this
point by the interpretation that the middle is an ongoing synthesis
between a thesis and an antithesis. One will not find these categories
23
employed by Hegel to describe his system at all. As will be seen of
the following quotation from Hegel, much of his triadic system cannot be
made to fit a thesis-antithesis-synthesis matrix which is a linear progres
sion as it was in Fichte's system. The following is perhaps one of the
most important statements from Hegel for understanding his triadic view
of reality.
Everything rational shows itself to be a threefold union of
syllogism, in that each of the members takes the place both of
one of the extremes and the mediating middle.
Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Pehomenology
of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, III.:
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This is especially the case with the three members of
philosophical science, i.e., the logical Idea, Nature and
Spirit. Here, first. Nature is the mediating member.
Nature, that immediate Totality, unfolds itself into two
extremes, the logical Idea and Spirit. But Spirit is
Spirit only insofar as it is mediated by Nature. Secondly,
Spirit-known by us as individual and active-is the
middle, and Nature and the logical Idea are the extremes.
For it is Spirit which recognized the Idea in Nature and
raises Nature to its Essence. Thirdly, the logical Idea
is itself the middle. It is the absolute Substance of
both Spirit and Nature, that which is universal and all-
penetrating. Thesa.are the three links of the absolute
syllogism or union.
The whole of reality can be broken down into three components,
nature, spirit, and logical idea. The best analogy of the relationship
among these three would not be a static thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but
rather a trinitarian idea (though this analogy breaks down at points).
All of the terms are extremes and, yet, all of the terms are mediators
as well between the other two. Each of the three possibilities shall be
treated in turn. This idea is developed in Hegel's Encyclopedia.
Fackenheim calls the first possible combination the Realistic
25
Mediation . Nature mediates between spirit and the logical idea.
Nature is a self-existent whole. It is not a mere idea of nature nor
a subjective experience. While it may mediate spirit and the logical
idea, unfolding itself into these extremes, it still remains distinct
from them. Thus spirit and the logical idea are not empty categories
26
which are merely filled by nature. They exist in their own right.
How then does nature mediate? "Finite spirit ... is spirit only
27
insofar as it is mediated by nature." Therefore, the possibility of knowl
edge of spirit comes through nature. The two are wedded together with
nature being the means by which finite spirit is known. However, in this
^"^Fackenheim, p. 84. ^^Ibid., p. 85. ^^Ibid,
27, t.-^Ibid.
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sense Hegel is not creating anotfier dichotomy between the finite and the
infinite spirit. The spirit is unity. In nature the infinite spirit immerses
itself into finitude. Nature mediates the spirit; yet, by this mediation the
spirit becomes finite. In this finite spirit one has a passage into the
infinite spirit.
The other extreme which nature mediates is the logical idea. At
this point Hegel embraces a Schellingian '"idealism of the infinite self,'
for which nature is the finite self's pre-self, taken by that self as
28
other-than self only because it is finite." Hegel is critical though,
of Schellingian's execution of this program in that he identified nature
29
itself with nature as reproduced in thought. Without any doubt
nature is "shot through with contingency." Nature without contingency
30
would not be nature at all. Contingency is a part of its essence.
Hegel's idealism did not wish to deny contingency but rather abstract
from contingency. "Such an idealism reproduces in thought, not nature,
31
but only the structure by which nature is maintained." Hegel's point
is that there is an underlying structure to nature. The structure can
be re-enacted by thought. Yet this idea is not an empty category when
it stands in relationship to nature. The absolute idea is immersed into
nature maintaining nature as it is. Absolute idea has self-hood which
is infinite and is the antecedent of finite self-hood of nature. However,
neither the absolute idea nor nature swallow each other up. Each has
their own selfhood as they stand in relationship to each other. Logical
thought rises to infinity which requires the reality of finite nature
32
in order to start the process of rising.
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Nature mediates the logical idea and, at the same time, mediates spirit.
Both spirit and idea are immersed in nature while all three maintain their
own identity as they stand in relation to each other. Even with Hegel's
realistic mediation there is still a dualism between the actual world of
33
nature and finite spirit, and the logical realm which maintains both.
Thus, if one is to have philosophical knowledge, one must leave the world
of contingency and leap into logical thought. Indeed, this can be seen
34
in Kant's four antinomies. Hegel sets forth the second combination
of the three categories at hand. The spirit mediates between the logical
idea and nature.
Hegel clears the way for this mediation between the logical idea and
nature by positing an epistemological model for the relationship between
subject (self or the knower) and object (nature or the thing known).
Nature is not a mere given object known by an equally fixed and purely
passive subject. Hegel dissolves all such fixities. By doing so he
makes the psirit which is individual self also to be active, in that it
mediates nature. To the knower, nature is immediate; yet, it is immediate
by way of the spirit's mediation. In a word, the spirit mediates nature's
36
immediacy.
This mediation of nature by the spirit is a process which has
37
existed in the history of humankind. Nature has meant different
things to civilizations at different times. According to Hegel, this
mediation has been progressing to a point throughout all of history.
38
And that point is to understand nature in philosophical thought.
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Functionally speaking, spirit in finite existence is that dynamic between
subject and object. This relationship between the two results in true
knowledge. It must be kept in mind that neither subject nor object are
static concepts, but rather, an active dynamic exists as they stand in
relationship to each other. Hegel wishes to avoid dissipating nature
into a system of subjective experiences. This would undercut nature's
self-existence. Nor does Hegel wish to divorce what nature is from the
39
varied ways in which it is humanly experienced. Hegel strives to
walk between the two. Logical thought is the product of subject inter
acting with object and, at the same instant, is the entity which makes a
relationship between the two possible. Logical thought must stand in
distinction from the whole logical realm. Thought is rooted in the spirit
which enables a knower to know. The thing which can be known is
nature and its inherent logical structure. The spirit stands between
the two, mediating both in the mind of the knower.
One must understand that the relationship between nature and the
logical realm is not one of two objects apprehended by a passive philo-
40
sophical subject. There is no subject per se to apprehend.
Fackenheim states:
Logical thought may see nature as maintained by the logical
realm; but it is an acting as well as a seeing. And what is
grasped by it is not a transcendent object, divorced from
another object which depends on it. The logical realm be
comes divorced from nature, only in and for the logical
thought which ^stracts it from nature, and even then it is
no mere object.
Hegel assert that taking any of the three categories at hand, in
and of themselves, is mere abstraction and does violence to the struc
ture of reality if this abstraction is taken as the reality itself. To
Fackenheim, p. 92. Ibid., p. 93.
41, u-^Ibid.
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abstract from reality is necessary to articultate the structure
of reality. But one must not confuse the thought with the thing
thought about. Hegel wishes no dualism at this point; yet, there is
4?
some distinction between the two.
Both nature and the logical realm are a manifestation of one spirit.
The logical realm as it stands in relationship to the spirit is not an empty
category. There is a unity in nature and logic and that unity is mediated
43
by one spirit. In this, one finds a tension in Hegel between the finite
contingent nature and a finite spirit immersed in this nature, and an infinite
logical realm which is abstracted from nature. Hegel attempts to manifest
these two by one spirit. But he creates an existential tension which Hegel
recognizes. Unifying these two is the main agenda for alio f Hegel's
44
philosophy. Hegel states:
In thinking I lift myself up to the Absolute above all that is
finite, and am infinite consciousness, while I am at the same
time finite consciousness, and indeed am such in accordance
with the whole empirical character. Both sides, as well as
their relation, exist for me. B^h sides seek each other,
and both flee from each other.
This is the human predicament; the thinking person is caught between
the infinite and the finite. Yet existence is in the middle which is a
synthesis of the two extremes. Hegel further claims:
At one time, for example, I accentuate my empirical, finite
consciousness, and place myself in opposition to infinite-
ness; at another I exclude myself from myself, condemn
42
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myself and give the preponderance to the infinte con
sciousness. The middle term contains notiiing else than
the characterisitcs of both the extremes.
Hegel has no intentions of leaving one in such existential tension.
He is convinced that human existence is not confined to simple finite-
ness and that philosophical thought is not doomed to remain in logical
47
abstraction. For Hegel religion represents the solution to this
48
tension. This will be treated later. Another resolution is found
49
in the relation between natural science and philosophy of nature.
To regard material objects as simply passive is a grave mistake.
50
It is the spirit which originally makes the differentiation possible .
As the spirit mediates between the two it partakes of both.
It partakes of finiteness because the nature which [s let
be remains shot through with contingency and givenness.
It partakes of infinity because what it lets be are not
fragments of nature but is nature as a whole. Natural
science, then is not a simply finite and passive appre
hension of^^ simply given nature. It is an arrested
mediation .
Truth is found between scientific theory and the total spiritual
existence from which it is abstracted. It must be emphasized that
taking any of these categories in and of themselves is a mistake. The
existence of all of them is seen by Hegel as depending upon each other.
Whether this is to be understood as being truth only from a finite
perspective allowing God an autonomous existence, or in an absolute
fashion making God dependent upon the finite, is a debated issue.
This will be treated later.
One finds in Hegel a paradoxical idea that spirit requires nature
'^^Ibid., p. 64. ^^Fackenheim, p. 94.
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as its presupposition, and nature requires spirit as its presupposition.
These conditions serve as the ground work for a Hegelian mediation.
"Only if the Spirit presupposes nature can nature be other-than-self.
when nature presupposes spirit can spirit rise to absoluteness. To
have the spirit immersed into nature means that in some regard the
infinite is made finite thus resulting in a type of death for the infinite.
Hegel states:
The life of spirit is not the kind which, shunning death,
keeps itself pure from destruction. It is a life which endures
death, and in death maintains its own being. It wins its trx\lh
only by finding itself in a state of absolute self-disruption.
It is a movement of "overreaching" by the infinite spirit to the finite
nature which enables the possibility of philosophical thought.^"* Thus,
the unity is in the power of overreaching. The spirit is active in its
unifying movement. Not only does spirit overreach nature but aM of
reality- It is this comprehensive overreaching which enables one in the
finite to rise into the infinite. All is unified by the one absolute spirit.
Hegel sets forth a third mediation for which the logical idea is
itself the middle. He gives this mediation in his Encyclopedia of
Philosophical Sciences. But before one can understand the third medi
ation, which is by necessity implicit in the first two mediations, one
must recognize the need for such a mediation. There is an inherent
tension between the first two mediations just reviewed. First, the
spirit must presuppose nature in order for finite spirit to have reality.
However, nature must also presuppose spirit, if spirit is to be able
to rise to absolute philosophic thought. Secondly, the logical realm
and the finite spirit which takes it as such, a reality. 11
52
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must actually exist independent of one's thought if the nature main
tained by it is to have self-existence. But the logical realm cannot
be a transcendent object over and against a passive thinking subject.
Thirdly, contingent nature must remain contingent, unless idea and
spirit are to collapse into an empty identity. Futhermore, philosophical
thought must be able to raise it to an essence above contingency unless
55
thought remains merely finite or a flight from reality.
The Hegelian middle contains all of these antithetical realities;
yet, they cannot remain together unless the spirit has overreaching
power to hold them together. This holding together is expressed
through the power of philosophical thought which the spirit works by
this overreaching.^^
Fackenheim points out that assigning the spirit overreaching
57
power necessitates that the idea also have this same power. One must
understand, as mentioned before, that the logical realm (idea) main
tains nature. And nature is self-existent apart from spirit lest nature
be an empty category. Logical thought is not to be confused with
the logical realm. Logical thought can discern the idea in nature,
but this act of discernment is a movement of thought. It is the idea
which causes this movement. The idea is self-movement and the
recognition of that (by thought) is the movement of the idea in a
person. In light of this, it is evident that the idea as well as the
spirit has overreaching power. If the idea only overreached thought,
then philosophic thought when it turns toward nature must make a
leap from infinite self-activity to finite acceptance of the given. After
Fackenheim, p. 100. ^^Ibid. Ibid.
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which case then, philosophic thought becomes natural science. This
places one essentially where Kant and Kierkegaard are epistemologically.
Both of these philosophers deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge.
Hegel wishes to obviate this epistemological question by allowing the
idea of the power to overreach not just logical thought, but all of nature.
Thus, when logic was applied no leap would be necessary.
Nature is in some measure the idea externalized; yet both have
their own identity. With the idea overreaching into nature, it can raise
nature to its essence. "For whereas nature is the externalized idea, �
philosophy of nature is the recognition of nature as the externalized
idea."^^
The idea not only overreaches nature but also the spirit. It
plays a mediation role which is the third combination of the three
categories at hand. This overreaching by the idea enables a person
to recognize its presence in nature. If this were not so, then only
fragmentary knowledge would be possible of nature. But the idea
raises the spirit above finitude and returns to itself in infinity and, in
doing so, conquers nature. Because of this activity by the idea, one
can build a logical bridge from the finite to the infinite.
The relationship between spirit, idea, and nature is more complex
than this brief account indicates. Hegel believed he had unified Kant's
phenomenon and noumenon, thus clearing the way for religious knowl
edge which in its highest form was philosophic knowledge, entailing all
reality.
Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., p. 103.
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Hegel's Logic
Hegel's Logic has suffered misunderstanding in the sense that he
is caricatured as being a pure essentialist wishing to reduce Christianity
to mere abstraction, cutting out all experience and passion. On the
60
contrary, Hegel sought to include aU of reality in his system. His
logic is not set over and against experience. This is seen from the
previous discussion on Hegel's attempt to unify all reality, this in
cluding experience. Hegel writes in his introduction to Logic, "The
rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought. Lts point of
61
departure Is experience. "
Hegel never intended for this Logic to stand alone as the compre
hensive statement of reality. It was meant to be a delineation of reality
in abstract form. Logic is merely "shadows of reality." Unlike Kant,
who assumes categories and critiques reason, Hegel, in Logic, critiques
62
the categories. He is in search of proper categories which can be
employed in talking about reality. His categories are not about things
as they are seen but, as Findlay points out, "Logic as the study of
thought-determinations is at the same time a study of things as they
CO
are." These categories in themselves are "dry abstractions" but
taken in the context of the whole of reality they form reality's under
lying logical structure. Hegel states in Logic:
Considering education and the relation of the individual to
Logic, I finally remark that this science, like grammar.
^^Hegel, Logic, p. 20. ^''ibid., p. 16.
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appears in two different perspectives or values. It is
one thing for those who first approach it and the sciences,
and quite another for those who return to it from them.
Whoever begins to study grammar, finds in its forms and
laws dry abstractions, accidental rules, altogether a lot
of isolated determinations which manifes merely the value
and significance that lie in their immediate meaning; at
first, knowledge recognizes nothing else in them. Whoever,
on the other hand, masters a language, and at the same time
knows other languages with which to compare it, will find
that the spirit and culture of a people reveal themselves to
him in the grammar of its language; the same rules and forms
now have a full, living value. Through the gramgfj^r he can
recognize the expression of the spirit, the Logic.
Thus Hegel clearly intends Logic to be nothing more than the laws of
logic which are found in existence.
Hegel sets forth in Logic three major categories: being, essence
and notion. The first two categories deal with objective logic, e.g.,
number, measure, difference, appearance, substance, and cause. Being
and essence have to do with grasping and organizing things and materials
which are not thoughts, nor posited as in any way essentially related
to thoughts. Findlay points out that the doctrine of the notion deals
65
with the subjective as well as the objective. "Thought" is its main
category. The three categories shall be taken in order.
The basis for any awareness of reality is being . Being also serves
fifi
as a basic category of God. Being is an empty abstract devoid of
67
substantial content. Hegel describes being in three grades: quality,
quantity and measure. He writes:
Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with
being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is,
if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the
character external to being, and does not affect the being
at all . . . measure, the third grade of being, whic^is
the unity of the first two, is a qualitative quantity.
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Under each of these three categories there are three divisions which in
turn have three subdivisions. To describe each of these would be involved
and tedious. The theme common to all of these is that each represents a
critique of categories Kant assumes to be a priori and closed to critiquing.
This section of Logic "Doctrine of Being" deals with aspects of reality
69
which are outwardly manifested. Towards the end of Hegel's section
of "Being" he searches for some underlying connection of reality
because after explicating quality, quantity and measure there remains
a sense of disunity. Hegel then discusses the "Doctrine of Essence"
and posits essence as being the connecting element which holds being
together. It must be noted that he does not construct a logical bridge
to essence from being; but rather he makes a leap.^^ This is signifi
cant in light of Hegel's "Doctrine of the Notion" which will be treated
later.
Essence, the second Hegelian category, deals with what is latent
in reality. It looks beyond the external and penetrates what Kant would
call the noumenon. While Kant dichotomizes essence and being, noumenon
and phenomenon, Hegel does not. Hegel maintains that essence js Being
72
"coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself."
Hegel writes further:
The absolute is the essence. This is the same definition as
the previous one that the Absolute is Being, in so far as
Being likewise is simple self-relation. But it is at the same
time hiaher, because Essence is Being that has gone into
A key term in understanding Hegel's use of Essence is "Reflection."
Because Essence is what lies beyond the immediate, it can only be
itself.
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penetrated by "Reflection." Reflection also has to do with relationship
and relativity. Something can be conceived reflectively when it is conceived
necessitates the negative of that something. To reflect on "A" is also to
be aware of "non-A".
Reflection for Hegel carries an impersonal and objective meaning as
well as a personal and subjective meaning. One does not merely "think"
various determinations for objects. The objects themselves point to
other things and determinations with which their content is connected.^'*
As in Hegel's "Doctrine of Being," his "Doctrine of Essence" is
divided into three divisions which in turn are divided into three sub
divisions. Each of these subdivisions is divided into three parts.
To explicate each of these would be beyond the scope of this study.
There is, however, one category which gives light to what he means
by essence. This category is "identity."
While being presents itself in various forms of quantity, quality
and measure, essence remains constant in this diversity of appearance.
The fact that an essential element runs through a series of appearances
implies that something identical is in all of them. This something is not
75
an abstract sameness but something of real substance. This noumenal
identity is not something detached from appearance, but rather appearance
is a manifestation of the identity in various ways.
It must be noted that both being and essence are over all abstract
categories, but in the first two sections of his Logic which have just been
discussed, Hegel developes them into refined categories. His pattern
as in relation to something else.
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in these sections is to start out with broad abstract, empty categories
and work towards more concrete substantial categories. A pattern of a
similar sort is seen in the "Doctrine of the Notion"; yet there are
significant differences. These shall be discussed next. The doctrine
of the notion is divided into three parts:
(1) The first is the doctrine of the subjective or formal
notion. (2) The second is the doctrine of the notion in
vested with the character of immediacy, or of objectivity.
(3) The third is the doctrine of the idea, the subject-^^ject,
the unity of notion and objectivity, the absolute truth.
Findlay points out that in the doctrine of the notion there is total
unity. In this third division of Logic, thought becomes self-conscious.
One finds that this self-conscious thought permeates aU of reality.
Within the notion one does not find the tensions found in being or
essence with their internal dialectics. The notion brings all of these
together. It is through the notion that one can see how all existence
fits together. This unifying element is the absolute idea. "The idea,
as unity of the subjective and objective idea, is the notion of the
idea."'^'^
In the notion one has the unity of thought and being. Hegel
points out that the task of modern philosophy is to reconcile thought
78
and being. But his reconciliation can never take place as long as
79
God remains outside this world of existence. Thus, for Hegel what is
contained in thought actually is. He states: "Thought is the identity
of subjective understanding and objective understood content: What
'^^Hegel, Logic, p. 225. '^�^Ibid., p. 292.
�^^Wood, p. 83. -^^Ibid.
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is thought, is; what is, exist in and for thought." Hegel unifies
these two entities. In light of this it is no accident that Hegel leans
81
strongly toward a form of the ontological proof of God's existence.
Absolute knowledge is the point at which Hegel's discussion of the
notion ends. The last section is entitled "The Absolute Idea." Indeed,
this is the point to which one must progress in order to have religious
certainty which is the uniting of the objective and the subjective.
Hegel states:
Because according to the process of knowledge, it is only
when absolute knowledge has been reached that the separation
of the Object of knowledge and subjective certainty is com
pletely resolved, and truth equa^d to this certainty, and
this certainty equated to truth.
Hegel derives the term "idea" from Kant who in turn borrowed it
from Plato. Kant maintains that the idea is closely related to reason;
yet Hegel does not divorce reason from understanding as does Kant.
Hegel does not agree with Kant that the idea is something far away and
hidden from understanding. Hegel contends that the idea is not elusive.
83"
... it is rather that which is mostly absolutely present."
The absolute idea or the notion is not some new truth which has
been created. It is simply the whole of truth. Thus, Hegel means for
his system to be taken as a whole. To break it down and separate its
components is to lose a part of the truth. The absolute idea and the
system states what is already known but from a different perspective.
It is, Hegel says, like the old man who utters "the same creed
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as the child, but for whom it is pregnant with the whole meaning of a
84
lifetime." The method is the only thing new.
In concluding Logic, Hegel makes the point that the first two
doctrines, being and essence, are unified in the notion. The notion is
the absolute idea - God. One must not think that the notion stands as
a third independent category over and against being and essence; but
rather there is an inherent unity of them in the notion. One cannot
find being without also finding essence and both are immersed in notion.
Hegel's Philosophy of Religion
The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion were complied and pub
lished in 1832 one year after Hegel's death. They represent gathered
works, printed and unprinted, mostly of class lectures. These compiled
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works represent the penacle of Hegel's mature thought.
Hegel posits God as the origin of all things:
God is the beginning of all things, and the end of all things.
As all things proceed from this point, so all return back to it
again. He is the centre which gives life and quickening to
all things, and which anima||d and preserves in existence all
the various forms of being.
It can clearly be seen from this passage that Hegel is attempting to
strike against any form of Deism. God is not some remote unknowable
thing but is at the heart of creation.
Hegel has been greatly criticized on the grounds that he is a
pantheist. It is this writer's opinion that he was not pantheist but
^"^Ibid., p. 265.
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rather a theist. Hegel says that the basis of religion is a person's
relationship with God. He writes:
In religion man places himself in a relation to this centre
(God), in which all other relations concentrate themselves,
and in so doing he rises up to the highest level of con
sciousness and to the reguon which is free from relation to
what is other than itself.
From this passage it is clear that while Hegel cited God as the
source of life, humanity stands in distinction from God. Hegel seems to
imply that there are two regions as a person rises from one to the
other. The latter is a region where there is nothing but God, i.e.,
"free from relation to what is other than itself . . . ." This is not
classical pantheism.
The task of religion is to examine and understand its own content.
From this reflective approach one can derive certainty. "The ground of
88
this . . . inward certitude is faith." Hegel maintains that one cannot
be satisfied with acquiescence of a creed. The believer must be critical
of his/her own faith. "Hence the believer is led to realise that his
faith is no longer immune to question and that strength of personal
conviction alone is not enough to authenticate the trust of teaching
89
familar from childhood." Hegel states: "To believe in God is thus in
its simplicity, something different from that where a man, with reflection
and with the consciousness that something else stands opposed to his
90
faith, says, 'I believe in God.'"
go
Bernard M. G. Reardon, Hegel's Philosophy of Religion,
(London: Billing and Sons, 1977), p. 26.
89�^lbid., p. 27.
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Philosophy is the discipline in which one moves from innocence to a
more mature basis for faith. In asserting this, Hegel is not saying that
personal experience or feeling is irrelevant. He is asserting that one
can and must articulate the object of one's feeling. "Hegel has no
doubt that emotion plays a large part in it (religion); but the feelings
91
are directed to an object or source that can be rationally conceived."
Hegel writes: "Religious feeling . . . contains in its content, in its
very determinateness, not only the necessity but the reality of the
92
opposition itself, and consequently contains reflection."
In the actual carrying out the goal of examining rationality the
content of religion (Christianity), one must employ a scientific methodo
logy. This is done, as mentioned earlier, by philosophy. Philosophy's
purpose is to take one beyond the finite physical into the realm of the
metaphysical. The object of both philosophical and religious language is
the same, the absolute or God. Religious language, however, is meta
phorical, and philosophical language is exact and abstract. Religion
addresses the imagination and emotions in its goal of intellectual appropri
ation of the absolute while philosophy and science profess a stern
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rationality. Philosophy and science are akin in procedure while
religion and philosophy are akin in their goal of knowing existence in
its totality. Thus, Hegel wishes to employ scientific methodology in
examining and articulating the content of faith and religion.
Hegel does not place one in the position of proving God exists,
then believing in God or having knowledge of him as if subjective
Reardon, p. 32.
Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, p. 133
Reardon, p. 33.
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knowledge counts for nothing. One must remember that Hegel wishes to
unite the subjective with the objective, not to dissolve the subjective
into the objective. In regards to one's awareness of God, Hegel maintains:
"For us who are already in possession of religion, what God is, is
something we are familar with--a substantial truth which is present in
our subjective consciousness. "
God is the only absolute, and all else is dependent upon him for
existence. There is nothing outside of God which is self-sustaining.
If read out of context, Hegel can sound like a pantheist.
We find the conviction that God is indeed the absolute true,
from which all proceeds, and into which all returns, upon
which ail is dependent, and b^eside which nothing has absolute
true self-sustained existence.
Here one could interpret Hegel as a pantheist. The answer to whether
Hegel is a pantheist or a theist is found in the whole of what he is
saying and not in a particular passage. In the passage just cited, is
Hegel suggesting God is absorbed into all things to the point of no
differentiation between him and his creation, or is Hegel polemizing the
Deism which was popular in his day? This writer maintains the latter.
This position can only be corroborated by looking further into Hegel's
thinking. This is the task at hand.
Against Deism, Hegel posits that nothing has absolute independence
from God. All being is borrowed from God. Therefore, God cannot be
totally removed and isolated from that which he creates. Hegel states:
the being of all these things is not Independent, but is
supported by, dependent on, something else, and has no
true independence. If we attribute a being to particular
things, it is only a borrowed being, only the semblance of a-
being, not the absolute self-sustained Being, which is God.
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Hegel admits that taking his philosophy in the most abstract form
97
could be held as Spinozism. But Hegel sets himself apart
from Spinoza by saying that thus far his (Hegel's) concern has been
only with God and not the created order. He writes: "But at the
beginning we have not as yet characteristics which are distinguished,
as one and another; at the beginning we are only concerned with the
Qp
One, not with the other." To attempt to find God in the particulars,
i.e., that which is created, is problematic. Clearly Hegel asserts "God
is spirit." He cannot be found in his essence in finite substance in the
sense of his total being. He writes: "God in His universality, this
universal, in which there is no limitations, no finiteness, no particu-
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larity, is the absolute self-subsisting being."
Hegel defends himself against the charge that he is a Pantheist if
by that term one means that God is the particulars and the particulars
are God. Hegel wants to make the point that he is not a traditional
Pantheist, yet, at the same time, wishes to maintain that the particulars
do not and cannot exist apart from the universal, i.e., God.^^^
Hegel considers the history of religions as being a progression
towards an ideal religion. The first stage of religion is a religion of
nature. Most of the ancient mythological religions fall into the category.
The second stage is the religion of spiritual individuality. Hegel places
the religions of Judaism, Greece, and Roman in this category. The
third and final category is the absolute religion
- Christianity.
In the first section of "The Absolute Religion," Hegel deals with
the meaning of revelation. For Hegel all religions of history represent
partial expressions of God. Only in Christianity is the absolute spirit
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 93. ^^Ibid., p. 92,
''^^Ibid., pp. 96-97.
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fully revealed. Revelation means that God reveals himself in the con
sciousness of humanity. Hegel becomes opaque at this point because
revelation is not defined in any orthodox sense. Religion is humanity's
consciousness of God and God's own consciousness of himself in humanity.
God knows himself in a consciousness which is distinct from himself,
because finite consciousness is also implicitly his own. "He distinguishes
himself in order to be his own object, while remaining completely identi-
101
cal with himself in so doing."
The absolute religion is revealed religion in that it comes to human
kind as disclosed from without. By revelation the infinite and the
finite are joined. God cannot be looked upon as pure object or a
"wholly other." Instead, his indwelling is the subjective consciousness.
According to Hegel, "The great advance which marks our time consists
102
in recognition of subjectivity as an absolute moment." One senses in
such a statement the contempt Hegel had for eighteenth century rationalism,
Reardon suggests Hegel had Schleiermacher in mind while writing the
above passage. As stated earlier, though the objective and subject are
joined, still each retains their own identity. In no way does the objective
dissolve the subjective side of religion. "For Hegel the objectivity is
itself within the subject, providing the content of his experience since
103
'what has no objectivity has no content.'"
Though Hegel placed great emphasis upon a person's ability to
reflect, think and understand God, i.e., the absolute spirit, religion is
not a discovery by a person. Revelation is the spirit actively revealing
^^^Reardon, p. 58.
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 2, p. 331
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Reardon, p. 130.
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itself. He writes: "In the idea in its highest form religion is not a
transaction of man, but is essentially the higher determination of the
104
absolute idea itself." The spirit reveals itself through the finite and
105
historical and then through reflection in a deep spiritual sense. In
other words, revelation comes by way of objective finite reality and also
by a subjective internal awareness. It must be kept in mind that for
Hegel these two are joined. His point is that revelation comes through
all levels of one's existence.
Hegel demonstrates a sensitivity to various cultures and religions
concerning the type of revelation. Hegel posits that God does not
have to be understood rationally before one can be in relationship with
him. This understanding is not even required for Hegel; the spirit
reveals itself in the manner which is relevant to that individual. Hegel
contends that.
The spiritual needs of man vary according to their culture
and development; and so also does the requirement and
assurance that we must believe on authority vatj^gaccording
to the different stages of development reached.
Hegel's overall point in his philosophy is that it is possible to under
stand the inner logic of Christianity. This does not address the issue
of personal experience that one may have with the spirit. Hegel is not
espousing a cold, rational "head religion" at the expense of an experien
tial heart religion. He is maintaining that there is understandable
rational content in Christianity for those who wish to venture in that
direction. Hegel feels that this logical route is superior. It is most
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, p. 206.
^^^Reardon, p. 60.
^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol 2, p. 340.
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unfortunate that those who followed Hegel often found offense not in
Hegel but in a caricature of him. In the history of philosophy, this is
a most regrettable thing.
One must remember that Hegel is attempting to address the issue
of Deism prominent in his day. Kantian Deism bifurcates phenomenon
and noumenon. Making these two realms of reality mutally exclusive
insures a type of absolute transcendence. Hegelian thought does not
attempt to dissolve these two realms into each other in a monistic fashion.
Hegel sets forth a system which is fraught with ambiguity and tension.
This writer feels that to accuse Hegel of having a God who is not
transcendent of nature and to interpret him as a traditional pantheist is
problematic.
A question which one could raise is does Hegel's God transcends
humanity. To answer this question one would have to investigate
Hegel's anthropology in light of humanity's relationship to nature.
Based on Hegel's Logic the answer to this is ambigious; yet, if one
studies his Philosophy of Religion, one would find that Hegel espouses
very orthodox views concerning Christ's life, death and resurrection,
and the transcendence of God. To collate Hegel's Logic and Philosophy
of Religion is beyond the limits of this paper, but this would be an
enlightening study.
Hegel's Idea of History
One of the most interesting and innovative components of Hegel's
system is his idea of history. The historical movement began in the
late eighteenth century with Herder (1874) and culminated with Hegel in
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his lectures on the philosophy of history delivered in 1822-3. Hegel
proposed that history is not merely the amassing of facts but rather an
1 08
understanding of the thoughts and motivation behind the events.
This approach epistemologically opens up the possibility for history to be
a mode of revelation for the spirit.
Growing out of this approach to history is the idea that nature has
no history. Only humanity has a history. History for Hegel must be
rational. This is not to say that the events themselves have to be rational
In light of the atrocities of history, such an approach would be naive.
Hegel maintains, though, that underneath the enigmatic turns and twists
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of history lies a rational base which directs humanity towards freedom.
This is Hegel's own answer to the question he raises.
But even regarding History as the slaughter-bench at which
the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the
virtue of individuals have been victimized - the question
necessarily arises: to what ^iJj^l aim these enormous
sacrifices have been offered?
Ill
Collingwood sets forth five main points to Hegel's idea of history.
First, Hegel does not approach history through nature. As just pointed
out, nature has no history. The pattern of nature is cyclical, whereas
the pattern of history is linear. It progresses to a point. Second,
Hegel insists that true history is a history of thought. There is no such
1 07
R. G. Collinwood, The Idea of History, (London: Oxford
Univ. 1956), p. 113.
^^^Ronald Nash, Ideas of History, (New York: E. P. Dutton,
1969), pp. 86-87.
^^^Karl Lowith, Meaning in History, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago,
1949), p. 53.
^^^Collingwood, pp. 114-120.
67
thing as a history of pure event. For Hegel one does not have access
to event. It is through thought that events are ascertained. It is the
historian's task to discover why events occurred. Third, the force
behind history is reason. Everything that happens, happens as a
result of the will of humanity. And behind the "will" is "thought."
Hegel accounts for the seemingly irrational aspects of historical events
by maintaining that the actions of humanity are a mixture of passion and
reason. It must be clearly understood, though, that reason governs
passion and uses it to achieve its end. This is what Hegel calls the
"cunning of reason." Reason tricks passion into the position of its
agent. One gets the impression that Hegel uses reason in the sense
of a unified personality which stands apart from particular individuals.
At this point Hegel becomes ambigious. As discussed earlier in this
chapter, Hegel contends that humanity and God are separate; yet, God
immerses himself as the infinite spirit into humanity in its finite spirit.
Almost paradoxically, the goal of history is humanity's freedom; yet, it
is God who controls the flow of history towards that goal. Again,
Hegel maintains an extremely close unity of God and humanity- Fourth,
history is a logical process. Thus, historical knowledge is a combina
tion of empirical and the a priori, the unity of objective and subjective.
Taking history as purely empirical means that one is limited in studying
only events. One cannot posit any reason connecting events. For Hegel
the a priori is logic, i.e., reason serving as the foundation for historical
flow. History in Hegel's mind
consists of actions and actions have an inside and an outside;
on the outside they are mere events, related in space and time
but not otherwise; on the inside Ijtj^y are thoughts bound to
each other by logical connexions.
Ibid., p. 118.
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Hegel does not split the inside and the outside. There is a unity
between the two. Event must have an ascertainable meaning and that
meaning is ascertained through logic. Fifth, Hegel's doctrine of history
maintains that history ends not in the future, but in the present.
Justifying this claim, Hegel says that future events are not objects of
knowledge but of hopes and fears. History must end in the present
113
because nothing else has happened.
In Hegel's Philosophy of History the history of all humanity flows
together for one purpose, freedom. This is despite the fact that the
particular individuals may be totally unaware of the part they play in
universal history-
Spirit uses and works through the totality of blind drives,
passions, and interests of men. Spirit progresses as men are
moved by their desireSj^^ Thus, the passions of men are the
mainspring of history.
The life of Christ is a key event in the movement of history. All
of world history had been working toward the birth of Christianity
which, as was already discussed, is the absolute religion. Thus, for
Hegel, the history of the world is essentially divided by the life of
IIS
Christ. Christianity provides the religious framework for the abso
lute spirit to have total self-reflection. That is, vn Christ God freely
know Himself, hence the significance of the Trinity.
This raises the question of the Christ of Hegel's Philosophy of
Religion and the Christ of history. To be sure Hegel views Christ as
being the symbol of divine-human unity. Hegel answers Lessing's
quandary concerning "the ugly broad ditch" he (Lessing) cannot cross.
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(Lessing will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter).
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For Hegel, Christ and the cult, which is the life of the Christian Church,
represent that bridge between "the necessary truths of reason" and
"contingent truths of history." Though Christ is an historical figure
who is past in any ordinary physical sense, his Church represents him
not just symbolically but also in his present reality in Christian commun
ity. Fackenheim points out that for Hegel,
The past divine incursion becomes present reality only if it
lives in the present community, as well as being the past
object of its present representation. The redemptive event of
Christian faith, then, is only begun by its occurence in the
historical past. It completes itself in its perpetual recurr|e.ru;e
in the community which lives by its believing acceptance.
Christ started the Christian cult and is its historical foundation; the
Holy Spirit lives in the community and is an historical extention of the
118
historical Christ as it is lives through the Church.
This bridge has its existence apart from Hegel's abstract philosophy.
Thus, he does not supply an answer to Lessing's question which did
not already exist. What Hegel does in his Logic is to articulate in
abstract language the unity between necessary truths of reason and
119
contingent truths of history.
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^^^Hegel, Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 3, p. lOOff.
^^^Fackenheim, p. 144.
CHAPTER THREE
KIERKEGAARD
Kierkegaard and Hegel
Much of Kierkegaard's philosophy was written in reaction to the
philosophical system of Hegel. To facilitate an understanding of
Kierkegaard it is necessary to outline briefly some key philosophical
components popular in Kierkegaard's day.
The center of attention in the nineteenth century was the distinc
tion between thought and being. As was pointed out earlier, Kant makes
this same distinction with phenomenon (thought) and noumenon (being).
Kierkegaard lauds Kant for making the thought-being distinction and, at
the same time, denounces Hegel for his attempted unity of the two.
Kierkegaard records in his journal:
If one attempts to characterize the confusion of modern
philosophy in brief, in a single word, particularly since
the time that, to use a cliche, it forsook Kant's honest
course and, if I may put it so, squandered the proverbial
hundred talers in order to become theocentriCj, I know of
no better word to describe it than dishonest.
Kierkegaard praises Kant for his refutation of the ontological proof
of God's existence propounded by Anselm of Canterbury. He argues
from the concept of a highest being to the reality of such a being.
Herman Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction, trans. David
Green (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 72.
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Kant attacks the notion that thought bears upon or has being or can
rightly claim such a proposition. In Kant's refutation of this idea, he
demonstrates that conceptually there is no difference between a hundred
possible talers and a hundred real talers but that the difference is
2
in regard to their reality.
For this line of reasoning Kierkegaard called Kant's reasoning an
"honest course." Hegel reacted against Kant's dualism of thought/being
or phenomenon/noumenon . Hegel maintains that there is reality or being
in thought and Kierkegaard calls this "dishonest." Hegel attempts to
bridge the distinction between Kant's noumenon and phenomenon by
3
seeking reality within the ego itself.
Hegel presupposes that in the act of thinking, what is thought
and thought itself are equivalent in the dialectical moment. This dia
lectical moment is most comprehensively defined as the synthesis of
being and essence in the absolute idea as Hegel describes it in his
Logic. This synthetic moment (the absolute idea) is not simply a
matter of the human ego knowing reality, but also, in the fullest sense,
one's self-knowing is God's act of self-knowing. One knows reality
because God knows it in and through human minds.
For Hegel this synthetic moment is not a state, but a process or
an event. And in this event God is at work. "What is thought is not
a state; thought is a living process of becoming. The reality of our
thinking is a component of the reality of God."^ Because reality (God)
is brought to one by the thought process, revelation is free from random
accidents of history. This is what Kierkegaard means when he uses the
term "theocentric. "
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 73. ^Ibid., p. 74.
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The question naturally arises: What is the object of pure thought?
The question cannot be answered with the normal subject-object schema,
in which the thinking individual confronts an object of which an image
must be formed. The object is the act of thinking through which one
comprehends reality by creating it intellectually. This reality is not
only the reality of self but of all of history.
One of the major objections of Kierkegaard to Hegel's schema is
that Hegel's logic or the idea of pure thought is static. It does not
possess the idea of a real becoming. As was noted earlier, Hegel
maintains that thought involved "becoming." Kierkegaard, though,
maintains that Hegel disregards the limits of logic and smuggles the
5
notion of becoming into it. Kierkegaard argues: "In logic, no move
ment becomes; logic and everything logical can merely be; and just this
impotence of what is logical is the transition of logic to become, where
g
existence and reality appear." In Kierkegaard's mind it is totally
illegitimate to unify thought and being. Pure thinking does not possess
the category of metaphysical reality in its concepts. It is an abstraction
from reality. Thus, as far as Kierkegaard is concerned, Hegel's entire
system is built on an error, i.e., thought possesses being.
^
Kierkegaard's existential dialectic is articulated as a polemic against
Hegel's system of thought and being. Both start at the same point,
which is the ego reflecting upon self. However, they take different
courses when it became necessary to define ego more closely and distin
guish the subject and object of knowledge within the identity of the
ego. Hegel's emphasis in inquiry is upon reality in general, whereas
^Ibid., p. 75. ^Ibid., p. 76. '^Ibid.
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Kierkegaard inquires about self or the individual's personal existence.
Kierkegaard writes: "For all knowledge of reality is (mere) possibility;
the only reality an existing individual does more than know about is his
own being, and this reality constitutes his absolute concern."^
A marked disparity occurs between Kierkegaard and Hegel at this
point. Kierkegaard does not allow thought to go beyond existence.
When examining self, there is no pure thought for Kierkegaard. The
thinker cannot leave the realm of his own existence. Therefore, the
object of thought is the subject. The weight of Kierkegaard's message
is upon a growing awareness of the existing self. When one starts, not
with thought but with existence, one is dealing with true "becoming."
Kierkegaard's existential dialectic is focused on the ego's increasing
awareness of itself as an existing ego, an awareness that provides the
9
ego with its reality.
Existence for Kierkegaard is a binding force essentially finite, yet
human beings are aware of an infinite dimension. Out of this tension of
the finite and infinite comes passion which in turn creates the unity.
Kierkegaard states: "Only in rare moments can the particular individ
ual as he exists experience a unity of finite and infinite, a unity that
10
transcends existence. This is the moment of passion.
Kierkegaardian Dialectic
The essence of personhood is one's sense of value and ethics.
There is nothing more existential than the way in which one lives.
Within the tension of the ideal and the real there is a type of double
Q 10
Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 77. ""ibid.
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reflection as one thinks of one's self. In the first stage of reflection
the thinker finds a universal principle; in the second stage, a particular
1 1
application of this principle to the individual's life is discovered.
This last stage of reflection makes way for action, for ethical reform.
The weight of emphasis is upon the subject and his/her responsibility.
Thus, "a consciousness of this double reflection and its essential character
will transform all ethical and ethio-religious communication into a maieutic
art."''^
In contrast to this, Kierkegaard sees objective thought as failing
to apprehend the necessity of application of the ideal. Objectivity
tends to reduce the role of the individual and of individual responsibility.
For Kierkegaard the individual is everything and what is outside one's self
is accidental and vanishing. This will be seen when "truth as subjectivity"
is dealt with later in this paper.
Value judgment is a major emphasis in the existential dialectic. With
Kierkegaard's emphasis on subject, it could be no different since human
13
existence is essentially a search and quest for the ideal. This dia
lectic is anything but static. It entails endless movements within three
chief spheres of value: aesthetic, ethical, and religious. "The normal
life-movement for an existing individual is from the aesthetic, through
14
the ethical, to the religious." Therefore, a person is always in process,
always becoming, for becoming is the essence of being. The individual
is always aware of the tension but is at the same time moving towards
the ideal.
^^David F. Swenson, Something About Kierkegaard, ed. Lillian
M. Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub., 1946), p. 114.
"�^Ibid., p. 115. ''^Ibid., p. 110 '''^Ibid., p. 117.
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This is by no means the natural flow of things. The process of
becoming in Kierkegaard's sense is not something automatic. In des
cribing the human situation he utilizes Christian categories to describe
humanity's predicament. This is by no means an arbitrary choice.
Kierkegaard views Christianity as the answer for humanity. The signif
icant work in which he appropriates Christian categories is Philosophical
Fragments, even though he never uses the term "Christian" in it.
Articulating schematically the content of this work is difficult. For good
reason the work is entitled Fragments. Kierkegaard relies on an indirect
method of communication which makes logical analysis form a formidable
task. This was done as a protest against the Hegelian system which
purports to lay the doctrine of God out in a lucid, logical fashion.
With this in mind, this section shall touch some of the key ideas in
Fragments to give the reader a feel for Kierkegaard's way of writing
theology.
Fragments
As has been stated earlier, Kierkegaard's Fragments is a protest
against Hegel's "system." An understanding of the way in which Kierke
gaard revamps the Hegelian view of sin is important. This is directly
related to the earlier discussion of value judgments and ethics. In
Kierkegaard's mind there can be no real and meaningful definition of
sin. Hegel raises his system to a realm of abstraction where, as far as
Kierkegaard is concerned, self-existence and reality can never appear.
Kierkegaard's main concern however, is how one is transformed from
non-being to being. "The problem of transition from non-being to
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being is the problem of sin." Hegel defines sin negatively as being
in a state of weakness or deprivation of spirit. The problem of sin for
Hegel is that sin must be seen as the transitory aspect of the dialectical
process. Thus, sin is something negative that comes about when a
thinker seeks to hold fast to one aspect of the dialectical process,
1 6
making movement of the dialectical process impossible.
Kierkegaard takes quite a different approach to sin. He does not
view sin negatively as does Hegel. Sin is more than mere deficiency, it
possesses positiveness. The problem of sin arises when self takes
responsibility for self in its natural state. The ego wishes to move
from a present state to an ideal state. At this point Kierkegaard runs
headlong into Hegel, for the question arises: how does one dispose of
17
that which has no being in order that that which has being may appear?
Hegel, because he works in pure abstraction, does not incur this problem.
But, for Kierkegaard this is a clear logical impasse, and the task of
moving from non-being to being is beyond the realm of human possibility.
Thus, this is the problem of sin. Humanity cannot overcome sin. Sin
is a positive force which holds humanity back from authentic existence.
Somehow the power of sin must be broken in order that the real self
may take on self-existence. Ultimately the answer to the problem is
forgiveness of sins.
Kierkegaard refuses to delineate a system of "doctrine" of sin
simply because sin is rooted in existence. It has real significance. He
is careful not to commit the same error as Hegel which was believing
that theology could be articulated exhaustively in an abstract logical
system. By avoiding any hint of such procedure Kierkegaard forcefully
'"^Diem, p. 82. ''^Ibid. ''^Ibid. ''^Ibid., p. 83.
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makes it clear that existence does not lend itself to being defined by a
logical system. Consequently, the forgiveness of sins is not a "doctrine"
but rather a process or living dynamic which takes place between God
and person.
In Kierkegaard's The Concept of Dread, he makes the point that
sin is not a thing to be studied as if one could ever hope to understand
it. In addressing the question under what branch of knowledge sin
should be studied, the answer is none. After treating the possibility
of studying sin under psychology, aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, or
dogmatics, he concludes that, "Sin does not properly belong in any
�19
science.
"
Kierkegaard opens Philosophical Fragments with some questions
which outline the problem of Christian revelation.
Can eternal consciousness have an historical starting point?
How can such a starting point be of more than historical
interest? Can everlasting salvation be based on knowledge of
a historical datum?
These questions set the agenda for both his works Fragments and
Concluding Unscientific Postscript.
Kierkegaard in Fragments adopts the Socratic method of teaching
as a starting point for communicating theological truth. It is important
to understand that Kierkegaard attempts to answer Lessing's problem of
epistemology in terms of Lessing's categories. Lessing equates theolog
ical truth with eternal truth, thus allowing no connection between
theological truth and historical event. This will be dealt with later in
Sglren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans.
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ.,
1974), p. 14.
SjzJren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F.
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1974), p. title
page.
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this paper. But suffice it to say, this understanding of the nature of
theological truth shapes the whole of Kierkegaard's theology.
Within the Socratic method of teaching the teacher does not actually
teach the student. Instead, the teacher functions maieutically by
causing the student to realize the universal truth already within the
student. Kierkegaard writes with reference to the Socratic method,
"Thus the Truth is not introduced into the individual from without, but
21
was within." The role of the teacher, then, is one of a midwife. In
other words, the teacher is incidental and serves only as an occasion
for causing the student to remember the truth. This scheme places no
emphasis on the time of occasion nor the place. The important item is
that the truth is remembered by the student. Kierkegaard states:
"From the standpoint of the Socratic thought every point of departure
22
m time is eo ipso accidental, an occasion, a vanishing moment."
Kierkegaard realizes, however, that truth will never be found by this
method. He writes further: " . . . it is not possible to advance
beyond Socrates, nor will one reach the concept of a Revelation, but
23
merely remain within the sphere of idle chatter."
There is infinitely more to truth than what the Socratic method
could ever discover. For truth has been revealed in the incarnation of
Christ. Truth is not had through mere dialectical thinking, but ulti
mately it comes from God who encounters humanity in history. If God
himself is our teacher and he reveals himself in time, then that moment
24
in time has "decisive significance." This would not be a regular
teacher whose occasion for teaching is accidental. God is truth and,
simultaneously, teacher; thus, when he confronts a person it is an
21
Ibid., p. 11.
22
Ibid., p. 13.
23
Ibid., p. 14.
24
Ibid. , D. 16.
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occasion of decisive significance. He is not a teacher among teachers,
but he is the teacher of truth because he is truth. This places him in
a most unique situation.
The task of this special teacher is not to cause the student to
remember the truth that is within the student but to cause the student
to see his/her own error. This error is sin, the very thing which
keeps one from the truth. Kierkegaard explains: "The Teacher is
then the God himself, who in acting as an occasion prompts the learner
25
to recall that he is in Error." It is only this divine teacher which
gives the condition to the student for accepting the truth. This giving
of the condition when the Divine encounters a person is called "the
moment. "
The clear emphasis in Kierkegaard is on self-existence. The past
does not exist; the future does not exist - only the present exists.
Thus, past historical events receive little attention. The emphasis is
on the present, for in the present there is true existence. The fact
that God became incarnate in time is true but its significance cannot be
historically perceived. The weight of importance is the "now", i.e.,
the present moment, when God encounters one in their own existence.
How then is one to know of the historicity of the incarnation? Indirectly
Kierkegaard explains: "I always reason from existence, not toward
existence, whether I move in the sphere of palpable sensible fact or in
the realm of thought." Objective knowledge is restricted to the
present emperical moment. The past event of the incarnation is known,
not through objective historical inquiry but through God's revelation to
an individual in the moment, in one's existence, i.e., the present.
Ibid., p. 19. Ibid., p. 50.
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The present experience of faith verifies the past event of the incarna
tion.
For Kierl<egaard, to exist is to be in process of becoming. The
human predicament is that humanity is between non-being and being.
How then can God who is pure being, who is truth, enter into a realm
where to exist means to be in process of becoming? How can the
infinite be contained in the finite? This idea is an affront to reason.
Christian belief involves a collision of reason with the absolute paradox.
There is no reconciling the two. But there is optimism in Kierkegaard.
He states: "If the Paradox and the Reason come together in a mutual
understanding of their unlikeness their encounter will be happy, like
27love's understanding." But this is only a possibility, for if reason
refuses to accept the paradox there is an unhappy relationship. He
28
calls this refusal to accept the paradox as offense.
This paradox is not a logical paradox but a living paradox which
acts upon humanity. Reason does not discover the paradox; the para
dox confronts reason which makes the paradox more offensive.
Kierkegaard states: "This discovery was not made by the reason; it
29
was the Paradox that placed the Reason on the stoll of wonderment."
There is no plea on Kierkegaard's part for reason ever to under
stand the paradox but only to accept it. One is only to "understand
30
that this is the Paradox." When reason and paradox encounter each
other and reason accepts the paradox then a happy moment occurs.
This moment takes place "when the Reason sets itself aside and the
31
Paradox bestows itself." This union of paradox and reason, which
32
occurs in the moment engenders a third entity which he calls faith.
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Ibid., p. 61.
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Ibid.
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Ibid., p. 65.
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Ibid. , D. 72.
31
Ibid., p. 73.
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Kierkegaard and History
Kierkegaard's understanding of history and its relationship to faith
now be treated. What are the answers to his opening questions on
he title page of Fragments? At this point it is necessary to pull together
-ragments and Postscript, for only by examining both works in light of
;ach other can one come to terms with his understanding of history.
Kierkegaard states that the most important point of theology has
Deen stated in Fragments. This emphasis permeates the whole of his
iheology, i.e., that the historical is secondary and the meaning is
Drimary. Thus, he considers the task of writing Postscript as approach
ing the problem "in its historical costume.
""^^ The essential message of
Christianity is stated in Fragments. The validity of historical inquiry is
a second thought. In describing the two works he states: "The author
can scarcely be charged with having indulged in the feminine practice
of saying the most important thing ... as an after-thought, in a
note at the end."^^ The kernel of truth is in Fragments.
To understand Kierkegaard's methodology one must deal with
Lessing's articulation of the problem of historical knowledge and eternal
truth. In a sense Lessing sets the agenda for Kierkegaard's dealing
with the problem. A brief description of Lessing's famous "ditch" is
in order.
Lessing's main concern is with theological proof of Christianity.
One of his presuppositions is the necessity for certainty in the
Christian faith. He rejects any type of historical proof on the ground
that there is not certainty in historical investigation. Two questions
Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 15. Ibid., p.
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emerge in Lessing's argument. Wiiat is tiie role of history in theologi
cal truth and can the facticity of an historical event be verified? These
two problems are quite distinct. To reject a particular account of an
event on the grounds of its failure to satisfy the criteria of reliable
historical assertion does nothing to settle the problem of the role such
35
an account could play. To make one question bear upon the other
question is a fundamental error. Nevertheless Lessing makes these
two questions interdependent. His argument is: if there is no cer
tainty with regard to historical questions, then history can have
nothing more than an accidental place in theological truth. For Lessing,
certainty is of paramount importance. If a method gave no certainty
then the method is invalid, at least for religious discourse.
Another fundamental assumptoin Lessing makes is that universal
truth is tantamount to theological truth. By necessity universal truth
is mutually exclusive from historical truth simply because history is
ensconced in time. That which is rooted in time cannot be universal
or eternal. Not everyone has access to certain historical events.
Therefore, equating theological truth with universal truth necessitates
an abyss between historical and theological truth (universal or eternal
truth). This abyss Lessing calls his broad ugly ditch. He writes:
That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get
across, however, often and however earnestly I have tried
to make the leap. If anyone can help me over it, let him
do it. I beg hir^g I adjure him. He will deserve a divine
reward from me.
Richard Campbell, 'Lessing's Problem and Kierkegaard's
Answer,' The Scottish Journal of Theology, 19 (March 1966):43.
Gotthold Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings, trans.
Henry Chadwich (Stanford: Stanford Univ., 1957), p. 55.
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A problem with Lessing's situation is that he is adjuring someone
to jump a logical ditch which he himself has dug. Given his categories
and presuppositions, the ditch cannot be logically jumped. Again, it
must be emphasized that the failure to understand the difference between
the two questions cited earlier will lead to Lessing's conclusions if one
equates theological and universal truth.
Kierkegaard's solution to Lessing's ditch was to give up ordinary
37
historical assertions as theologically instructive. This was also Lessing's
approach to the problem. Lessing states: "If no historical truth can
be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of histor
ical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become
38
the proof of necessary truths of reason."
Theological truth for Lessing must come through another medium
than history, since history is incapable of containing universal truths.
Being a product of eighteenth century rationalism, the obvious solution
to the problem of certainty is found within reason.
The cogency of Lessing's conclusion hinges upon an implicit a
priori assumption that theological truths come into the class of "neces
sary truth of reason." This is to say that these types of truths lend
themselves to the sort of deductive demonstration that one finds in
39
Euclid. If Lessing's identification of necessary truths of reason with
theological truth is conceded, then the impassable ditch is a foregone
conclusion .
Kierkegaard embraces Lessing's statement of the problem of his
torical knowledge and theological truth. In the opening chapters of
Postscript, Kierkegaard examines Lessing's idea of historical and eternal
Campbell, p. 44. Lessing, p. 53.
Campbell, p. 45.
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truth and praises him for his stand. He says of Lessing: "He religiously
shut himself up within the isolation of his own subjectivity; that he
did not permit himself to be decieved into becoming world-historic and
systematic with respect to the religious. "'^^ This is also an indirect
cut at Hegel and his system. Kierkegaard dismisses the idea that
religious truth has anything to do with historical inquiry.
Historical inquiry leads only to an approximation. There is no
certitude in historical knowledge; therefore, it cannot serve as an
epistemological base out of which to know religious truth. He writes:
"An approximation, when viewed as a basis for an eternal happiness, is
wholly inadequate, since the incommensurability makes a result im-
41
possible." Regardless of how diligently one may research the history
of the resurrection one can only come to an approximate certainty which,
for Kierkegaard, is no certainty at all. Kierkegaard terms this historical
42
probability "quantitative approximation." The 'qualitative dialectic' is
theological truth; quantitative approximation can never have anything to
say to qualitative dialectic. Thus, a gulf exists between them. This is
part of the meaning of the term "leap." Kierkegaard does not leap from
the historical to the eternal truth but rather from eternal truth to history.
The histroicity of the Scripture is valid and factual, but the way one
knows that is by a leap of faith based on an encounter with the Divine.
The objective never leads to the subjective. The starting point must be
self-existence, i.e., subjectivity. Any objective vertification is merely
accidental. Based on this Kierkegaard can say "no one can become
immediately contemporary with this historical fact . . . it is an object
Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 61. Ibid., p. 25
Ibid., p. 29.
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of faith since it concerns coming into existence. "^^ As he develops this
idea the weight and importance of the paradox becomes clear. God
entering into existence is the Absolute Paradox. How the Truth can be
"coming into existence" is beyond all understanding. Even the disciples
who were contemporary to Christ had to take a leap of faith and believe
that the Divine had come into existence. These disciples did not believe
because of objective facts, but they believed because God as teacher
spoke to them. Kierkegaard writes: "But no contemporary can believe
44
by virtue of his immediate sensation and immediate cognition."
Because of Kierkegaard's idea of truth being subjective, he must
maintain that there can be no difference between the contemporary dis
ciple of Christ and one living at present. In both cases the starting
point of revelation is "self." "Thus at no time does the past become
necessary.
"^^ This is basically due to the fact that existence is in the
present and it is in the present which God reveals himself. But even
if the objective fact is standing in the presence of a contemporary
disciple there still must be that subjective encounter to which one
ideally responds by faith. Any "attempt to construct a quantitative
approach to faith is a misunderstanding, and (that) any appearance is
46
successful in this endeavor is an illusion."
Kierkegaard posits a rigid division of objective and subjective
when it comes to religious matters. Truth is not an object to be taught
but a subject to encounter or by which to be encountered by. Attempt
ing to articulate truth as object or adducing objective facts to support
the veracity of an event is to misunderstand the nature of truth.
44^
Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 109. Ibid., p. 106.
'^^Ibid. ^^Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 15.
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Kierkegaard states:
Objectively the interest is focused on the thought-content,
subjective on the inwardness. At its maximum, this inward
"how" is the passion of the infinite and the passion of the
infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely
subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the truth ....
Only in subjectivity is there decisiveness; to seek objectivity
is to be in error. It is the passion of the infinite that is
the decisive factor, and not its content, for its content is
precisely itself. In this manner si^l^jectivity and the sub
jective "how" constitute the truth.
Kierkegaard's emphasis on truth as subjectivity intensifies his idea
of a "leap of faith" because it is a "tremendous risk, and objectively
48
groundless affirmation of the rationally incredible." This is not to
say the leap is irrational or blind. Kierkegaard's frequent use of the
words "absurd" and "paradoxical" can lead one to believe that he is
advocating irrationalism. In reading Kierkegaard one needs to keep in
mind that the audience for whom he is writing are persons who believe
that Christianity is a completely rationalistic doctrine, which can be
49
fully understood, proven true once and for all. One must also keep
in mind that one views the eternal only through finite eyes. It is fair
to say that the paradoxes about which Kierkegaard speaks are so because
one exists. In other words, they appear to be contradictory but in
God's eternity they are not. There is good reason to take a leap of
faith, but the reasons are all subjective. Kierkegaard explains:
When the believer believes the absurd is not the absurd faith
transforms it ... . The passion of faith is the only thing
capable of mastering the absurd .... In the category of
^�^Ibid., p. 181.
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Arthur E. Murphy, "On Kierkegaard's Claim That 'Truth is
Subjective'," in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry Gill (Minneapolis:
Burgess, 1966), p. 96.
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Elmer Duncan, S^ren Kierkegaard, Makers of the Modern
Theological Mind. (Waco, Texas: Word, 1979), p. 86.
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the absurd rightly understood, there is therefore absolutely
nothing terrifying.
Kierkegaard has much to say to us today. His emphasis on the
subjective aspect of truth is something which some overlook as being
irrelevant for theology today. Kierkegaard's impact upon existential
thinkers is incalculable. Through his influence new vistas have been
opened which bring into full bloom the wonder of subject or personhood
which was effectively squelched under the force of cold impersonal
rationalism. One begins to think that truth is nothing more than propo
sition. Somewhere in the meticulously laid out logic and reasoning of
the Enlightenment, the personhood of Christ was lost. Kierkegaard and
other existential writers have and are accentuating the fact that God is
person and that he strives to have a personal relationship with humanity.
The dynamic of personhood is infinitely greater than any logical system.
Kierkegaard has rightly brought this to attention.
However, there are some key points in Kierkegaard which are
problematic. The major question should be asked: is Kierkegaardian
thought Biblical? The answer in some instances seems to be no; for
example, his acceptance of Lessing's bifurcation of theological truth and
history is questionable. The Biblical revelation is history. Lessing's
two questions concerning the role of history in theological truth and the
verification of the facticity of historical events, which he sees as bear
ing upon each other, are difficult to correspond with biblical revelation.
Another weak point in Kierkegaard's theology is that the Old
Testament is unnecessary for revelation. Of course, this grows out of
Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard: 'Paradox' and Irrationalism,"
in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry Gill, (Minneapolis: Burgess, 1966),
p. 110.
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his disinterest in history as revelation. With his emphasis that history
is accidental the question must be asked whether history is necessary
at all. Once history and revelation have been separated, one's theology
is set afloat with no objective basis and it quickly becomes a religion
among religions.
Kierkegaard and Kant
A comparison of Kant and Kierkegaard is interesting. Obviously
much can be said about their differences. There is, however, some
overlap in their ethical theory. In fact, it has been suggested "that
Kierkegaard did not have a distinctive ethical theory of his own. He
51
adopted, with some adjustment the ethical theory of Immanuel Kant."
The emphasis of this writer's comparison is on an epistemological.
The dearth of material on this type of comparison of Kant and Kierkegaard's
epistemology makes it a difficult subject to research. The writer wishes
simply to make note of some fundamental comparisons.
One finds in the epistemologies of both Kant and Kierkegaard a
radical break between faith and knowledge. Kant posits the inapplica
bility of the categories of the mind to the noumenal world. Thus, any
argument to prove the existence of God is invalid. That which is in
the phenomenal cannot speak of that which is in the noumenal with any
certainty. Kant writes:
Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a
theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that
the principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct
us to any theological truths, and consequently, that a
rational theology can have no existence, unless it is found
upon the laws of morality. For all synthetical principles
of the understanding are valid only as immanent in exper
ience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates
Duncan, p. 57.
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their being employed transc|gdentally and of this the under
standing is quite incapable.
In a word, Kant thinks metaphysics to be impossible. Like Kierke
gaard, no stock can be placed in reason when religious matters are at
hand. In Prolegomen to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant advises thinkers
not to bother themselves with traditional metaphysics, since it is strictly
a logical impossibility. Kant bases knowledge of God on ethics; Kierke
gaard on a moment of subjective encounter with the Divine. They both
agree that reason cannot contribute to a knowledge of God. The rigid
line that separates reason and faith bears upon both epistemologies.
Two reasons can be cited for Kant's epistemological line between
reason and religious knowledge. First, it enables Kant to isolate the
nature and limitations of speculative reason. Second, Kant is able to
53
establish moral philosophy and action on an independent basis.
Clearly, Kant wishes to base religion on a purely subjective level which
is his a priori sense of duty. These two reasons fit rather smoothly
into Kierkegaard's epistemology with some adjustment made concerning
ethics being a basis of religious knowledge. With this epistemological
line drawn, metaphysics or religious speculation is effectively denied.
After Kant had laid out the bifurcation of phenomenon and noumenon,
philosophers began to maintain that "the elements and categories of
human understanding actually reflect the structure and nature of the
54
noumenal world. The sophisticated analysis of human reason was
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 529.
^^Jerry Gill, "Kant, Kierkegaard and Religious Knowledge,"
in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry Gill (Minneapolis: Burgess, 1966),
p. 63.
Ibid., p. 65.
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used by later philosophers in a way quite different from that which
Kant ever intended. It was turned around and used as a key to un
locking the mysteries of the noumenon. The systematic philosophy of
Hegel represents the climax of this method of metaphysics. Hegel's
"Absolute Idealism" unites the structure of the mind with the structure
of transcendent reality. Thus, Hegel effected a marriage between
philosophy and religious knowledge, a marriage against which Kierke
gaard rebelled and which Kant never intended.
Some suggest that Kierkegaard relied upon an epistemological
position similar to Kant's epistemology in order to overcome Hegel's
identification of idealistic philosophy with religious knowledge. Kierke
gaard's espousal of absolute dichotomy between faith and knowledge is
clearly seen from this journal entry:
But such a scientific method becomes especially dangerous and
pernicious when it would encroach also upon the sphere of
spirit. Let it deal with plants and animals and stars in that
way; but to deal with the human spirit in that way is blasphemy,
which only weakens ethical and religious passion. Even the
act of eating is more reasonable than speculating with a
microscope upon the functions of digestion .... A dread
ful sophistry spreads microscopically and telescopically into
tomes and yet in the last resort produces nothing, qualitatively,
though it does, to be sure, cheat men out of the simple,
profound and passionate wonder which gives impetus to the
ethical . . The only thing certain is the ethical-
religious.
It is interesting to note that Kant's epistemology precludes the
possibility of history serving as a revelatory mode. Because Kant
restricts knowledge to the phenomenal realm which is accessible to the
thinker by only two ways, sense impressions, and a priori categories,
history is silent concerning religious knowledge. Consequently, Kant and
Kierkegaard have essentially the same attitude concerning revelatory history.
Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. xv.
91
For both men, religious knowledge occurs at a purely subjective
level. With Kant it is ethical, with Kierkegaard it is the moment of
Divine encounter. For Kierkegaard, faith is a leap; reason must be
set aside. A happy moment occurs when "the Reason sets itself aside
and the Paradox bestows itself." There is also a type of leap in Kant
when one comes to religious knowledge. Here one acknowledges the moral
imperative within and "postulates" God and immortality. Compare the
following famous statement by Kant to Kierkegaard's statement above
concerning reason and faith.
It is evident that even the assumption--as made on behalf
of the necessary practical employment of my reason--of God,
freedom, and immortality if not permissible unless at the
same time speculative reason be deprived of its pretensions
to transcendent insight. For in order to arrive at such
insights, it must make use of principles which in fact, extend
only to objects of possible experience, and which, if also
applied to what cannot be an object of experience always
really change this into an appearance, thus rendering all
practical extension of pure reason impossible. I have
therefore found it nece^^ry to deny knowledge, in order
to make room for faith. (Italics mine)
It should be noted that when Kant spoke of experience he was not
referring to experience in a Kierkegaardian sense but rather as sense
experience. Both men found it necessary "to set aside" reason or "deny
knowledge" in order to make room for faith.
The dearth of comparisons between Kantian and Kierkegaardian
epistemology suggest that this is a topic which has not received due
attention. To be sure, the difference between these two men is enor
mous, particularly in light of the fact that Kant was a deist and
Kierkegaard, on a Biblical level, was quite traditional. Nevertheless,
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Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 73.
^^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 29.
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much can be gleaned from a detailed study of their respected episte
mologies which this writer thinks are quite similar at key points.
Concluding Remarks
It can be seen that Hegel epistemologically stands in many ways
against both Kant and Kierkegaard. Hegel attempts to unify the sub
jective and the objective. Kant and Kierkegaard separates them.
There can be no objective certainty concerning God in the framework of
Kant and Kierkegaard. Both view reason as having little to say when
it is applied to religious knowledge. Admittedly, there are marked
differences between Kant and Kierkegaard in that the former was a
deist and the latter was not. But both placed religious awareness in
the domain of the subjective. Hegel, as was seen earlier did not wish
to separate the objective from the subjective. One must also keep in
mind that much of Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel was based upon a
misunderstanding of Hegel. If Kierkegaard's assessment of Hegel is
correct, then Hegel did not unify the objective and the subjective but
dissolved the subjective into the objective, leaving only the objective
religious knowledge. As was argued in the previous chapter, this is
not obviously the case. Hegel assumed subjective certainty but he went
on to posit objective certainty as well based upon the subjective.
Both Lessing and Kierkegaard gave up the idea that critical history
is relevant to faith. Kant never gave it serious consideration because
of his deism. Hegel's God reveals himself on all levels of existence,
e.g., through art, philosophy, religion, nature, reason, history as well
as subjective revelation. For Hegel the whole of existence reveals God.
This is ascertainable by anyone who ventures inquiry. This is the
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underlying thrust of Hegel's system, that religious knowledge can be
derived from every aspect of human existence. Hegel attempts to
orchestrate all of them into a system. Hegel strives to demonstrate that
existence is indeed unified and that one really does live in a uni-verse.
Kierkegaard should be appreciated for his emphasis that truth
(God) is not an object to be cut up, categorized and systemitized as he
felt Hegel had done. One wonders if Kierkegaard has not done the
theological community a favor by reminding them of this fact. One
could suspect that in Hegel's attempt to objectively articulate a "system"
he, not unwittingly, reduces God to an object. For Hegel, God is
primarily an object to be understood rather than a subject to be exis
tentially known.
Today's theological community is indebted to Hegel for emphasizing
that history is a means of religious knowledge. God is active in history
revealing himself through the actions of individuals. Hegel employs an
important Biblical motif, that history is the arena in which God and
humanity enter into a relationship. Much can be gained by careful
study of Kierkegaard and Hegel and their concepts of religious knowl
edge. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between them. An examination
of the thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg will hopefully point in the direc
tion of a mediating position.
PART TWO
WOLFHART PANNENBERG:
A CONTEMPORARY RESPONSE TO
THE PROBLEM OF REVELATION
AND KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER FOUR
PANNENBERG
The Neo-orthodox Setting
An extreme epistemological dualism grew to be a major theological
premise of twentieth century theology. In particular Karl Barth and
Rudolf Bultmann are representative of recent attempts to come to terms
with the problem of faith and history as articulated by Kant, Hegel and
Kierkegaard. Kart Barth (1886-1968), influenced especially by both
Kant and Kierkegaard's epistemology, posits the locus of revelation in
language (word) not in history (event). He grounds the reality of
2
revelation within history, but history is not revelation. The "Word of
God" is the focus of revelation. One receives the Word of God by
Scripture with the aid of the Holy Spirit. This releases revelation from
being bound by historical events which do not "exist" and places it
squarely in the present which is existence. The Holy Spirit through
Scripture reveals God. All knowledge of God is rooted in the Word of
God and is not open to historical investigation as a means of religious
Thiselton, p. 322.
p
Laurence W. Wood, "The Relation of Theology and History
Studies in the Context of Epistemological Dualisms" (Ph. D. dissertation.
University of Edinburgh, 1972), p. 205.
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certainty. The Word of God always speaks to the present, i.e.,
existence. By this emphasis of revelation, Barth obviates the problem
of the relationship of historical investigation and religious certainty.
He accomplishes this by promulgating that revelation "has nothing to
4
do with the general problem of historical understanding."
Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1876) supports Barth's basic approach to
revelation and historical knowledge. "Barth rightly saw, Bultmann
remarks, that Christianity is not merely 'a phenomenon of the history
5
of religion.'" Bultmann goes beyond Barth in bifurcating fact and
value, historical knowledge and revelation. Whereas Barth posits
history as being the basis for revelation, Bultmann completely splits
history and revelation. He theologizes with the critical assumption
that there are two types of history, Historie and Geschichte. "Historie
designates what actually happened. It points to those events which take
place in the cause-effect chain and which can be studied by historians
employing scientific-methods." Bultmann expresses no interest in
Historie as having anything to do with theology. In Kantian categories
Historie is a purely phenomenal and has no bearing upon theology. In
contrast to this "Geschichte designates an event of history which con
tinues to have influence or meaning on later persons and events."^ It
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Introduction to the Theology of Karl
Barth, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), p. 57.
'^Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of the Word of
God, Vol. I, part 1, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1963), p. 168.
^Thiselton, p. 322.
^Morris Ashcraft, Rudolf Bultmann, ed. Bob E. Patterson,
Makers of the Modern Theological Mind (Waco, TX: Word, 1974), p. 35.
'^Ibid., p. 36.
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has to do with value or timeless truth. Bultmann places faith solely upon
Geschichte, not Historie. Thus, he leaves theology out of the phenomenal
realm and places it in the noumenal realm (Kant's category) which is
purely value and not fact.
Bultmann's epistemological schema possesses great significance for
the actual historical (historisch) facts of the New Testament. He denies
o
the actual resurrection. He declares:
It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to
avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries,
and at the same time tOg believe in the New Testament world
of spirits and miracles.
In light of this he can assert the validity of an Easter faith apart from
the resurrection because theology is concerned with value and has nothing
to do with fact. Kant's divorce of theology from phenomenon finds easy
expression in twentieth century existentialism.
A major result of Barth and Bultmann's theology is the fragmentation
of existence and truth. With good reason Kierkegaard entitles one of
his major polemics against Hegel's comprehensive philosophy as Philo
sophical Fragments. Thus, just as there are two types of history there
are two types of truth, i.e., factual and value, with theology having
to do with the latter. With this fragmentation, it naturally follows that
theology would be preoccupied with ethics. This is lucidly seen in the
works of both Kant and Kierkegaard.
The rise of religious existentialism devastated historical knowledge's
place in theology. Bultmann writes:
^Rudolf Bultmann et al., Kerygma and Myth, ed. Hans W. Bartsch
(New York: Harper and Row, 1961), pp. 38ff.
^Ibid., p. 5.
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It would be wrong ... to raise again the problem of how
this preaching arose historically, as though that could
vindicate its truth. That would be to tie our faith in the
Word of God to the results of historical research ....
It is not for us to question (the Word of God's) creden
tials.
Thus, historical knowledge is silenced in relation to faith and theology.
Faith, then, must stand upon itself. It possesses no objective basis.
Pannenberg stands as a twentieth century alternative to existential
hermeneutics. He rejects the Kantian epistemological dualism which is
foundational to Bultmann. Pannenberg views Bultmann and those who
have similar views of history as accepting "all too uncritically the neo-
Kantian distinction between being and value. "^^
Pannenberg refuses to accept the underlying epistemological dual
ism fundamental to existential theology. He rejects Kierkegaard's divorce
of faith from historical knowledge. When one examines Pannenberg's
position, a definite pattern emerges from the historical flow of thought.
As was pointed out in the previous chapter, both Kant and Kierkegaard
separate fact and value. As was also seen, Hegel reacts to this bifur
cation and attempts to construct a system unifying fact and value,
phenomenon and noumenon, history and faith. According to Kierkegaard,
1 2this attempt failed to bring the two together. Thus, Kierkegaard
moves epistemologically back towards Kant as he places theology out of
the reach of pure reason or historical inquiry.
Pannenberg, in his reaction to Kant - Kierkegaardian dualisms,
moves epistemologically back towards Hegel. He believes that Hegel's basic
"'Ibid., p. 41.
11
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, trans.
George H. Kehm (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), p. 85.
12
Kierkegaard, pp. 110-3.
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approach to theology is correct. Pannenberg states:
One might suppose that Christian theology would have had
sufficient reason to welcome Hegel's philosophy as a means
of rescuing itself from its difficult situation, as a liberation
from the attacks of rationalist criticisms upon the substance
of Christian faith and rom the pressure to seek refuge from
these attacks in an inward piety without content.
Pannenberg also concurringly cites Barth's question: "Why did Hegel
not become for the Protestant world something similar to what Thomas
15
Aquinas was for Roman Catholicism?" One of Pannenberg's basic goals
is to plant faith back into history and move theology back to a more
Biblical view of revelation. He attempts to do this by positing history as
1 6
revelation; thus, unifying Historie and Geschichte. This chapter will
demonstrate how Pannenberg does this through an examination of some
of his main ideas.
Truth
Fundamental to Pannenberg's approach to theology is his concept of
truth. One's view of truth plays a determinitive role in how one articu
lates theology. Pannenberg carefully traces the history of the concept
of truth and, then, voices his own views. A brief recapitulation of
Pannenberg's approach follows.
The question of truth is one of the most important questions put
to Christianity by both the religious and secular community. The issue
'�^Thiselton, p. 83.
^"^Wolfhart Pannenberg, The Idea of God and Human Freedom,
trans. R. A. Wilson (Philadelphia! Westminster, 1973), p. 159.
^^Ibid., p. 160.
^^John B. Cobb and James M. Robinson, eds. Theology as
History, Vol. Ill (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 127.
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at hand is not whether Christianity represents a particular type of
truth among other truths. The question is whether or not Christianity
is the absolute truth whose essence is one. Inquiring into the truth
of Christianity is to inquire into the whole of reality. Christian truth
1 8
must embrace the whole of human experience. Faith, for Pannenberg,
is not rooted in a particular of reality. It must be rooted in reality as
a whole. To understand the nature of truth one must examine the
history of truth.
Pannenberg observes that the western view of truth is a synthesis
1 9
of the Greek and Hebrew ideas of truth. He attempts to demonstrate
"that the tension between Greek and Israelitic ideas of truth determines
the whole of history of the understanding of truth in the west right
20
down to the present day."
Pannenberg notes that the Hebrew word for truth is emeth . The
verb means to stand firm, establish support or bear. Emeth carries
the idea of reliability, unshakable dependability of a thing or a word.
21
This idea is set in the context of the faithfulness of persons. Emeth
is not timeless truth detached from the contingencies of existence. It
must occur or be proven over again with the faithful action of a person
standing true to their word. Consequently, truth in the Israelite
sense is only demonstrated by history. A person speaks the truth
when that person's history of their word is established. Thus, truth
is history. It is not something which lies under or behind things or
22
is discovered "by penetrating into their interior depths." Pannenberg
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II,
trans. George H. Kehm (Londoni SCIVl, 1971), p. 1.
""^Ibid. "^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 3. ^""ibid.
22,bid.
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observes that trust must be grounded in the past which also embraces
the future. He cites Hans von Soden's statement "truth is that which
23
will show itself in the future."
The Greek idea of truth leaves no room for history. The Greek
verb aXTideueuv originally meant "to let something be seen as it is in
24
itself; not to conceal something." Pannenberg points out that the
notion of physical senses distorting "that-which-is" is typically Greek
thought. Rational thought on the logos is the only thing which has
25
access to things as they are. Fundamental to the Greek concept of
truth is that truth never changes. As a result, truth must be divorced
from this worldly existence because of its vicissitudes. Greek truth
is timeless and unchanging; sense-impressions are fluid appearances
always in flux. Pannenberg identifies a marked difference between
Hebrew truth which is inherently tied to the flux of history and
Greek truth (because of its unchangeable timelessness) which will
26
have nothing to do with history.
Despite these rudimentary differences Pannenberg also observes
significant similarities. Both hold that truth is reliable, stable, and
enduring. Both maintain that truth can be experienced. Greeks and
Hebrews experience truth quite differently. For the Greek, knowledge
proves a key for obtaining truth. Truth manifests itself through
cognitive experience. There is no Hebrew parallel to this experience
of truth.
^'^
Truth, for the Hebrew, "did not disclose itself in its fullness
to the logos of cogitative comprehension, as did the Greek but only
28
when met with trust in God's faithfullness.
" There is in Hebrew
23 24 Ibid.
25
Ibid., p. 4.Ibid.
26 27 Ibid., p. 6.
28
Ibid.Ibid., p. 5.
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thought an inseparable link between truth and faith. The Hebrew term
e 29
for faith, he min, has the same stem as truth, emeth .
A Greek experiences the consistency and stability of truth by a
cognitive process. A Hebrew experiences the consistency and stability
of truth by binding himself/herself to God who reveals his stability by
his faithfulness to keep his word. Pannenberg observes that Hebrew
30
truth is always set in the context of the future as well as the past.
Truth asserts itself in the face of an open future. Thus, for
Pannenberg, faith is the trust that the future will once again verify
the consistency of the faithfulness of God, i.e., truth.
Pannenberg asserts that Greek truth does not stand vis-a-vis
Hebrew truth. Hebrew thought does make some room for knowledge
of truth, though it is not purely cognitive, but rather based upon
events. Both Greek and Hebrew truth possess stability. Knowledge
31
of that stability is mediated by different means.
Von Soden notes that, for Israel, truth confronted thought in a
contingent manner or revelation. By no means is this revelation
irrational. Contingent events are the basis of historical experience.
By these contingent events God's faithfulness or consistency is re-
vealed; truth is revealed. Historical revelation is the revelation of
the "what-is." This "what-is" is self-evident for the Greek; for the
Hebrew it has to be demonstrated in history. Abstract necessities
of thought, while adequate for Greek thought, were not adequate
33
for Hebrew thought. Truth must demonstrate itself concretely.
30|bid. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid.
103
Pannenberg makes a key observation that, "for the Israelite, the
34
trust of God embraces all other truth." It provides the foundation
for all other truth. God's faithfulness overreaches all of creation and
includes all of humanity and spans all of time (Ps. 111:7f; 119:90f;
146:6). Pannenberg observes that the unity of truth posited by Hebrew
thought made the early church's combination of Greek and Hebrew
35
thought quite natural. The Hebrew's wholistic view of reality stands
in contrast to the Greek view. He states: "Greek thought offers an
abridged view of reality in contrast to the deeper experience of reality
oc
which is established by the God of the Bible." Pannenberg points
out further that the Biblical view of truth and reality takes the Greek
view and refines it.
Pannenberg notes that the "Greek dualism between true being and
changing sense-appearances is superceded in the biblical understanding
37
of truth." For the Hebrews, true being is thought of not as timeless
but as historical. It proves its stability through history. While the Greek
gods served as the ground of the cosmos, the Hebrew God actively
participates in the cosmos but is distinct from it. In the light of this,
Pannenberg writes:
The Greek truth is superseded in principle by the Biblical
truth insofar as the latter includes those features of
reality which the Greek idea of truth excluded, though
without any less decisive int^^st in holding fast to
the permanent and enduring.
Having collated the Greek and Hebrew concepts of truth, Pannen
berg discusses the impact each of these has had on modern Christianity.
A major component of Greek thought was that truth reveals itself in the
34 35 Ibid.
36
Ibid., p. 9.
37
Ibid.Ibid.
38
Ibid., p. 10.
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knower. This made a person passive when receiving truth. Truth
impressed itself upon the soul, whereby the soul recognizes it as being
truth. Western thought, Pannenberg observes, differs at this critical
point. The emphasis is not on truth revealing itself to the knower.
qqThe knower creates his/her own truth. He writes: "The experience
of truth was no longer understood as a passively received duplication
of this in the soul, but rather as a creative act of man."'*^ With this
idea established, truth existing independently from man becomes problema-
41
tical. Thus, the subject, in Western thought, regards itself as the
source of truth. Pannenberg points out that a major consequence of
this is that truth "loses its relationship to extrahuman reality and is
4?
now only an expression of man himself .... " Since Kierkegaard's
subjectivization of truth, the objectivity and universality of truth has
too often been devalued in Christian theology. Pannenberg observes:
"Consistent with this, one then seeks confirmation of even the truth of
faith only in the behavior of Christians, only as an expression of a
43
mode of existence, and no longer in that wherein faith believes."
Pannenberg notes that the subject orientation of truth was not
completely alien to Greek thought, in that thinking served as the norm
for truth. However, it was not the intent of the ancient philosophers
for truth to ever become completely subjective. "They meant that thought
was distinguished precisely in its aptitude for undistorted reception
44
of that which was inherently being and truth."
Augustine marks a key turning point concerning Christian truth.
He "grounded the truth of knowledge upon the self-certainty of
^^Ibid., pp. 12-13. ^^Ibid. ^''ibid., p. 13.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid. ^^Ibid., p. 14.
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thought." Pannenberg points out that Augustine's influence was
extended through the medieval Scholastics. Nicolas of Cusa, was
perhaps the first to understand thought "as the creative productivity
4fiof the human spirit, independent of sense impressions." Cusa
appeals to the imago dei doctrine in support of this assumption. Pan
nenberg observes that this is a major epistemological step towards
the modern scientific method of understanding reality. Modern
science projects certain hypotheses which are then empirically tested.
This is Cusa's "creative productivity". Modern historical method has
a similar structure since it also creatively projects schemes or idea
upon events. Historical methodology does not merely draw upon sources
and the mixing of them. It freely reconstructs the course of events in
question by developing a picture of how it could have happened. Cusa's
idea of the creative character of intellectual activity as it regards truth,
48
stands as the underpinning of modern historiography.
Creative subjectivity serves as a major thesis of modern existen
tialism. With this being the case, a problem exists in reconciling
extrahuman reality with this creative subjectivity. This problem did
not arise for the ancients because humanity was viewed as a replica
of extrahuman realities, e.g., image of God. Cusa followed this line
of thinking. Pannenberg states in reference to this that:
God is the presupposition from which alone the agreement
of human thought with extra human reality can be explained
and guaranteed. Since then, the truth of human thought
in the sense of its agreement with extrahuman realit^ghas
been guaranteed only on the presupposition of God.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., p. 15.
49,,.^
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Ibid.
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Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 17.
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Pannenberg observes that Kant represents a partial break from this
view of reality. As was seen in chapter one, Kant removes God from the
phenomenal realm which includes the sciences. Thus, he posits theoretical
truth as existing independently from the presupposition of God. Yet,
his value system, i.e., ethics, still maintains a divine presupposition.
Kant fragmented reality, and the unity of truth was dealt a devasting
blow with Kantian epistemology. Pannenberg rightly observes, 'without
the presupposition of God, truth is no longer conceivable in terms of
. ,50agreement. '
Pannenberg calls for a return to a concept of truth as unity. He
stands opposed to the Kantian dualism. As long as truth is fragmented,
nothing can be argued about truth. Thus religious apologetics is
silenced. He declares:
What is true is that it is possible to argue about truth
only where the unity of truth is presupposed. This means
that theology must be able to defend its claim to be a
science in argument with other views of science, and to
do this it must accept^ common basis for the argument
about what science is.
He also asserts that the unity of all truth bears greatly upon
52
historical method in regard to revelation. Thus Pannenberg repre
sents a return, at the point of unifying science and theology in a
common divine ground, to Augustine.
Pannenberg wishes to demonstrate biblical truth as presupposing
one truth; i.e., God. This mean that all knowledge, science and
''''ibid., p. 18.
^^Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science,
trans. Frances McDonagh (Philadelphis: Westminster, 1976), p. 19.
"ibid.
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religion, can fit into a biblical framework. He notes that beginning with
the Romantic movement individuals became aware of the diverse views of
reality around the world. Each view possessed its own history. It
became evident that if truth was to be unified it had to interact with
other world views and views represented not only in the present but in
the past as well. Thus, truth must embrace the whole of reality which
includes the history of human thought. The question may be raised
as to how there can be unity when there is so much diversity in the
history of thought. Pannenberg answers that the
unity of truth can now only be thought of as the his
tory of truth, meaning in effect that truth itself has
a history and that its essence is the process of this
history. Historical change itself must be thought of as
the essence of truth if its unity is still to be maintained
without narrow-mindedly substituting a particular per
spective for the whole of truth.
Hegel's system stands, to date, as the most significant attempt to
articulate one truth as being the basis for the whole of reality.
Hegel notes that history cannot be sectioned off as though one part has
little to do with the others. He unites all of thought both past and
present. His view of time is: the present contains the past in a
real way; the past lives in the present. Hegel states:
The acts of thought appear at first to be a matter of history,
and, therefore, things of the past, and outside our real
existence. But in reality we are what we are through
history: or, more accurately, as in the history of thought,
what has passed away is only one side, so in the present,
what we have as a permanent possession is essentially
bound up with our place in history. The possession of
self-conscious reason, which belongs to us of the present
world, did not arise suddenly, nor did it grow only from
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, II, p. 20.
Ibid., p. 21. ^^Ibid.
108
the soil of the present. This possession must be regarded
as previously present, as an inheritance, and as the ffisult
of labour - the labour of all past generations of men.
Pannenberg finds it significant that Hegel viewed truth not as
a finished product but as an ever-developing process. "Trust is the
57
whole." It is the combination of the history of truth. Consequently
for Hegel, and Pannenberg concurs, truth must be viewed within the
context of the whole of really. This is what Hegel's system attempted
to accomplish. Pannenberg asserts that Hegel's view "that the truth
of the whole will be visible only at the end of history approximates
CO
the biblical understanding of truth . . . ." Pannenberg observes
two critical points of similarity. First, truth is not a changeless,
timeless entity, but it is "a process that runs its course and maintains
59
itself through change." Second, the unity of truth is in the process
"which is full of contraditions while it is under way" but will come into
60
full understanding only from the perspective of the end of the process.
Pannenberg, at this point, levels a major objection against Hegel.
The future has little room or significance in Hegel's system. Pannenberg
notes :
He had to understand his own position as the end of history
in order to be able to think of the unity of history. The
unity of history - and thus of truth - comes into view only
from its end. Theologically, this means that He^l no longer
had an open future, an eschatology, before him.
Pannenberg has a distinctly Hegelian approach to truth. However,
^^G. W. F. Hegel, On Art Religion, Philosophy, ed. J. Glen
Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 10.
57
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baille,
(New York: MacMillian, 1949), p. 84.
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, II, p. 22.
59|bid. SO|bid. S^lbid.
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he makes a key adjustment of Hegel's thought. Pannenberg posits that
truth can only be fully apprehended when the whole of reality is in view.
Thus, unlike Hegel, Pannenberg places the end of history in the future.
In order to understand fully the flow of history, history must be viewed
in its totality. This cannot be done at present because history is not
complete. He writes: "The meaning of a past event can be fully deter-
S?
mined only in the total content of history (Geschichte) as a whole."
Pannenberg is not stating that meaning cannot be determined from events
but that meaning must be provisional and open to new data that might
come in the future. Because of the unity of truth, the same principles
apply to science. Any statement, scientific or philosophical, implicitly
63
presupposes the totality of both reality and human experience.'
Thus, any assertion, whether about science or God, must be open to
the possibility of future verification or refutation.
Thomas Torrance makes a similar point by declaring that any
scientific knowledge must be tentative and open to the future. He
illustrates his point by citing the relation between Newtonian physics
and quantum mechanics. Heisenberg, the twentieth century German
physicist, recognized that "scientific concepts cover always only a
very limited part of relaity, and the other part that has not yet been
fifi
understood is infinite." Like science, theology also must be open to
^^Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 70.
^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid., p. 220.
^^Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science (Oxford: Oxford
Univ., 1969), p. 16.
^^Ibid.
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the future. The underlying truth of both is one truth. Admittedly,
because of the differing nature of the two, there are some methodo-
must be open to the whole of reality; theology must have that same
openness. Pannenberg declares that: "theology deals with the
totality of meaning of experience and must be aware of this if it is
CO
to know what it is saying when it talks about God."
With this general methodology, Pannenberg lays the cornerstone
of his theology. His starting point is the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
The key to understanding revelation lies in the proleptic character of
the Christ event. That is to say, the resurrection of Christ is prolep-
tically the end of history. This makes the resurrection the focal point
of all theology. In the resurrection event one sees the end of history
happen in the context of the historical porcess. Jesus Christ is the
total self-revelation of God. Thus, in Christ one finds the destiny of
humanity and the knowledge of God. At the present humanity is sus
pended between the already and the not-yet. One can have partial
understanding of the meaning of the resurrection event but must wait
until the end of history for full understanding. Full understanding,
however, will be connected with the historical event of the resurrection.
That event is pregnant with the eschaton. For Pannenberg the incarna
tion is still a partial mystery. He quotes a line from T. S. Eliot's poem
"The Dry Salvages" as illustrative of his point. "The hint half guessed,
69
the gift half understood, is Incarnation."
logical differences between science and theology.
67
However, science
67
Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, pp. 221ff.
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Ibid., p. 224. Cobb and Robinson, p. 276.
68
Ill
Pannenberg observes that the destiny of Jesus Christ was the
basis of the certainty of truth. He raises the question whether one
living in the twentieth century can possess the same certainty of
truth. Pannenberg answers in the affirmative but bases this upon
two presuppositions. First, the apocalyptic hope of the resurrection
still contains truth for twentieth century humanity and "can still be
reproduced within our understanding of the being of man in the world."'
Second, one "must still understand the resurrection of Jesus as a his
torical event which happened at a specific time: as a reality, and not
71
a mere hallucination." Pannenberg writes further: "On these two
presuppositions hinges the decision as to whether the primitive Christian
understanding of revelation can still be carried out as our own, despite
72
the change in our intellectual situation" These two presuppositions
will be discussed more fully in subsequent sections of this paper.
Faith and Reason
The tension between faith and reason has been a major problem
of contemporary theology, especially because of the Kantian split
between faith and knowledge. Pannenberg attempts to integrate faith
and reason. He makes no case for objective certainty or the idea that
Christianity can be proven in the same way one proves a mathematical
theorem. This is not the function of theology in Pannenberg's system.
To be sure, he does not take the opposite extreme and retreat to pure
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 25.
Ibid., p. 26. �^^Ibid.
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subjectivism as he believes neo-orthodoxy does. The theologian's
task is to investigate historical foundations of revelation. There can
be no objective certainty in the absolute sense simply because human
beings are fallible and finite. A more complete understanding of our
faith will come only at the end of history, but, for now, theological
dispute and a degree of objective uncertainty prevail. He writes:
The truth of the faith is not given to theology in advance
for the simple reason that it is still in dispute in the history
of Christianity and so is the object of Christian theology.
The function of theology is to study and describe Christianity
understood as the history which receives its impetus from
the investigation of the truth of the Christian faith, or of-
the reality of the kingdom of God made present in Jesus.
Is Christian faith irrational? Pannenberg answers this question
negatively. Pannenberg wishes to set forth the idea that Christianity
has a rational basis. To understand clearly faith and reason, he
examines each term.
Rational inquiry into faith is the only means by which the integrity
of faith is preserved. In fact, Pannenberg notes that a lack of rational
74
inquiry harms the essence of faith. Faith would likely be "perverted
into blind credulity toward the authority claim of the preached message."
The purity of faith can only be maintained if a lucid understanding of
its rational basis is grasped. This is not a matter of "grounding faith
7fi
in man instead of God." Without rational inquiry faith is solely
effected by God. This issue is one of mediation of faith.
Pannenberg finds objectionable the notion that faith is solely trust.
''�^Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 417.
'^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 28.
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
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He notes that this is not what the Reformation meant by faith. An
isolated act of trust cannot stand on its own. If trust is not to be
irrational, it must appeal to some basis of the trustworthiness of the
object or subject trusted. Pannenberg makes an appeal to classical
Protestant dogmatics which defines faith in terms of knowledge (notitia),
78
assent (assensus), and trust (fiducia). The relationship among the
three is important. He points out "that knowledge of the content of
faith (notitia with assessus) remains the logical presupposition of the
79
trust which is based upon it." One must ground fiducia in notitia
and assensus. Pannenberg asserts that to ground faith upon trust is
to make faith the basis of faith. The issue at hand is: in what logical
order should fiducia, notitia, and assensus be placed? He maintains
that Christian biblical faith is ground upon knowledge (Rom. 6:8f; II
Cor. 4:13). The disciples did not see the resurrected Christ because
they believed; they believed because they saw. Thus, faith must rest
upon knowledge.
It is crucial in understanding Pannenberg to note his distinction
80
between the logic of faith and the psychology of faith. The logic of
faith demands trust (fiducia) to be grounded upon knowledge (notitia).
Knowledge precedes trust. But Pannenberg clearly declares that: "In
the psychological enactment of faith, both (knowledge and trust) can be
taken up in the same act. Trust can also arise in the expectation that
g
the (logically, already presupposed) knowledge will later be disclosed."
He also points out that this distinction between the psychology and the
77 78 Ibid.
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Ibid.Ibid., p. 30.
80
Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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logic of faith is implicit in the whole of epistemology. This is "character
istic not only of the attititude of faith but also of the cognitive process
82
generally." Any assertion, theological or scientific, may be based in
part upon knowledge, but it anticipates that the proposition will be verified
in the future when the move of reality is known. Furthermore, this would
83
be verified with objective certainty if the whole of reality was known.
To be sure key differences between empirical science and theology exist,
84
but they do have some common epistemological roots.
Pannenberg is suspicious of any appeal to supernatural knowl
edge. For him all knowledge is natural. He states:
I cannot free myself of the suspicion that the distin
guishing of a special knowledge of faith leads once
again to the conclusion that the truth of such knowledge
can be ji^gtified in the last analysis, only by a decision
of faith.
To separate knowledge into natural and supernatural categories does
violence to the unity of truth. It is not a question of divine revelation
versus no revelation. It is a questions of the mode of revelation. One
might note that this does not preclude divine activity as recorded in the
Old Testament. Pannenberg chooses to call these special events "divine
,86
manifestions. " rather than God's "self-revelation."
82,bid.
^^Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, p. 220.
^^For further discussion see Theology and the Philosophy of
Science, pp. 206ff.
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, II, p. 33.
^^Frank Tupper, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), p. 82.
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God has revealed himself in such a fashion so that all humanity
might see. Pannenberg posits:
Nothing must mute the fact that the truth lies before every
one's eyes, that its perception is a natural consequence
which emerges solely from the facts. [The perception of
God's revelation is Christ does not require an] additional
perfection of man, as though he could not focus upon such
a super-natural truth with his normal cognitive facilities.
This position precludes faith from being based exclusively upon a
subjective experience. Further:
If we take our bearings solely from the experiences of
our personal life, the decision to believe or not to believe
always retains an ultimately arbitrary, emotional element.
It is the breadth of total experience of every and all
reality which provides the field where we have to inquire
whether the divine nature of the God of the Bible can stand
up to verification; it is not the narrow bound%jpf an entirely
personal experience of life, taken in isolation.
This is not to say experience has no part in religious certainty.
Pannenberg is not promulgating a purely cognitive religious experience.
He clearly asserts that
mere knowledge of God's revelation does not yet make one
a participant in the salvation (of Christ) .... Salvation
is received only in the act of trust, which is essentially
self-surrender, in the exact, literal sense of a placing
of one's reliance entirely upon that to which one entrusts
himself. The knowledge of that which faith beliex^ can
not displace the act of self-abandonment in trust.
Pannenberg's view of the Holy Spirit has come under criticicism
by those who feel the Spirit has no place in his theology. In Revela
tion as History, he states that the Holy Spirit is "not the condition
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Revelation as History, trans. David
Grunskou (New York: MacMillian, 1968), p. 136.
^^Wolfhart Pannenberg, The Apostle's Creed, trans. Margaret
Kohl (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), p. 35.
^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol I, p. 37.
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without which the Christ-event could not be recognized as revelation."
The conclusion drawn by his critics is that, for Pannenberg, the Spirit
has nothing at all to do with the origin of faith. In response to this
91he maintains that such a conclusion was not intended. The point is
that the Holy Spirit is not the criterion of truth. "The convincingness
of the Christian message can stem only from its content. Where this is
not the case, the appeal to the Holy Spirit is no help at all to the
,92
preacher." Pannenberg claims that if the argumentation is valid "the
93
Holy Spirit becomes effective through his (preacher's) words . . . ."
Argumentation does not compete with the word of the Spirit. They
94work together. The veracity of the message which is preached can
only be answered out of its content. Thus, the inherent meaning of
95
the event reported appeals to the hearer. The Spirit acts upon the
one who hears the gospel through the reporting of revelatory event
of the resurrection of Christ.
The content of the preceding paragraph deals with revelation in
a logical fashion. Pannenberg notes that one must be sensitive to the
psychological aspect of religious experience. He states: "With respect
to the psychological process of its (the Christian message) appre
hension - an illumination is necessary in order for that which is
96
true in itself to appear . . . ." The task of this illumination is
that of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit does not add to the content
of the Christian message. He does, though, clear away prejudgments
^^Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 36.
^Vannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. II, p. 34.
^^Ibid., p. 35. ^^Ibid. ^"^Ibid. ^^Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 40.
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which obscure the truthfulness of the message itself. Pannenberg
observes in respect to theological content that "logically impeccable
grounding is one thing, but the consent of man is very often quite
98
another matter." An argument may be logically perfect; yet, one may
not apprehend the reasoning because of pre-judgment. Pannenberg also
observes: "The sweeping away of such pre-judgments can never be a
matter of rational argument alone because these pre-judgments are
themselves irrationally rooted, provided that we are dealing with pre-
99
judgments. "
Illumination is necessary to clear the way for the content of the
Christian message. The Holy Spirit attempts to illumine the hearer by
removing the pre-judgments which preclude the proclamation of the
Christ event to be apprehended, but the Spirit adds nothing substantial
to that event. It works through the event. The veracity of the event
stands on its own and has no occasion to appeal to the Holy Spirit for
verification. "The Spirit, who illuminates, leads to the truth of the
Word and thereby shows himself to be the power of the Word itself.
"^^^
Pannenberg's concern with a modern view of the Holy Spirit is
that it has become a "catchword" for subjectivity. He points out that
the New Testament concept of the Spirit is "no 'haven of ignorance' for
pious experience, which exempts one from all obligation to account for
its contents. "^^^ While faith is clearly a gift from God, in Pannenberg's
mind, it is necessarily linked to a knowledge of the revelatory event of
the resurrection. The resurrection will be discussed later.
97 98 Ibid.
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Faith and reason, then, can be seen as not standing vis-a-vis one
another. Nevertheless, he does not maintain that faith and reason can
be unified at this point in history. He states that "the perfect unity
of faith and reason has been promised for the eschaton only (I Cor.
Hegel thought that from his own point in history he could completely
reconcile faith and reason. If faith does not stand vis-a-vis reason
and there can be no perfect unity at present, then what is the rela
tionship between the two? The key in answering this is understanding
that, even though there will be unity only in the eschaton, one can
have a provisional understanding of that unity presently. The basis
for anticipating the unity of the two is grounded in the past proleptic
event of the resurrection of Christ. This will be discussed further in
a later section.
In order to explore in greater detail the relationship between faith
and reason, Pannenberg appeals to a history of the tension between the
two. Having already defined what he means by faith, he discusses,
historically, reason's role in faith. Pannenberg astutely points out
103
that for each age the problem of faith and reason is different. In
the past, authority of the Scripture, dogma, and the Church served as
the stabilizing elements in theology. It must be pointed out that these
three authorities did not serve as havens for irrational theology. Their
authority was based upon the veracity of historical revelation which was
scrutinized by the theological methods of that day. He writes: "The
iilO'i
acceptance of an authority was ground in insight into its credibility."
13:12f).
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Pannenberg departs from Hegel at this point because
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Augustine states: "No one believes anything unless he has first thought
105
that it is to be believed."
The twentieth century stiuation, Pannenberg maintains, is different.
Theology must dialogue with the questions of twentieth century reason.
Whereas, at one stage of history appealing to authority was acceptable,
presently it is viewed as irrational. It is critical for one to understand
that the place and definition of reason is fluid and changes from age to
age. This will be illustrated later as Pannenberg critiques three types
of reason. Twentieth century questions based upon a contemporary
view of reality and history must be answered by twentieth century
answers. Thus, an appeal to authority is not adequate. Pannenberg
notes :
In the face of this modern attack upon the meaningfulness
of the Christian faith, theology cannot retreat to the stand
point of authority. The difference between the modern and
the medieval situations consists in the fact that the authority
of the Christian tradition (be it of the church and its dogma,
or of Holy Scripture) can scarcely be viewed any longer as
unpreblematically authoritative. As long as the mere authority
of Scripture can guarantee the truth of its contents, theology
can only demand that reason simply submit to it. In the
realm of modern thought, however, where even historical
questions are settled not by appeals to authorities but by
the new science of historical criticism, persistence in main
taining the authoritative character of faith in contrast to
reason takes on a new aspect. This insistence upon an
authority that is no longer generally convincing as an
authority takes on the character of an external coercion,
and an individual's ac(j:ggtance of such a claim becomes
an arbitrary decision.
This viewpoint is not surprising considering Pannenberg's under
standing of revelation. God's self-revelation is universably binding
and absolute. It is ensconced in a historical event which is unique and
absolute. Regardless of culture or age, self-revelation possesses a
105
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consistent core to which any method or form of articulation must remain
faithful. The aspect of theology which is fluid and not universally
binding is the mode of apprehension. This is relevant to the cultural
situation. Thus, the authority of Church, dogma, or Scripture may
be legitimate in one age or culture and may not be in another, e.g.,
twentieth century culture. Pannenberg's point is that the content of
God's self-revelation is open for rational inquiry and will stand on its
own under the scrutiny of the age. It must be emphasized that Pannen
berg speaks in purely logical terms concerning religious epistemology.
One does not hold one's faith in suspension until its veracity is appre
hended by the believer. The believer can have faith without such
inquiry, yet trusting that there is a rational basis for belief if one
cares to investigate. As pointed out earlier, even when one investigates
one must trust that complete understanding will be forthcoming in the
eschaton. For now, however, adequate but provisional knowledge will
suffice until the end of history.
For the present age the task of setting forth a rational account of
the truth of faith is urgent. Appealing to the authority of Scripture as
the ground of faith as an a priori is no longer adequate. Appealing to
religion grounded in a religious ethical experience, as Kant attempted to
do, is not adequate either. Such a basis can make no claim to be
universally binding. Pannenberg points out that appealing to such a
basis "can only lead to a subjectivism which is not only non-obligatory
.i107
for one's fellowmen, but also destroys the essence of faith."
Pannenberg examines three types of reason common in the history
of philosophy: a priori reason, the so-called receiving reason
Ibid., p. 53.
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(Vernehemende Vernunft), and historical reason.
108
To answer the
question, "What has faith to do with reason?", it is critical to inquire,
"What type of reason?" What follows is Pannenberg's examination
of the three types of reason just mentioned.
The type of reason which Luther reacted against was the
Aristotelian-Thomistic understand of reason. Thomas makes a distinc
tion between intellect (intelletus) and coordination of reason (ratio) .
The analogy Thomas draws in relating the two is that of rest and move
ment. The intellect exists in serene contemplation of truth, whereas
reason "moves from one representation (Vorstellung) to another in its
ranging about (discursus) in order to lay hold of the one truth that
109
binds all truths together." The intellect intuitively discerns that
110
which reason can attain only as a result of its discurus.
Thomas posits that human knowledge is not yet a perfectly
intellectual sort. One cannot have an unmediated view of the true
essences of things. The body limits human apprehension of things
as they are. Therefore, one needs reason to apprehend at least a
partial understanding of reality. Pannenberg calls this the process
of ratiocination. Ratiocination would not be possible without a starting
point. This starting point is that "we at least possess general princi-
111
pies that are immediately evident." Pannenberg points out that this
is a form of aprioristic reason. In other words, one has a priori
categories which are applied to experience. "All knowledge occurs as
an application to the data of experience of principles already contained
112
in the intellect."
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An outgrowth of this is that reason in applying these given principle
of the intellect to sense impressions, "cannot be open to something that
113
is not congruous with these principles." Luther sharply criticized
reason because the Christian faith could not be derived from these a
priori principles. Thus, the content of Christian faith had to be
regarded as suprarational or supranatural , i.e., "situated beyond the
114
natural range of reason." Pannenberg observes that Thomas Aquinas
relates faith and reason in such a way that "the supranatural truths
of faith must step into the place of natural principles of knowledge, the
light of faith in place of the light of nature, in order that the knowl-
115
edge of faith may occur." Revelation for Thomas is an illumination
of reason, raising it to an awareness other than natural a priori prin
ciples.
One can see that this understanding of reason easily lends itself
to be carried over into Kantian thought. As this paper has already
demonstrated, rational activity, for Kant, was "thought of as the appli-
116
cation of a priori principles to the material of experience." Luther
was correct, in Pannenberg's thought, to react against reason. Reason
could have nothing to do with faith. The reader saw in this paper
that with Kant's view of reason coupled with his deism a split between
reason and faith naturally ensued. His "setting reason aside to make
room for faith" completely undercuts any objective basis for metaphysics.
This type of reason, Pannenberg affirms, is basically incompatible with
117
faith.
' "
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In opposition to a Kantian view of reason, philosophers such as
Herder and Jacobi have set forth the idea of "reception" as being the
receiving "that which is." Jacobi equates the receiving with faith.
Pannenberg points out, though, that the receiving reason is oriented
toward something other than the content of Christian faith. This type
of reason leaves no room for the idea of future essential to Hebrew
faith. The Israelites did not ground faith in the thing behind sense
appearances as if it were a timeless reality. Instead they ground
faith in knowledge of historical events and the person (God) who
effected those events. Faith, then, is trust that the future will verify
the faithfulness of God (Heb. 11:1). Thus, Pannenberg asserts that
this Greek view of reason (Plato) is incompatible with faith. He points
out that
in the history of theology, receiving reason, in the Greek
sense of a perception of what always is, has repeatedly
obstructed understanding of the historic^Qtruth of the
promising God, on which faith depends.
By its very nature faith is future oriented. Reason restricted to the
present can never be made to coexist with faith.
Pannenberg is most sympathetic toward the third type of reason
which he examines - historical reason. He maintains that one cannot
adhere to a fixed view of reason. Imagination plays a major role in
historical history. Reason is granted a certain creative power to build
new constructs in response to new understanding concerning the nature
of reality. This understanding of reason is key to Hegelian thought.
With each age a new construct of reason, history and reality prevails.
essence of reason.
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This follows a Platonic thought that reason is
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Each construct is transformed into a new construct with the coming of
assuming that his construct of reality and history was the final one.
Pannenberg alters the Hegelian system by making the final construct
of reality and history to be at the end of history. Reason can reflect
upon reality and history, but its conclusions are always provisional.
Thus, reason must have an openness toward the future with regard
to its own construct.
The meaning of any aspect of reality is linked to the future and is
always articulated in light of a foreconception of the final construct
which exists at the end of history. Thus, this conception of reason
drives one to the horizon of eschatology for its final construct. Con
sequently, both faith and reason, for Pannenberg, are directed toward
the future. And, indeed, in the future both will be brought together.
As for the present thought, a disparity still exists between the two.
With regard to their present relationship Pannenberg notes:
A difference between faith and reason remains, nevertheless.
Faith is explicitly directed toward that eschatological future
and consummation which reason anticipates while at the
same time keeping behind it when it says what those things
are whose essences it names. Reason is indeed not confined
to such naming of present things. As a movement of reflec
tion, it returns to its absolute presupposition, which has
been shown to us to be the anticipation of a final future
constituting the wholeness of reality. But reason is always
concerned with present things in the first instance. For
this reason, it can happen that it might forget its own im
plicit presupposition and understand itself on^^e basis of
the present things with which it is involved.
One can see that Pannenberg acknowledges a certain tension be
tween faith and reason. The question naturally arises regarding the
place of psychological certainty of God's self-revelation. Pannenberg
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is confronted with the same problem as Lessing and Kierkegaard:
"Can historical knowledge serve as the basis for faith?"
Pannenberg observes that whether one embraces a broad concept
of faith, encompassing fiducia, assensus, and notitia, or whether one
concurs with the Reformation's linguistic usage, concentrating on the
element of trust in faith, knowledge (logically) must precede trustJ^^
Specifically, for Pannenberg, the focus of knowledge is the historical
knowledge of the resurrection of Christ. He contends that this knowl
edge leads to trust or faith. Pannenberg reasons:
In the sense of a logical presupposition (though not always
a psychological antecedent), the knowledge of Jesus history,
including his resurrection from the dead, is the basis of
faith. Furthermore, this knowledge has the peculiarity that
it leads on to faith. Knowledge is not a stage beyond faith
but leads into faith Tp^'^'-' more exact it is, the more
certainly it does so.
Faith is not a blind trust in the historicity of a particular his
torical event. This would lead to subjectivism. Faith must lay itself
open to historical inquiry. In fact, Pannenberg asserts that it is only
in this spirit of openness to inquriy that faith can be at ease. "Faith
can breathe freely only when it can be certain, even in the field of
25
scientific research, that its foundation is true." To be sure reason
cannot fully comprehend the Christ event. To separate faith and his
torical investigation, however reduces faith to a work of self-redemption.
Faith will ultimately depend upon the believer and the decision to
, ,. 126believe.
Pannenberg distinguishes between the certainty of faith and
historical certainty. They lie on two different levels. "Thus the
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unconditional revelatory summons to faith is not compromised by the
provisionality that characterizes the knowledge of historical revela-
127tion." Pannenberg argues that there is no essential contradiction
in basing trust on a historical event which can be known historically
only with probability. Historical research can never establish definite
certainty but only greater or lesser degress of probability. Yet, the
certainty of faith is found in the completeness of trust. It is trusting
that he who has revealed himself in the past will reveal himself in the
eschaton. Like the Hebrew concept of faith, trust in God is rooted in
the knowledge of history. God demands nothing less than total trust.
Pannenberg notes that "total trust is required despite the relative un-
1 ?8
certainty of our historical knowledge of Jesus."
Even though faith-establishing knowledge varies from age to age,
faith itself is not shaken, "so long as the current image of the facts
of history permits faith to recognize anew and to appropriate again
129
the event which establishes faith itself." Therefore, Pannenberg
alters the usual view of faith in light of historical knowlege by main
taining that all that is needed is for the possibility of the historicity
of the resurrection event. Even if by current historiography the
historicity of the resurrection was given a low probability, faith would
remain entact. It must be emphasized that Pannenberg asserts that the
historical probability of the resurrection is in fact very hight. Pannen
berg is not retreating to subjectivism with this stand. To be sure, if
^^'^Ibid. ^^^Cobb and Robinson, p. 273.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 138.
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there were no historical evidence, then faith would be brought into
dispute.
''^^
Clearly, in Pannenberg's thought faith and knowledge are not the
131
same. By transcending historical knowledge, faith achieves a cer
tain independence from the knowledge of the event out of which it
132
emerged. Though faith is rooted in the historical event which
reveals God, i.e., the resurrection, "faith itself relies upon the God
133who has revealed himself therein." Faith's independence from
knowledge is never absolute; it is relative. Pannenberg declares:
"Faith does not cling to its own form of knowledge, but abandons
itself to the event from which it lives, though always by means of
134
knowledge through which it holds fast to this event." One could
have knowledge of the event and yet not have faith. Unless one is
willing to trust the God of the event for salvation there is no faith.
Pannenberg states:
No mere knowledge of the object of faith is capable of grant
ing a part in the saving event; that belongs to faith alone.
For only in the act of faith do I forsake myself in order to
anchor myself in the reality in which I trust. In this act of
trust, faith goes beyond its own criteria, abandoning not
only (it)self but the particular form of knowledge of its
object from which it started, and laying itself open to a
new and better knowledge of the truth on which it relies.
While faith presupposes historical knowledge, it achieves relative
independence from that knowledge; yet, it cannot be totally independent.
''^^Cobb and Robinson, p. 274. ''^''ibid., p. 128.
''^^Tupper, p. 127. ''^^Ibid.
^�^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, p. 209.
^^^Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, 2nd ed. trans.
Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968),
p. 83.
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Faith must posses some objective basis. Pannenberg does not solve
Lessing's problem of the ugly ditch - at least to Lessing's satisfaction.
The issue is that Lessing wanted objective certainty. He would not find
it in Pannenberg. One wonders where trust would fit in if objective
certainty were possible. This would radically alter the Hebrew concept
of faith. It might be pointed out that Lessing's problem in its essence
is not one of historical epistemology but epistemology in general. Even
the apostles who saw the resurrected Christ would be hard pressed to
answer modern epistemological questions raised in response to their
experience. It may be that Lessing creates a problem for which there
can be no answer. But the questions is: does this warrant the
divorcing of faith from historical knowledge as Kierkegaard does simply
because faith and knowledge can be reconciled totally? As it has been
demonstrated Pannenberg answers this negatively.
Pannenberg makes no pretense in resolving the tension between
faith and reason. The tension will always exist as long as the whole
of reality is non-accessable. Unity, from a human perspective, will
exist with the coming eschaton. At this point it might be suggested
that Pannenberg and Kierkegaard are not very far apart. Both are
keenly aware of the tension between faith and reason. They differ
in that Kierkegaard does not tolerate the tension. Instead, he denies
that revelation could be mediated in the context of such tension, thus
divorcing revelation from historical inquiry. Pannenberg, not Kierke
gaard, is the one who is most theologically aware of the tension between
faith and knowledge.
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Theological Anthropology
In order to understand how God reveals himself to humanity, one
must understand the constitution of personhood. Pannenberg sets
forth some key ideas concerning anthropology. A person cannot find
all of his/her needs met within this realm of existence. He states:
"One may presumably characterize it as a generally demonstrable
anthropological finding that the definition of the essence of man does
not come to ultimate fulfillment in the finitude of his earthly life."^"^^
A person has certain existential needs. God answers those needs.
The fundamental point Pannenberg posits in his theological anthro
pology is that a person possesses openness. He calls this "the openness
137
to the World." Understanding this phrase is critical to understanding
Pannenberg's view of humanity. There is a great distinction between
animals and humans. The distinction lies in the fact that animals are
1 38
limited to an environment that is fixed by heredity. Humans on the
other hand are not inwardly tied to the environment. Animals are
driven by instincts which are mechanically triggered by the environment.
A person's drives are basically undirected. One learns how to express
139
drives by culture.
What is a person's view of the world? What are the responsi
bilities involved? Pannenberg's main point is that a person's inward
force drives oneself beyond the world as it is known into the unknown.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Man, trans. Duane A. Priebe
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1962), p. 3.
''^^Ibid., p. 4. ''^^Ibid. "^^^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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Thus, humans constantly create culture as an artificial environment yet
140
are never satisfied with the constructs. He writes: "They not only
transform nature into culture, but they constantly replace earlier forms
of culture with new ones. Thus man finds no final satisfaction even
141
through his own creations" Humans are constantly driven towards
an undefined end or a goal. Pannenberg writes further: "The pres
sure of human drives is directed toward something undefined. It
142
arises because our drives find no goal that entirely satisfies them."
This inward restlessness is the root of all religious life. Humanity is
constantly striving for what is beyond the horizon. Religion serves as
the framework region beyond the horizon. Pannenberg maintains that
religion is not merely a construction of humanity. This need for re
ligion has deeper roots. He astutely observes: "Man is dependent . . .
on something that escapes him as often as he reaches for fulfillment.
Man's chronic need, his infinite dependence, presupposes something
143
outside himself that is beyond every experience of the world."
The God of the Old Testament created humanity to have dominion
over the world. This inward restlessness and awareness of dependence
was never meant to be found in this world. Humanity is to rule the
world not worship it. God, in his transcendence over the world, is
the one and only upon whom humanity is dependent. The openness to
the world is the one and only, upon whom humanity is dependent. The
openness to the world to find that the unbounded horizon which it longs
for is God himself. God and the world are never to be confused. Pan
nenberg writes of the Old Testamant person that "for him the world could
140,bid., p. 9. '''^''ibid. ^'^hb\6., p. 10.
143,bid.
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no longer be a world full of gods and thus an object of pious awe as
it was for other religions. The world was divested of its deities and
144
was handed over to human management." The only object of worship
which could meet humanity's restlessness was not the world but the
transcendent God. Pannenberg's point is that humanity was made for
God and that careful examination of humanity's constitution bears this
fact out.
Pannenberg maintains that the capacity and need to trust is built
into humanity's make up. In light of the relationship between trust and
faith one might say that humanity was made for faith. He posits that
145
"no one can live without trusting." This bears out the fact that a
person must face their world with a sense of openness. The reason for
the necessity of trust is based upon humanity's limited view of reality.
A person, then, is dependent upon the whole of reality which one can-
^ . ,,
. 146
not fully perceive.
In the act of trusting a person places himself/herself at the mercy
of the object or subject trusted. The assumption is that the future will
justify fully the step of trust. Yet, one does not trust something or
someone when it or he/she is not found trustworthy. Trust is present,
yet it is rooted in the past and anticipates the future. Thus, experience
147
of the thing trusted is key.
Pannenberg observes that the tendency of a person is away from
1 48
trust and towards security. He means by security the assuredness
which is derived from controlling one's environment. In ancient civili
zations people attempted to control their environment and the gods by
^^^Ibid., p. 28. '^^Ibid., p. 29. ^^^Ibid,
^^^Ibid., pp 34ff. ^"^^Ibid., p. 34.
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magic. The gods were a means to an end thus precluding the possibility
of relationship. Pannenberg observes a key principle: "A personal
relationship in which one wants to control the other must perish as a
149human relationship." This attempt to control can involve the deifica
tion of security. In Pannenberg's system a person is made for trust and
that trust ultimately must be directed toward God. He observes that
one's relationship with God is "destroyed when a person tries to replace
trust with security . "^^^
Control in itself is not bad. As stated before, humanity was
created to have dominion over the earth. However, it was also created to
trust God. The finite is to be controlled; the infinite is to be trusted.
As opposed to animals, persons are not inwardly dependent upon their
environment. Thus partial control is possible. The fact is, to control
something presupposes independence from the thing controlled. There
fore, in light of humanity's dependence upon the infinite, one can only
^ ^ 151trust It.
Though humanity was created to control the finite, total control is
not possible because the totality of finite reality is not known. Whether
152
one admits it or not, a person must and does trust the finite. The
question is, why does humanity refuse to trust the infinite as well? The
answer, as previously noted, is that the highest premium is placed
upon security as opposed to trust. It is ironic that humanity must trust that
which it was originally to control (nature) and has always attempted to
control that which can only be trusted (God).
'�'^^Ibid., p. 35. ^^�lbid., p. 37. ''^''ibid., p. 38.
^52,5id.
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God wishes humanity to trust him, yet, in order for him to be
trusted, he must manifest himself in some comprehensivel fashion.
Pannenberg Jesus Christ is the embodiment of the divine. Christ
represents the union of the finite and the infinite. God has invaded
humanity's world to make himself a subject of trust. More will be said
about Christ later.
A key anthropological insight which Pannenberg makes is his
phenomenological analysis of hope. Hope stands at the center of a
person's existence. This is in distinction to other creatures which have
little awareness of time. "All other creatures live entirely in the pres
ent. When animals anticipate the future, they still do not experience it
154
as future." A person is constantly aware of the future. It is
natural for a person to calculate life in light of the future but this can
1 55
be done only to a small degree. Ultimately the future brings the
unexpected for which there can be no calculation. So Pannenberg
observes that "hope beings just at the point where calculation ceases."
The ultimate problem of life is being constantly aware of one's own
death. For Pannenberg this bears greatly upon the meaning of life.
He observes: "Whether or not hope is a meaningful attitude in life at
all is decided for the individual in the final analysis in the question of
157
whether there is anything to be hoped for beyond death." Because
of a person's ability to know the future as future and, thus have a
Thus, Pannenberg opens the idea up for the incarnation.
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knowledge of his/her own death, then hope beyond death is essential
1 58for a meaningful existence in the present. Pannenberg raises the
question: "Does not the knowledge that death is unavoidable render
everything that fills our fleeting days stale and empty?" It is
only when one is certain of the future can one clearly focus upon the
present with meaningful concentration.
Hope was key for the Israelites. They were aware of the future
as history. They had full expectations that God would completely
reveal himself in their history. Later in Jewish history they embraced
1 fin
an apocalyptic expectation of the resurrection of the dead. This was
carried over into Christianity and, in fact, was corroborated by the
resurrection of Christ. Only in God can one find total fulfillment.
The hope beyond death that is inherent in a person finds a legitimate base
in Christ. It ceases to be wishful thinking and becomes a reality
because the resurrection has already happened in Christ. The hope for
all humankind is directed toward the end of history when the resurrec
tion will occur. Pannenberg's point in examining anthropology is to
demonstrate the consistency of the content of revelation with the nature
of humanity.
Revelation as History
Theologians such as Barth and Bultmann maintain that critical
history poses a threat to faith. Barth, who reacted against the higher
critical methodology of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
"^^^Ibid. ''^^Ibid., p. 50.
^^^Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 9.
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liberalism, sought to retain the purity of faith by removing it into a
realm beyond the reaches of historical criticism. He accomplished this
by placing the locus of revelation upon language, thus, the neo-
orthodox emphasis is revelation through the "Word of God." Barth
considers a means of revelation in the Old Testament to be the name
of Yahweh. The announcement of God's name was looked upon as his
direct self-revelation (DC, I/I, pp. 363ff.).^^^ Even in light of the
fact that in ancient times the name of a person symbolizes one's essence,
Pannenberg disagrees with Barth. Pannenberg observes that "Ex. 3:15
expressly states, the impartation of Yahweh's name is made so that man
1 62
can appeal to God by means of this name."
Pannenberg redefines the concept of revelation in terms of the whole
of history. Instead of setting faith vis-a-vis critical history, he recon
structs critical history to point the way to faith. Pannenberg revamps
the critical method of investigating history by rejecting "its positivistic
presuppositions and its absolutizing of the principle of analogy which
precluded the possibility of any absolutly unique event occurring in
1 fi3
history." Pannenberg equates theological knowledge with critical
historical knowledge. He does not allow the bifurcation of reality into
fact and value as did Kant and Kierkegaard. By bringing together
historical knowledge and theology, Pannenberg follows Hegel's assump
tion of the unity of fact and value, history and religion. Pannenberg's
''^'�ibid., p. 10.
^^^Laurence W. Wood, "History and Hermeneutics: A
Pannenbergian Perspective," Wesleyan Theological Journal, 16 (Spring,
1981): 7-8.
'�^^Ibid., p. 13.
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quest is for objective l<nowledge. Thus, he clearly breaks from the
"Kantian presupposition that reason can cognize no valid theological
content which rather must be referred to faith as a subjective postu-
�164ation . "
While Pannenberg follows Hegel's idea that God reveals himself in
history, Pannenberg views Hegel's idea of history as being limited.
Since history in Hegel's view is "the exhibition of spirit striving to
165
attain knowledge of its own nature," he reduces history "to the
1 66
nonessential insofar as anything really new occurring." Pannenberg
sees history as progressing toward a goal - the eschaton. One may
have provisional knowledge of God by knowing of His acts in history,
but one cannot have a total knowledge of reality. Reality is history
and history is not complete. The whole of reality can only be seen
from the end. Pannenberg writes: "The end of history can also be
1 67
understood as some thing which is itself only provisionally known."
Total knowledge will come only at the end of history-
Central to Pannenberg's view of revelation is his view of time.
Time is looked upon as a continuum. Any event in history has an
impact upon all other events both future and past. This presupposes
^^^G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Robert S. Hartman
(New York: Liberal Arts), p. 25.
^^^Wood, 'The Relation of Theology and History Studied in the
Context of Epistemological Dualisms,' p. 337.
^^^Wolfhart Pannenberg, History and Hermeneutic ed. Robert W.
Funk, Journal for Theology and the Church, Vol. 4 (New York: Harper
and Row, 1967), p. 151.
^^�^
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, ed.
Richard J. Neuhaus (Philadelphia^ Westminster, 1969), p. 53.
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that in God lies the totality of reality. This permits the fact that the
"future and the present are inextricably interwoven." God stands
at the end of history drawing temporal events of history to himself.
The future is the focus of history. Pannenberg writes: "The future
decides the specific meaning, the essence, of everything by revealing
169
what it really was and is." The future then is not an abstract
possibility that has yet to be actualized. Rather it takes an active
role in the present. "The past and the present are seen to be the
1 70
effect of the future." A strong sense of unity of time and history
emerges out of this. If God stands at the end of time drawing the flow
of history to himself and humanity is aware of this, then there neces
sarily must be a unity between Historie and Geschichte. This is the
assumption upon which Pannenberg operates.
Pannenberg develops seven theses which outline his approach to
revelation as history. In these theses he explores the Old Testament
and New Testament concept of revelation. Then he focuses upon the
significance of the Christ event for revelation and demonstrates that
in the resurrection of Christ is the end of history. Each of the seven
theses is outlined as follows:
Thesis One: The self-revelation of God in the Biblical wit-
nesses is not of a direct type in the sense of a Theophany,
but is indirejp^^and brought about by means of the historical
acts of God.
''^^Ibid., p. 60.
^^^Wood, "The Relation of Theology and History Studied in the
Context of Epistemological Dualisms," p, 347.
^�^^Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 125.
^'^Vannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 127.
138
What Pannenberg means by self-revelation is not "communication of
some 'truths' by supernatural means . . . but it is essentially God's
172
'self-disclosure.'" This concept of revelation can be traced back to
Hegel as was seen in the previous chapter of this paper. Hegel is
ultimately where Barth came to understand revelation as God's self-
disclosure (CD, 1/1, pp. 362f.) as he (Barth) studies the Hegelian,
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Marhemke.
Revelation as seen in the Old Testament is historical in nature.
The identity of Yahweh was known through his historical activity. In
the early traditions God's self-revelation came through the exodus from
Egypt. This event embodies the proof of Yahweh's deity and his power
1 74
(Ex. 7:17, 8:16, 18; 9:14). Deuteronomy shifts the attention from
the exodus to the "occupancy of the land, all of which is viewed as
1 75
the self-vindication of Jahweh." To be sure, the revelation of
Yahweh was expanded to encompass both the exodus and the occupa
tion of the land (Dt. 4:37-40).
As the history of Israel progressed the past events, e.g., the
exodus and the occupancy of the promised land, became obscure. The
prophets of the exile "no longer took the events connected with the
1 76
occupancy of the land as the ultimate self-vindication of Jahweh."
The focus of Yahweh's self-vindication shifted from the past to the
future. "The apocalyptic writings expected final and ultimate self-
vindication of Yahweh in connection with the end event, and envision
^ �^^Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 125.
''^^ibid., p. 126. ^^^Ibid. ''^^Ibid., p. 127.
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his appearance in glory." Pannenberg points out that it is only
when one views Christ and his resurrection in this historical context
1 78
can these events be understood. He roots the message of Christ,
his death, and his resurrection in the historical setting of that day. To
separate one from the others does violence to the meaning of the event.
Thus, to understand revelation is to understand history.
Pannenberg observes that the concept of God's self-revelation is
not totally dependent upon the terms for revelation. Proceeding from
anoKaXuTCTeuv to cpavepouv will not elucidate the idea of revelation. He
observes that the term glory is the key term. Von Rad demonstrates
that kab8d Yahweh in the Old Testament is connected with God's self
manifestation.'"'^^ In Isaiah the manifestation of the glory of Yahweh
1 80
is generally bound up with his historical acts. One may
note that
since the time of the postexilic prophets the appearance of Yahweh's
glory has become a future event (Is. 43:1ff).
Von Rad calls this future
1 81
glory the "eschatological hope."
This emphasis is found in the New Testament as well.
6o'5a is a
key New Testament term in connection
with God's revelation. At this
point Christ becomes the focal point because
the glory of God is
visible in Christ (II Cor. 4:6). God indirectly reveals himself
in the
fate of Christ. Christ has made the future present.
The eschaton,
1 82
which is at the end of history has broken in
the middle of history.
Through Christ, God has been the believing
community, the uve.5ua
TT1S 6o'5tis (I Pet. 4:14). Pannenberg states:
177,,,,^ 178,bid. ^^^Ibid. ^^�lbid., p. 129.
^81, bid. '^^Ibid.
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Because the Spirit is the specific form of reality in the new
aeon, the event of Christ is itself spiritual as the eschato
logical event, and the resulting participation in the Spirit
mediated through the proclamation of this event and faith
in it (Gal. 3:2 and 14) is the earnest, mpney on ths future
glory (I Cor. 1:22; 5:2; Rom. 8:23).'""^
For the first century apostles the past event of salvation, "the
future of the faithful, and the present of the Spirit are all bound
184
together in the eschatological nearness of God." In subsequent
generations the tendency was to dissolve past and future into the
present. This was done in the gnostic movement by placing the total
emphasis of religious knowlege upon a subjective, direct revelation of
God in the present. Pannenberg notes that this effectively destroys
the historical character of revelation. One can easily observe the end
results of gnosticism in Bultmann. Pannenberg wishes to preserve
the historical character of revelation by making a distinction between
the past, present, and future. A tension exists for Pannenberg at
this point. While there is a marked distinction in the tenses of time,
the future still has an impact upon the present and past. The present
and the future may be inextricably interwoven, yet they still, in a
measure, stand in distinction from one another.
Having God revealing himself in history means that he does so
indirectly. With indirect revelation God reveals his own essence
at the
end of history. Through the course of history, however, this indirect
rev
elation has content other than what is ultimately to be communicated, i.e..
the essence of God.
185 Direct revelation, the type gnostisism maintained
183 Ibid.
184
Tupper, p. 85.
185Pannenberg, Revelation as History, pp. 14-15.
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has God revealing himself immediately in the fashion of a divine epiphany
1 86
but in the sense of a complete self-disclosure. Pannenberg clearly
asserts that biblical revelation is historical, thus indirect. Each act in
history reveals a part of God's essence. One must take all of the act
together to discern God's revelation. Pannenberg writes:
Each individual event regarded as an act of God illumi
nates the being of God, but only fragmentarily . God
performs many other acts, continually unforeseeable,
which in different ways refers back to him as their
author. it seems, no single act could possibly re
veal him.
The similarity between Hegel and Pannenberg at this point is clear.
One may note that Pannenberg maintains that the Christ event is God's
total self-revelation. The last line of the above quote refers to histori
cal events prior to the death and resurrection of Christ.
Thesis Two: Revelation is not comprehended completely
in the bj^nning, but at the end of the revealing
history.
The idea of connecting revelation with the end of history is related
to its indirect character. It is only at the end of history that God's
deity is fully perceived. God's revelation in Israel's history was destined
to become revelation in universal history. In fact this can be seen in
the major prophets of Israel. God reveals himself in Israel's his
tory and, thus, in universal history. His full self disclosure
comes
explicitly only at the end. Pannenberg notes that "it is
not so much
the course of history as it is the end of history that is at one with the
essence of God."^^^ Pannenberg moves away from Hegel at this point.
''S^lbid., p. 16. ^^^Ibid., p. 131. ''^^Ibid.
^S^lbid., p. 133. ""^^Ibid. ^^^Ibid., p. 134,
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As mentioned earlier, Hegel posited his own time to be the end of his
tory. Hegel and Pannenberg have two different ideas as to what total
self-revelation means.
The key to Pannenberg's idea of revelation is the notion that in
Christ "the end of history is experienced in advance as an anticipa-
192
tion." Thus, the resurrection of Jesus is unique in history. In
him one can see partially the content of the end of history. Jesus is
the total revelation of God; yet, the content is not yet fully visible.
Jesus, however, partially reveals God for all the world to see.
Thesis Three: In distinction from special manifestations
of the diety, the historical revelation is open to anyxyae
who has eyes to see. It has a universal character.
Pannenberg reacts against the idea that revelation is an occurrence
that one cannot perceive with natural eyes and is only known through
secret mediation. This smacks of gnosticism. He is quick to point out
that the activity of the biblical God is no secret to anyone. It is
194
"open to anyone who has eyes to see." In the Old Testament
Yahweh's self-vindicating acts of history served to prove his deity
to all people, not just to Israel.
This idea is found in Paul. Some do not believe, not because
the gospel is accessible to only a few, but because "the god of this
world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers." (II Cor. 4:4)
Pannenberg notes that, "there is no need for any additional perfection
of man as though he could not focus on the 'supernatural' truth with
195
his normal equipment for knowing." Thus, he dismisses the
notion that the Holy Spirit is a precondition for faith.
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It is important to understand that placing knowledge of revelation
in the natural realm does not mean that a person is only confirming
knowledge is not found within one's being. A person must be acted
upon from without in order for one to have specific knowledge. The
revelatory events and their message are made available to humankind
only because God has acted in history. These events, even though
they are in the natural realm, "do have a transforming power. When
these are taken seriously for what they are, and in the historical
context to which they belong, then they speak their own language, the
1 97
language of facts." (Italics mine)
A person does not bring faith to the events of historical revelation
as though faith was a prerequisite. "It is through an open appropriation
198
of these events that true faith is sparked." Faith and trust have to
do with the future. Faith is grounded in the past. Faith is not a
blind leap. It must have some basis. The prophets called Israel to
have faith in Yahweh's promises (which were future) on the basis of his
faithfulness of past experience (history). In the same way one must
base faith upon the knowledge of the resurrection. Thus, the task of
historical research is necessary. Faith, however, is not totally depen
dent upon historical knowledge. Pannenberg notes: "Thus far-reaching
independence of faith from the particular form of historical knowledge
out of which it has come is founded on the fact that in the act of
1 99
trust, faith transcends its own picture of the event." Faith must be
based upon historical knowledge; yet, Pannenberg does not reduce faith
what he/she already "knows through the force of his intellect. II
196
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to historical knowledge. This is a tension in Pannenberg's thought
which will only be resolved in the eschaton. To be sure Pannenberg
lucidly posits that "it is not knowledge, but the resulting faith in God
deity in Jesus Christ? Pannenberg answers this in the fourth thesis.
Thesis Four: The universal revelation of the deity of God is
not yet realized in the history of Israel, but first in the fate
of Jesus of NazarethQ^jnsofar as the end of all events is anti
cipated in his fate.
Yahweh has not proven himself to be the God of all men in the Old
Testament. Certainly, this universal self-vindication was announced
by the Old Testament prophets but only as a future event. Pannenberg
views Yahweh's revelation in Israel's history as being incomplete. He
points out that the twentieth century person is heir of the "Greek
philosophical tradition and can give the name God in an unqualified way
202
only to the one God of all men . . . ."
As was mentioned earlier, the apocalyptic writers looked to the
future when Yahweh would once and for all self-vindicate himself before
all humanity- Closely connected with this end, when the kabod Yahweh
would be manifested, was the resurrection of the dead. With this apoca
lyptic feat God would show himself to be the deity of all humanity. This
apocalyptic end has been actualized in the person of Jesus Christ. "For,
in him, the resurrection of the dead has already taken place, though to
203
all other men this is still something yet to be experience."
Pannenberg observes that this final revelation meets the criterion
of diety in Greek philosophy. The Greek method of discovering the one
that secures participation in salvation. II
200
How does God prove his
200 201 Ibid., p. 140.
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diety was by contemplation of the cosmos. This is not dissimilar to
the early Christian approach because when all of reality, i.e., all of
history, is apprehended, God's essence is revealed. Of course this has
not yet occurred in an explicit sense. This will only come at the end
of history. Pannenberg sees the Greek view of the cosmos limiting
because it is a closed system. It is not open for any new unique
events. Thus, the "experience of the reality of history is superior to
that connected with the contemplation of the cosmos. "^^^
The whole of history can be viewed only from the end. With the
resurrected Christ the end has appeared. In Christ is revealed his
torically the ultimate end of all humanity. He stands as the anticipation
of the end and the revelation of God. Thus, Pannenberg reasons, "no
205
further revelation of God can happen." To be sure God is still
206
active in history, but there is no further revelation.
Thesis Five: The Christ event does not reveal the deity of
the God of Israel as an isolated event, but i"a|^-^i" insofar as
it is a part of the history of God with Israel.
The traditions of Israel are essential for understanding the signifi
cance of Christ. The Father of Jesus is the God of Israel. In many
ways Christ's teachings were out of the prophetic tradition. He stood
in distinction from the prophets in that he possessed a consciousness of
authority unparalleled throughout Israel's history. While Jesus was
connected with John the Baptist, he moved beyond John in that he
proclaimed not only repentance, but proclaimed the impending end and
208
himself as the means of eschatological salvation. Thus the message
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and fate of Jesus cannot be understood apart from the prophetic-
209
apocalyptic expectation of the end. In fact, Christ proleptically
reveals the end of history.
The concept of prolepsis is essential in understanding Pannen
berg's Christology. How can the historical particularity of Christ, one
210
event within the whole of history, be the final revelation of God?
Christ stands as the pre-actualization of the end of history. This
211
anticipated end in Jesus binds history into a unitary whole. Pannen
berg notes that "Jesus is the anticipated end and not the middle of
212
history." In other words with the resurrection of Jesus the end of
history has erupted within history. The actual content of this proleptic
relvelation is only particularly revealed. Only at the end of history
with the Christ event is God explicitly apprehended. The end of
history will focus back upon the Christ event because there exists a
unity, beyond total comprehension, between the resurrection and the
end of history. Yet, enough is revealed to understand Christ as the
bearer of eschatological salvation. It is important to note that "it is
not simply the history of Jesus that reveals God but Jesus himself, for
213
the event of revelation must not be separated from the being of God."
Thus, one is not dealing with just an historical event but God himself.
Prolepsis is the underlying concept which allows Christ to transcend the
event while at the same moment maintaining a unity between the event
and the revelation.
209Tupper, p. 92. ^10,^^,^
Vannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, p. 24.
^''^Tupper, p. 93.
^^^Pannenberg, Revelation as History, p. 149.
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Thesis Six: In the formulation of the non- Jewish conceptions
of revelation in the gentile Christian Church, the universality
of the eschatological self-vindicatiori- of God in the fate of
Jesus comes to actual expression.
Because of the inextricable connection of the Christ event and
Israelite history, a problem emerges for the proclamation of the gospel to
the non-Jewish community. They do not bring to the gospel the Old
Testament or the apocalyptic expectation. The resurrection of an
individual did not connote apocalyptic feeling to many non-Jews. In
fact, the idea of resurrection from the dead was common in Hellenistic
215
times. Gods dying and rising again can be found in ancient near
eastern mythology. Only the Jew connected the resurrection of the
dead with eschatology.
"The primitive Christian mission among the Gentiles made expec
tation of the end and the resurrection of the dead part of its mission
PI c
kergyma (I Thes. 1:9f; Heb. 6:2)." The importance of not separ
ating the Christ event from its Hebrew roots was ever present in the
apostle's mind. Yet the task was set before the early Church to pro
claim the kerygma to a Hellenized world. Pannenberg observes that
gnostic thought played a role in translating the gospel into Greek
categories. "It was the means by which the eschatological synificance
217
of the Christ event could be expressed." He further notes that
gnosticisim's function was to convey the gospel where apocalyptic pre-
21 8
suppositions could not longer be understood. This created a tension
in the theological community of the early Church. Though gnosticism
abetted the proclamation of the kerygma, there existed significant dangers.
214 215 Ibid.
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Pannenberg observes three key differences between gnosticism and
the Hebrew kergyma. First, for the gnostic, revelation occurs directly,
i.e., through direct communication. This was done via a heavenly
pneuma through a revealer. As already discussed, God reveals himself
indirectly through acts in history. Secondly, for the gnostic, revelation
by-passes the mind and deals directly with the spirit. Again as has
been discussed, God's revelation is for aU to see. Ancient Hebrew
anthropology made no distinction between mind and spirit. Thirdly,
"the gnostic understanding of revelation involves the appearance of the
21 9
divine in the human." Pannenberg notes gnosticism's heavy influ
ence upon incarnational theology. The incarnation itself is, of course,
valid. Gnosticism, however, pays little mind to the cross or resurrection
of Christ and Pannenberg contends the resurrection to be the heart of
220
God's revelation in Christ. While gnosticism served to make the God
who raised Christ intelligible as God to the Gentiles, the points of differ
ence just mentioned were a concern for the early church.
Thesis Seven: The Word relate|2-jtself to revelation as fore
telling, forthtelling and report.
Pannenberg wishes to point out that the revelatory "word" is not
to be confused with the gnostic concept of a word of direct revelation.
Biblically, history is not composed of brute facts. The history of
revelation is far more. It is understanding, hope, and remembrance.
,222
"The development of understanding is itself an event in history.' A
history of the transmission of history is history- The point is, revela
tion is complex and requires critical faculties to understand the
219,bid. 220,^^,^^ p ^52. 221,
222|bid., p. 153.
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nuances. Pannenberg in no way allows for revelation to be totally
independent of history and the historical context.
Pannenberg attempts to define the meaning of the "Word of God."^^
He makes three points concerning its meaning. First is, "the
224Word of God as promise." Israel knew of the deity of Yahweh be
cause his acts in history served as fulfillment of his promise. The
prophetic word was the vehicle of proclamation but was not itself the
revelation. The acts of history served as the revelation. The second
point is "the Word of God as forthtelling." The law of Yahweh falls
into this category. Pannenberg points out that the law followed the
divine self-vindication of Yahweh, e.g., the giving of the law after the
exodus. It was God's acts which established the validity of the law.
The third point is "the Word of God as Kerygma." The first two
uses of the Word of God are deeply rooted in the Old Testament. This
last use is new with the New Testament. The kerygma comes from the
eschatological revelation of God. It is the reporting of the Christ event
which is unique in history. This report goes beyond a mere objective
and detached chronological description of the Christ event. It is rather
227
a proclamation. One must be careful not to bifurcate the historical
event and the kerygma. One cannot be totally independent of the
other. The locus of revelation is the event not the kerygma.
These seven theses offer an outline of Pannenberg's understanding
of revelation as history. With these he attempts to ground revelation in
God's acts of history. With these points in mind, Pannenberg's histori
cal method must be examined.
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It is one thing to talk of God revealing himself in history yet how
does one come to a knowledge of such events? As has been previously
stated one cannot make a decision based totally upon personal experi
ence. Logically there must be some objective basis for believing.
Pannenberg states: "Immediate religious experience cannot by itself
228
alone establish the certainty of the trust of its content." Indeed, if
God has revealed himself in history, these revelatory acts must be
229
subject to historical inquiry.
Admittedly, an anthropocentric element inheres in the structure of
historical method. Yet, Pannenberg contends that this does not neces-
230
sarily limit historical inquiry to an anthropocentric world view. To
justify this stance Pannenberg examines the basic component of the
historical method, namely the presupposition of universal correlation and
231
the application of analogy.
Universal correlation of all historical phenomena posits that every
historical occurrence is reciprocally connected with the circumstances in
its environment and cannot be segregated from other events related to
its happening. Thus, for Pannenberg there can be no separate salvation
history, only universal history. As pointed out earlier, all divine acts
in history can only be fully understood when seen in the context of the
rest of history. Pannenberg contends that Barth's "primal history" is
not acceptable on theological grounds. Pannenberg states that
228
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^^^Tupper, p. 111.
^^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. I, pp. 45-50.
^^''ibid., p. 41.
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God's redemptive deed took place within the universal corre
lative connections of human history and not in a ghetto of
redemptive history, or in a primal history belonging to^pdimension which is 'oblique' to ordinary history . . . .
Universal correlation accepts the causal relation between historical
phenomena. It must be pointed out however that the contingency of
historical events and the openness of history to the future precludes
any attempt to understand history in an essentially evolutionary fashion.
The tension between the historical method and a theological conception
of history is due not to the universal correlation itself but to the
223
misuse of the causal principle.
The principle of analogy, or more precisely the application of analogy
by modern historiography, is the decisive problem for the relation of
234
historical method to theology. In historical research, analogy means
that phenomena is difficult to understand "should be conceived and evalu-
235
ated in terms of the investigator's experience and observation." The
method of analogy proceeds from the known to the unknown. It repre
sents the "power of disclosure through the illumination of 'what is
?3fi
obscure' by referring it to 'what is plain.'" Even though the employ
ment of the principle of analogy is anthropocentric, Pannenberg maintains
that anthropocentric methodology does not necessitate an anthropo-
237
centric world view.
The misuse of the principle of analogy can preclude revelatory
events which are unique in history. Pannenberg notes that an un
necessary constriction of historical inquiry through anthropocentrism
232Tupper, p. 112. ^^^\b\d. ^^'^\b\d.
^�^^Ibid. ^^^Cobb and Robinson, pp. 264-5.
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does occur when, instead of specifying concrete analogies in light of a
specific case, the historian "appealing to the omnipotence of analogy -
postulates the fundamental homogeneity of all reality which makes man's
238
usual experience the norm for understanding history." Pannenberg
maintains this approach is restricting to historical research and distorts
any openness history has to the future. When employed properly,
analogy is a powerful tool to point beyond the normal experiences of
phenomena to the unknown. Absolutizing a general analogy to apply to
all of reality is the point at which it becomes restricting. Analogy
allows one to look beyond the known. Pannenberg observes:
The most fruitful possibility opened up by the discovery
of historical analogies consists in the fact that it allows more
precise comprehension of the ever-present concrete limitation
of what is held in common, the particularity that is present in
every case in the phenomena being compared. A genuine
extension of knowledge takes place in this way. The funda
mental anthropological disposition of being able to transcend
any given content, the power of concrete negation, is ex
pressed in ^'^ity to evaluate discovered analogies right up to
their limits.
It is important to note that in historical research one does not
begin with a detached gathering of fact. Rather, one starts out with a
vague formulation or theory concerning a series of events. Then by
weighing the evidence one adjusts one's theory or model. Pannenberg
states:
All reported details, which are always to be understood
as expressions of the view of the reporter, obtain historical
significance only through relationship with the conception
of
the course of history which the historian brings with him.
Depending on the findings concerning the particulars, this
conception will be confirmed, modified, or else al^doned as
inadequate in order to make room for a new one.
^^^Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, Vol, I, pp. 47.
239|bid. 240-^upper, p. 114.
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The two basic component's to Pannenberg historical method are "an
imaginatively projected theory of the whole of history and concrete
eschews historical positivism in light of the priority of historical imagi
nation. Though this emphasis on historical imagination permits the
element of subjectivism to enter historiography, Pannenberg maintains
its validity. The historian still answers to the facts. He notes:
To the extent that the projection of a historical course
of events is verifiable by its agreement with the available
findings on the particulars, it is obviously no mere individu
ally conditioned perspective in the consciousness of the
historian butpgather a recounting of the event itself in its
own context.
Clearly, Pannenberg insists, against Barth, that theology is in no
position to say what actually happened in the past. That is the task of
the historian. Theology is drawn from history. Never is the reverse
true. Faith, though based upon historical knowledge, is future oriented
(Heb. 11:1).
The focus of Pannenberg's attention concerning revelation is upon
his christology. The question may be raised, "What does christol
ogy have to do with the historical Jesus or the apostolic Kerygma?"
Martin Kahier and Albrecht RitschI take their starting point of theology
in the proclamation of Christ, or the apostolic kerygma. One can only
know the true Jesus Christ in a complete sense by examining the con-
243
tent of his community's proclamation about him They were responding
historical investigation in terms of the theory. II
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to the movement to bifurcate the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history.
The goal of this movement was to search out the true historical
Jesus apart from any kerygma. Pannenberg agrees with Kahler's ob
jection when as he argues against setting the figure and message of
Jesus in opposition to the apostolic preaching in such a way that the
two would be disjoint. But the rejection of this antithesis does not
mean that the essence of Jesus Christ is to be found only in the apos-
244
tolic preaching or in the truly historic Jesus.
Pannenberg asserts that, from a truly historical perspective, there
must be a continuity between the historical Jesus and the preached
Christ. One must inquire, as an historian, how the facticity of
the life of Jesus gave rise to the apostolic kerygma of the early church.
Any assertion of an antithesis between the Christ of faith and the
245
historical Jesus is completely unsatisfactory to the true historian. It
is necessary for the theologian to go behind the Apostolic kerygma to
the historical Jesus and establish how one relates to the other. Even
this approach leaves many directions in which one could take christology.
Some theologians, like Wilhelm Herrmann, embrace the continuity
between the apostolic kerygma and the Jesus of history but emphasize
the precariousness of faith based on historical investigation. The
foundation of faith must be something consistent. Herrmann contends
that the results of historical research are constantly changing. Faith
should be something accessible to both learned and unlearned alike. It
. , . �
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should not be based on scholarly investigation.
244,bid. ^"^^Ib-^d., p. 24. 246,^i^_^ 25.
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Herrmann's approach is inadequate for Pannenberg. One must go
beyond the preached Christ and come to terms with the historical Jesus.
It is this historical Jesus that gives the New Testament unity. Treating
the scripture as an historical text is the only way continuity is preserved.
This is so because Jesus of Nazareth is the central figure of the New
247
Testament.
Schleiermacher instituted a new emphasis by making contemporary
Christian experience central to theology and using it as the departure
point. This theory is pervasive in liberal and existential circles
today. One consequence of this theological orientation is exclusive
subjectivism. It involves the risk of having a faith that has no histori
cal basis. Bultmann speaks in terms of an encounter with the proclaimed
Christ in the kerygma. The emphasis is not upon who Jesus was, but
rather, upon who Jesus is as he encounters us.
Ebeling counters this position by arguing that if the person to
whom the kerygma refers is in no way definable or historically verifiable,
248
then the kerygma is nothing but pure myth. Pannenberg concurs
with Ebeling at this point. To Pannenberg, "the basis of our faith
249
. . . lies completely in what happened in the past."
Walter Kunneth speaks of a contemporary experience with the
Christ of faith which vindicates the veracity of the historicity of Jesus
Christ. The question must be raised: "On what basis does one assert
faith?" Can one believe simply because he experiences the risen Lord in
a contemporary experience? Pannenberg asserts that no one can be
certain of any such subjective experience. There is no criteria for one
to judge whether he is self-deluded or not. He clearly contends, in
^^^\b\d., p. 27. 248,bid. Ibid., p. 28.
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opposition to Althaus, tliat faith has everything to do with what Jesus
was. Pannenberg's christology is concerned not only with the Christian
community's confession of Christ, but, above and beyond that, he is
concerned with the grounding of faith in the activity and fate of Jesus
point from an experience, a creed, or proclamation of faith. It must
start with history. Christology must go behind the apostolic kerygma
and explore the historical facts that gave rise to the kerygma of faith.
For Pannenberg there can be no separation of the revelation of
God through Christ, i.e., the apostolic kerygma and the historical
Jesus. History is not an appendage to faith. He does not allow for
any division at this point. In fact, Pannenberg feels very strongly
that faith must inhere in history. The two are inseparable. He states:
"Only when its revelatory character is not something additional to the
events but rather, is inherent in them can the events form the basis of
faith. "2^^ Faith grounded in event is meaningless and arbitrary when
event is disjointed from history.
Pannenberg's objective in christology is to establish the true
understanding of Jesus' significance in history. He is not attempting to
isolate the historical Jesus apart from the Christ of faith. Starting
from history he works towards building a bridge to the apostolic kerygma.
His task, therefore, is not purely historical. In a word, it is in Jesus
of Nazareth that God is revealed, and the thrust of Pannenberg's
christology is to articulate the dynamics of this fact.
Christ as historical figure.
250
Christology cannot take its starting
250
Ibid., p. 30.
251
Tupper, p. 129.
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The essence of Pannenberg's christology is that when one deals
with Jesus Christ one is dealing with God. Provisional knowledge of
God does exist apart from Jesus, but Christians confess Jesus Christ to
252be the final revelation of God. As already seen there are two start
ing points in christology, Jesus of history and the Christ of the kerygma
Pannenberg starts with the Jesus of history. This is not to say that
he neglects the Christian community's confessions of Christ, but clearly
his emphasis is grounding these confessions in the activity and fate of
253
Jesus in the past. Pannenberg identifies these two christologicai
methodologies as "Christology from above" and "Christology from below."
Christology from above denotes starting from the divinity of Jesus to
which the incarnation is central. Christology from below is concerned
primarily with Jesus' message and fate. It arrives at the incarnation
and divinity of Jesus as the final result of an historical investigation.
It starts from the historical man Jesus and works its way to the recog-
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nition of his divinity.
The christologicai procedure "from above to below" is followed by
Karl Barth. He speaks about a history of the incarnation. "The Son
of God goes into what is foreign, into humiliation, by becoming a man,
256
uniting himself with the man Jesus" (CD, IV/1, #59). He has com
bined two doctrines which were distinguished in seventeenth century
orthodox Protestant dogmatics.
First was the doctrine of Jesus as man and God, the doctrine of
two natures. Second was the doctrine of the humiliation and exaltation
2^2|bid., p. 131.
^^^Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 33.
254|bid. 2^^lbid. ^^^\b\d., p. 34.
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of the incarnate Son of God as two consecutive stages along Jesus'
path. Pannenberg points out that Barth comes closer to the basic
outline of the gnostic redeemer myth than is necessarily characteristic
of an incarnational christology that is constructed "from above to below."
There is a cyclic pattern established in this, a descent of the redeemer
from heaven and his return there. This serves as Barth's basic con-
257
cept of christology. Pannenberg observes that the difference in
Barth, as in all of the church's christology, is that the redeemer re-
pcp
deems not himself but man as a being essentially different from God."
It is characteristic of any attempt to build a christology from
above that the doctrine of the Trinity is presupposed. The question at
hand is: How is Jesus Christ human? What does it mean to say Jesus
was divine and yet human? For Barth there can be no logical reason to
confess Jesus as divine. One must confess the divinity of Jesus be
cause Jesus is divine. In a word, theologians who embrace a christology
from above are mute at the point of giving justification to the doctrine
of the divinity of Christ. This is perceived by Pannenberg as being a
259
weakness in this methodology.
Pannenberg espies three objections to christology from above.
Firstly, as has been stated previously, he finds objectionable presup
posing the divinity of Jesus. For Pannenberg, the primary task of
christology is to present the reasons for the confessions of Jesus'
divinity. Christology must provide an answer to the question: How
260
has Jesus' appearance in history led to the recognition of his divinity?
257|bid. 258,,.^ 259,^i,
26�|bid., p. 35.
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Secondly, christology that takes the divinity of Jesus as its starting
point faces the problem of establishing the historical uniqueness of the
man Jesus. Furthermore, the importance of Jesus' relation to the
Judaism of his time is undermined. Yet, one's understanding of Jesus
as a historical figure is essentially concatenated with his Jewish heritage.
The office of priesthood which Christ held and the meaning of sacrifice
become inane upon the separation of Jesus and Judaism. His historical
singularity is compromised. Any person could have been enjoined with
the divine. Pannenberg states that "no determinative significance can
accrue to the historical particularity of Jesus." Even the significances
of his death is called into question. Why must a person who is engaged
by God subordinate himself to human death? These issues are difficult
to handle when Jesus and Judaism are disjoint as is the case of christol
ogy from above. Pannenberg asserts there must be a necessary connection
between Jesus Christ and his personal history and culture. Christology
262
from above vitiates the link between the two.
The third objection to christology from above is methodology. The
method of christology
from above is closed to us. One would have to stand in the
position of God in order to fully understand the path of
Christ from divine to the human. All of history is viewed
from the human situation. One can never transcend this
limitation and view the incarnation from God's perspective.
One must start from hu^^n history in dealing with the incar
nation of Jesus Christ.
Pannenberg's christologicai method is squarely based upon the
historicity of Jesus of Nazareth. If one is to call Jesus divine, he must
posit historical evidence to do so. The issue at hand is Christ's claim
264
to deity, his unity with God.
261, bid. 262,,j^_ 263�j^_^ p_ 36_ 264,^,^^
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An important emphasis surfaces at this point in Pannenberg's
christologicai methodology, the unity of word and event. An event is a
happening, a historical fact. The fact that Jesus Christ healed the
sick or fed five thousand persons with two fish and five loaves of
bread are just brute facts -- they are events. Events in history are
meaningless and static without interpretation of some sort. With most
history one is left to supply an interpretation of a particular fact. The
event of the resurrection is unique in that the interpretation is given
to us by Jesus himself. He gives us "the Word." The word interprets
the event and, thereby, gives it life and makes it significant to us.
As a consequence of Jesus giving the word, there is a safeguard against
arbitrariness in interpreting the event of the resurrection.
The Word for Pannenberg is not just the mere words of Jesus but
is representative of the whole dynamic of Jesus' unity with God.
Statements about Jesus taken independently from his relationship with
pec
God could only result in a crass distortion of his historical reality.
The treatment of Christ must encompass the totality of Jesus' life.
There must be a unity between what Jesus said concerning his deity
and the events in his life. The words gives life and specificity to the
event. The event serves as an historical foundation for the word. It
gives the word concreteness and makes the word accessible by reason
in an objective fashion. There is a necessary reciprocity between word
and event.
If Pannenberg's christology begins with history, what is the sub
stance of his claim that Jesus' divinity can be substantiated by an
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, trans. John Maxwell
(Philadelphia: Westminister, 1977), p. 59.
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historical method? Pannenberg's demonstration of the historicity of
Jesus' resurrection is central to his christology. The pivotal point on
which the entire life of Jesus and its significance to us rests is the
resurrection .
The resurrection is the key to understanding the life of Christ.
Without the resurrection the events of Jesus' life would be incoherent
and unintelligible. Certainly the disciples did not understand the full
meaning of the teachings of Christ prior to Christ's resurrection. One
must remember that the Gospels are not a mere account ipso facto of
the activities of Jesus. They are the articulation of the life of Christ
as seen through the resurrection. A rough analogy would be someone
reading a complicated book with little understanding, then towards the
end of the text something is stated which suddenly gives meaning to
what has been read up to that point. The resurrection is the sole
starting point for Pannenberg in dealing with Jesus. Jesus is not God
because he healed the sick, forgave sin, walked on water, or died on a
cross. Jesus is God because he was resurrected from the dead.
Pannenberg states: "From the end, which is the resurrection, he is
266
revealed as the God of the beginning."
There is an important principle in Pannenberg's historical metho
dology that warrants citing. History is a science and, like science,
history is descriptive of reality. History and science have no way to
define anything. They, at best, can only give an account of what
is.
This is not to say that history and science are purely descriptive. It
is the task of these disciplines to describe and give interpretive accounts
of the relatedness of fact. In a word, a value judgment is made with any
Torrance, p. 10.
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factual account. There is a value judgment at work in the sense of
applying its meaningfulness to us.
The foundational element in Pannenberg's historical methodology is
"openness" to all possibilities in history. Thomas Torrance develops
this idea in his book Theological Science. Torrance systematically
delineates a method of investigation in the sciences which include
history.
Torrance sets forth a method of science that emphasizes an open
ness one must have to asking questions about the reality being investigated.
What is known must be dictated by the object one investigates. One
must be open to what reality has to say upon questioning it. Torrance
states: "We must operate with an open epistemology in which we allow
the way of knowing to be clarified and modified pari passu with advance
267
in deeper and fuller knowledge of the object."
Torrance adduces quantum physics as a contemporary example of
268
his point. Quantum physics operates with a system of physical laws
unknown to the twentieth century scientific community prior to its discovery.
The source of the new laws of quantum physics, which contradict Newtonian
physical laws, is quantum physics itself. The object brought under
investigation must be the governing element of our conclusions. One
cannot freely impose one's prior theory of the nature of the object's
existence with a closed mind. Torrance states:
"^�^^Torrance, p. 10.
26^See index of Thomas Torrance's Theological Science (Oxford:
Oxford University, 1969). Under "Quantum Physics."
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All scientific knowledge has a systematic interest for it must
attempt to order the material content of its knowledge as far
as possible into a coherent whole. It would be unscientific,
however, to systematize knowledge in any field according to
an alien principle, for the nature of the truth involved must
be allowed to prescribe how knowledge of it shall be ordered.
In other words, the systematic interest must be the servant
of objective knowledge and never allowed to become its master.
All of one's knowledge comes from one's dealings with reality. It
cannot be supposed that one has actualized and discovered all of reality.
Again, quantum physics serves as an example. The question arises:
What else is there that remains undiscovered? Of course the question
cannot be answered, but it reminds one that one must be open to new
realities as one interacts with reality.
Since history is a science, the same principles of epistemology are
at work. There is an important distinction which must be made between
history and science. A basis for the scientific method is reproducibility
of the phenomenon under inquiry with a controlled environment. Ob
viously, history does not lend itself to reproducibility. Yet, historical
epistemology must have in its nature the same spirit of openness
about the possibility of a particular thing happening. This is exactly
what Bultmann's epistemology lacks. Bultmann presupposes a set of
universal laws that for him governs what is possible and not possible in
history. Therefore, the veracity of an historical event is determined
first by its consistancy with known physical laws and second by an
historical method. With this mind set Bultmann can approach the resur
rection account stating "any school boy knows that dead men don't
rise." He further states: "It is impossible to use electric light and
the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical
Torrance, p. 138.
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discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world
270of spirits and miracles."
Bultmann operates with a closed view of science and physical laws
which governs his historical method. In Torrancian terminology, Bult-
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mann operates with a set of "closed concepts," that is, a set of rigid
rules that are inflexible. The basis for these rules of physical law
which Bultmann embraces are derived from reality. Torrance has
pointed out that we must be open to reality, ready to receive what it
has to offer us. Bultmann, in a sense, is stating that he has the last
word on what is possible and what is not in terms of reality, i. e.,
physical laws. This implies, operating on Torrance's method of epis
temology, that Bultmann knows all there is to know about physical laws
of the universe in order to posit his statement about the resurrection
from the dead.
Torrance's approach of openness to reality is not limited to cor
poral reality. It is a principle which applies to the whole of reality,
metaphysical as well as physical. Butlmann's closed concept of reality
precludes the possibility of metaphysical or supernatural explanations of
the resurrection of Jesus Christ. In order for one to dogmatically
conclude the nonexistence of the metaphysical or the supernatural and
conclude that he/she has the last word on what is possible in terms of
physical laws, one has to assume one has complete knowledge of the
whole of reality- Bultmann makes the assumption.
Pannenberg's historical methodology is in concurrence with Torrance's
thought on epistemology. For Pannenberg, one must be open to the
reality under investigation. The governing principle of the possibility
Bultmann, p. 5.
Torrance, p. 15.
165
of a particular event occurring is primarily determined by an historical
method. Whether or not Christ was resurrected from the dead is an
historical problem, not a scientific problem. Therefore, the fundamental
difference between Bultmann and Pannenberg is one of presuppositions.
Pannenberg is open to all possibilities which are governed by an histori
cal method. Regardless of how congent Pannenberg's historical arguments
are, they would have no effect on Bultmann's position because Bultmann's
objection to a physical resurrection is not historical but scientific.
Pannenberg's entire christology is built upon the historicity of the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. His faith is totally contingent upon the
facticity of the resurrected Lord. It is absurd, in Pannenberg's thought
to state: "I believe Jesus Christ was raised from the dead by faith."
He believes the resurrection, not because of faith, but rather, because
it is historically verifiable. Certainly none of the apostles believed in
the resurrection by means of faith. They believed because it was an
event that was historically verifiable by the existance of an empty tomb
and post-resurrection appearances.
Pannenberg is not willing to talk of any revelation apart from an
historical reference. He will not talk in terms of God directly revealing
himself to an individual. Any revelation must be in terms of an histori
cal event in some way.
Historical reference is for Pannenberg the authenticating element in
any Christian experience. This is not to say that he mitigates a pres
ent experience with the risen Lord. Pannenberg clearly states: "[the
historical] basis of our faith must stand the test of our present exper
ience of reality. "^'^^ jhere exists, for Pannenberg, an inseparable
Pannenberg, Jesus-God and Man, p. 27-
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bond between any experience of God and iiistory. He states furtlner:
"Our present experience of reality . . . itself lies completely in what
273
happened in the past."
Pannenberg is, on occasion, misinterpreted because of his great
emphasis on history as revelation. Grobel levels the accusation:
"Pannenberg directs attention away from the question of God's immediate
274
dealings with individuals." Pannenberg answers the accusation by
stating: "Far be it from me to contest the immediacy of contingent
divine activity in individuals. Where this activity becomes the content
of consciousness, certainly, an immediate, individual experience of God
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occurs." But when such an event happens to an individual it must
have a reference to history. Any isolated event that an individual has
with God must be categorized as something other than revelation.
Pannenberg asserts that "even when such a direct self-manifestations
appears in the form of prophetic inspiration, I cannot attribute to it an
276
autonomous status as revelation." One who has such an experience
must confront the question of whether or not he really experienced God
or whether the word "God" might not here be merely a conventional
cipher or one reproduced by personal necessity which should more
correctly be described in psychological terms as opposed to theologi
cal.
^'''^
The overlying emphasis of revelation for Pannenberg is through
the whole of history. "If one is at all justified in speaking of God as
the power over everything, it is only in view of the whole of reality,
278
and not of certain special experiences [disjoint from history]."
^'^^Ibid. 274^^1^,^ Robinson, p. 209.
2^^lbid., p. 238. ^'^^\b]d. 277, ^j^^ p 239.
278,bid.
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Clearly, for Pannenberg history is the foundation for faith. It may
appear to some that he has reduced faith to mere historical investiga
tion. Faith does, in fact, play a significant role in Pannenberg's
christology. As stated earlier, one does not accept the resurrection by
faith but by historical method. One does accept the eschatological
significance of the resurrection by faith. Faith is not based upon
faith. The antecedent of faith is history. Faith must have an object,
which is the historical verifiable resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.
Pannenberg makes it clear that historical investigation is not a
prerequisite for salvation.
[Historical] knowledge is thus not a condition for partici
pating in salvation, but rather it assures faith about its
basis. It thereby enables faith to resist the gnawing doubt
that it has no basis beyond itself and that it merely satisfies
a subjective need through fictions, and thus is ^y accom
plishing self-redepmtion through self-deception.
With the amount of emphasis Pannenberg places upon history, the
question of historical certainty arises. The questions arise out of
Pannenberg's own epistemology. He states: "The conclusions of such
historical research are never completely incontestable. They are always
more or less probable and can be changed by new discoveries and new
280
approaches to the problem." The implication is that there can be no
one hundred percent historical certainty of Jesus' resurrection. Does
this not leave open the accusation that one's faith is based upon
something problematic? The answer is a qualified "no". Pannenberg
states: "Historically assured certainty is the greatest certainty we can
281
ever have of past events." If one calls in the question the histori
city of the resurrection because of a lack of one hundred percent
^'^Ibid., p. 269.
28T|bid.
Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, p. 71.
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certainty tlien one must also call into question the historicity of any
historical event. For Pannenberg, the evidence overwhelmingly affirms
the facticity of the resurrection.
The question may be asked: Why root faith in something one can
know only with an historical probability? Why not choose a more adequate
basis? Faith must have an antecedent lest it be arbitrary. Therefore,
as stated before, faith cannot be based on faith. Experience will not
serve as a basis, because of its subjectivity and arbitrariness. History
is the only foundation for faith.
In dealing with the question of faith being based upon historical
probability, Pannenberg draws a logical distinction
between historical certainty and certainty of faith. He states: "These
two lie on different levels, and therefore there is no essential contra
diction in basing a sure trust on an event which we can know historically
282
only with probability." All history can only be known in terms of
probability.
But certainty of faith, on the other hand, depends on the
peculiarity of a particular historical event, namely, the history
of Jesus .... The certainty of faith consists in the complete
ness of trust which in turn is g^i^nded in the eschatological
meaning of the history of Jesus.
There is no way to prove historically the eschatological significance of
the resurrection. Because it is historically verifiable and because it
is a unique event in history, what Jesus claimed to be must elicit our
full and sober attention.
It is only in this precarious and provisional way that knowledge is
possible of the full significance of the life of Jesus Christ. Knowledge
Cobb and Robinson, p. 273. 283,.
..
Ibid .
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of the historical Christ and certainty of faith find themselves in this
shadow of the mystery of the incarnation. "Both the variability of our
historical knowledge of the history of Jesus as wel as the inexpres-
284
sibility of its meaning" makes one aware of the limits of knowledge and
language. The fact arises out of an incompleted history with as open
future which is God. Pannenberg fully recognizes and wishes to maintain
the mysteriousness of the infinite becoming finite. If there were no
mystery involved in an historical understanding of the Christ event,
then what one would be dealing with would be something less than the
infinite. In essence, for Pannenberg, one will never fully understand
the inner dynamics of the incarnation.
Ibid., p. 275.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pannenberg strives to establish a theological method which is
compatible with what he thinks is the essential component of Christianity,
i.e., the historical nature of divine revelation. The epistemology of
Kantian deism removed God altogether from the realm of religious knowl
edge. His approach to philosophical theology did not allow the possibility
of any divine revelation in history. God's being is totally removed from
the phenomenal world and is inaccessible to human inquiry. Kierke
gaard followed a similar path in that he denied the possibility of knowing
God from the standpoint of rational inquiry. Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard
did believe one could know God through the leap of faith. That is, one
is enabled to know God because He creates the condition for faith in
the existential moment. Kierkegaard unlike Kant, believed this moment
of faith guaranteed subjectively that the historical events upon which
Christianity are based are also trustworthy.
This approach divorces theology and philosophy as they were
viewed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consequently,
Christianity was removed from the possibility of philosophical inves
tigation .
Both Kant and Kierkegaard were attempting to answer the philos
ophy of their time and were striving to protect the aspects of religion
they felt were important. A major point of weakness in Kant and
Kierkegaard is that neither man integrated biblical thought into their
philosophies. Kant rejected biblical authority altogether. Kierkegaard,
while embracing biblical authority, failed to perceive the bearing of the
historical nature of revelation in the Old Testament upon the New
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Testament concept of revelation. As a result Kierkegaard's over
emphasis on subjectivity, the rational and objective aspect of His truth
was minimized. That is, the volitional aspect of truth was elevated at
the expense of the intellectual aspect.
Hegel's wholistic approach to reality allows him to integrate all
aspects of knowledge in formulating theology. He does not separate
theology from other disciplines. Philosophy, history and science all
have a part in theology. Pannenberg follows the same approach. He
makes theology accountable, in some measure, to all disciplines. Pannen
berg constructs theology based upon careful study of the whole of
Scripture as well as the sciences and history in general. He examines
the historical nature of revelation in the Old Testament and articulates
a concept of New Testament revelation in light of this.
Unlike Hegel, Pannenberg demonstrates an appreciation of the
open-ended nature of historical reality. Total understanding of God's
revelation in Jesus Christ will come only at the end of history. Pannen
berg rejects the idea that theology is completely amenable to reason.
Yet he does not allow for any absolute separation of faith and reason.
Faith is not reason; but faith must be reasonable. There exists a
tension between faith and reason in Pannenberg's thought. Moving to
either extreme would eliminate the tension. Pannenberg refuses to do
so because Scripture does not. Biblical revelation by its own admission
will not be fully comprehended until the eschaton (I Cor. 13:12).
Pannenberg offers a significant alternative to current neo-orthodox
theology. By his own methodology with its emphasis upon historical
revelation, he secures the resurrection of Jesus Christ as a real histori
cal, objective event, as the focus of God's revelation to humanity.
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